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ISSN 1933-5350
The Commons Digest
formerly known as The Common Property Resource Digest
NO. 6 QUARTERLY PUBLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF THE COMMONS Summer 2008
Welcome to the Summer 2008 edition of the Commons Digest. This issue is organized with the 2008 IASC biennial
meetings in Cheltenham, England in mind, and highlights one of the conference themes: Collective Action and Common
Property Theory. David Bray opens the Commons Forum with an inspiring essay showing how traditional commons
management can evolve to exploit market opportunities in the world economy. Kathrine Hilario, bringing in her per-
spective from work in Honda Bay, the Philippines, highlights the importance of community organizing for collective
action. The next response comes from Naya Sharma Paudel. In her essay, Naya provides a contrasting case of
collective action and forestry to David's and ponders why successful forestry entreprise can be seen in one area and not
another. Next, Kusum Athukorala brings her perpective as a practitioner to advocate for commons research which
actually benefits the people and communities we study. Ahswini Chhatre closes the forum with a call for looking at not
only the evolving and changing nature of institutions, but also reminds us that institutions are more than simply cause and
effect; institutions thesmselves co-evolve with the outcomes we are interested in mapping.
This is the last Digest issue before the IASC biennial meetings begin in Cheltenham, England the 14-18 July. The
programme is packed full of exciting panels, policy seminars and field trips; hope to see you there! Enjoy!
CONTENTS Commons Forum
COMMONS FORUM: Collective Commentary
Action, Communities, and Collective Action, Common Property Forests, Com-
Common Property Theory munities, and Markets
David Barton Bray
Collective Action, Common Property
Department of Environmental Studies, Florida International
Forests, Communities, and Markets
David Barton Bray................................................. 1 University, Miami, FL USA
Revolutionizing Community-based
Approach: Collective Action in CBCRM Collective action theory seeks to understand how groups of individuals
Kathrine I. Hilario................................................... 4 are able to cooperate to overcome social dilemmas, assuming that being
a self-interested, short-term maximizer is the default position. The
Challenges for Collective Action in behavioral approach to collective action begins with an evolutionary
Community Forestry Enterprises argument: human beings have evolved the capacity to learn cooperation
Naya Sharma Paudel................................................ 6 norms and social regulations which have enhanced the success of groups.
In this view, individual rational action is just one of a suite or a continuum
The Study of Commons- for Whose of behaviors from the very individual to the very social which human
Benefit? beings exhibit and which can be adaptive in different circumstances. It
Kusum Athukorala.................................................... 8 further suggests that the default position may be cooperation, which can
then be withdrawn if there is no reciprocity. Whether cooperation or
Communities, Institutions, and Institu- individual actions dominate depends heavily on the social context.
tional Trajectories However, the need to build a universal theory of human collective action
Ashwini Chhatre .................................................... 10 has lead to a continued emphasis on individual self-interest as the starting
point of analysis even among theorists focused on the role of social
Recent Publications .......................... 11 norms. A major missing component even in behavioral collective action
Announcements ................................... 15 theory focused on common property dilemmas is "community" as a
The Commons Digest
bearer of norms, as rich institutional environments. An
The Commons Digest exception is Singleton and Taylor, who have argued that
Formerly The Common Property Resource Digest communities, which they define as "communities of
mutually vulnerable actors", dramatically lower the
Published with support from transaction costs of collective action. In addition to
the Ford Foundation reducing transaction costs, some communities show a
remarkable and consistent capacity to control the "ratio-
Editor nal egoists" among them and enforce a strict norm of
Alyne E. Delaney community service. In the reach for the most general
principles, the term communities is seldom used analyti-
cally as the agent of collective action in formal studies,
the starting point of analysis is always "groups" as in
"groups of self-organized principals" or "forest user
groups", not communities as such.
Yet, particularly in communities in rural areas of the less-
developed countries, the favorite field subject of students
of common property, community is the overwhelming
social reality and source of norms that defines what
International Association for the constitutes cooperative behavior. Community is by far
the most important arena where mutual commitment and
Study of the Commons trust are developed, norms are created and enforced,
formerly the International Association for the Study of and where group identity is formed. In laboratory
Common Property studies based on experimental games, researchers have
Current Officers found that in the study populations (mostly university
students) fall into behavioral categories that Ostrom calls
President: Owen Lynch "conditional cooperators" and "willing punishers" , i.e.
President Elect: Ruth Meinzen-Dick "norm-using players" who under the "sparse institutional
Immediate Past President: Narpat S. Jodha environment" of the laboratory can assert cooperation
norms that can convince "rational egoists" towards
Council greater cooperation. Growing up and living in a relatively
Doris Capistrano Frank Matose isolated rural community with millennial traditions is to
Leticia Merino Calvin Nhira play a game with extremely well-defined and time-tested
Dianne Rocheleau Doug Wilson
rules. A strong culture of cooperation and reciprocity in
traditional communities emerges, not as an inevitable
Executive Director Michelle Curtain
tendency, but because they are also well aware of the
Commons Digest Editor Alyne Delaney
Information Officer Charlotte Hess problem of the "rational egoists" in their midst. In
Mexican rural communities, where I carry out research
Conference Coordinators and action projects with colleagues, norms of community
solidarity, consensus, and harmony are emphasized
2008 Biennial Meetings because communities have also seen and experienced
University of Gloucestershire, England what happens when these norms are not sufficient to
John Powell Chris Short
control powerful individuals. In the Mexican context,
these individuals are known as caciques who use their
networks of family and friends to advance their own
© 2000 IASCP interests above those of the community, with conse-
quences for the levels of tension, violence and dishar-
WWW.IASCP.ORG mony in a community.
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Summer 2008
But when the conditional cooperators in a community are In this sense, Mexico is an advanced historical case of
able to consistently place the conditions on social behav- the decentralization of natural resource management
ior, drawing on a reservoir of culture and rules from now occurring elsewhere in the world, having passed
varying historical periods, and when that community is from state-dominated community forestry to
given full legal access to a very valuable natural resource, community-dominated community forestry with all
remarkable things can begin to happen at the interface resource rights. They have achieved full operational
between collective action, community, forest common and collective-choice governance, and share
property, and markets. The case of Mexican indigenous constitutional choice with the environmental laws of
forest communities of the Sierra Norte of Oaxaca, which Mexico. This is, as Camille Antinori has termed it, the
reflects realities elsewhere in Mexico and where I am "community as entrepreneurial firm". The results of
currently conducting research with colleagues, provide a marrying traditional communities with strong
powerful example of the role of community in building and governance and social capital and valuable forest
enforcing social norms and how those norms can then be resource that cannot be optimally exploited by
channeled towards institutional innovations that can allow individuals are striking. A recent study showed that
communities to use forest resources compete in 2,300 communities in Mexico had had logging permits
competitive markets. It also shows that when traditional in the last ten years. A closer study of the ten most
communities are given full legal ownership of a large, important forest states with 1,730 community forestry
valuable, forest resource, the incentives for collective enterprises ( 75% of the total), showed that 163
action are so great that community collective action can communities (10 percent of the ten states) had achieved
not only manage common properties for subsistence levels of collective action and forest industrial
production, but can be a foundation for community forest integration that enabled them to establish and manage
enterprises that can compete in international markets. sawmills, no small feat of industrial administration.
Another 436 communities (around 25% of the total)
had acquired some level of extractive equipment, from
The forest communities of the Sierra Juarez, like many
skidders to logging trucks. Thus, nearly 600
others in Mexico and elsewhere, are not just groups of
communities were managing forest industries at varying
"self-organized principals", but individuals who have
levels of vertical integration, with the remainder selling
experimenting with how to get along with each for
timber on the stump, but normally under community
hundreds of years, under a variety of political forms that
control. Some of these communities are now defining
have sought to control them for their own purposes. The
their enterprise strategies to cope with the competition
institutions of community governance which have evolved
in furniture production from China. While whether they
in the Mexican case are based on a political syncretism of
will succeed is not clear, it shows that common
pre-conquest, colonial, and 20th century Mexican agrarian
property forms of governance cannot only rationally
laws. The Mexican Revolution (1911-1918) led to a
manage natural resources, but can also allow
process that lasted through most of the 20th century of
community enterprises to position themselves in globally
land and forest distribution and the definition of a legal
competitive markets.
community of rights holders to a territory that in that
process ended up turning over valuable forests to
communities within a strong legal framework. These These communities have had to learn how to adapt
forest communities then had to conduct historical struggles their existing community political institutions to create
against government concessions, allied with activists and enterprise governance institutions that organize
government reformers to gain effective control of their industrial production processes and compete in the
forests, since the legal framework still defined the market. Communities with smaller forests tended to
government as the ultimate owner. But constitutional place forest industries under the direct control of the
reforms in 1992 gave them full ownership, with forest elected community authorities. But larger operations,
extraction regulated by the environmental laws of Mexico, with millions of dollars in assets, have had to develop a
and with substantial autonomy in their internal institutional supply of new governance institutions that can mediate
arrangements for how they manage their natural between the democratic participation of the community
resources. General Assembly and the need for a more hierarchical
control for enterprise efficiency. However, particularly
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The Commons Digest
in communities with less valuable forests, a large variety communities can potentially give them a head start in
of institutional arrangements and divisions of the forest collective action that other "groups" may have to
stock and flow have occurred. strive to obtain.
The most sophisticated Mexican forest communities For further reading:
have also undergone a distinct cultural evolution. After Adhikari, B. 2005. Poverty, property rights and collective
action: understanding the distributive aspects of common
several decades of developing their forest industries, and
property resource management. Environment and Development
with a three-year rotation of responsibilities for many Economics. 10:7-31.
positions in both the political and enterprise governance Bray, D. B., C. Antinori y J. M. Torres-Rojo. 2006. The
systems, most legal members of the community have a Mexican model of community forest management: The role of
working knowledge of the problems and issues of agrarian policy, forest policy, and entrepreneurial organization.
Forest Policy and Economics 8:470-484.
industrial forest production. In some cases the force of
Antinori, C. y D. B. Bray. 2005. Community forest enterprises
the fusion between community and enterprise has been as entrepreneurial firms:Economic and institutional
so noteworthy that new cultural forms of community perspectives from Mexico. World Development 33:1529-1543
have been created. Mexican anthropologist Claudio Garibay Orozco, Claudio. 2008. Comunalismos y Liberalismos
Garibay, who has studied in detail two of the most Campesinos: Identidad Comunitaria, empresa social forestal, y
poder corporado en el México contemporáneo.
successful community forest enterprises, has argued that
Ostrom, E. 2000. Collective Action and the Evolution of Social
"in a complex political process of social reengineering a Norms. The Journal of Economic Perspectives. 14:3, 137-158.
new social order has been constructed". A pastiche of Singleton, S and Taylor, M. 1992. Common Property,
political governance institutions from different historical Collective Action and Community. Journal of Theoretical
periods has combined with the demands of forest Politics 4:3,309-324
industries to create new levels of community welfare and
the communal provision of the public good of healthy, brayd@fiu.edu
productive forest ecosystems.
For benefits from forest commons management to be
spread equitably, it is important that the community as a
whole manage the forest commons for timber as a COMMONS FORUM
whole. Bhim Adhikari has shown for Nepal that poor
households benefit less than wealthier households from
RESPONSE
use of the forest commons, mostly for subsistence Revolutionizing Community-based
products, suggesting that common property resource
Approach: Collective Action in
management can exacerbate distribution problems.
However, in Mexico, the unity between community, Community-Based Coastal Resource
enterprise, and timber flows, and the practices of Management (CBCRM)
distributing benefits either as public goods in Kathrine I. Hilario
infrastructure or directly as profit sharing in equal parts School of Politics and International Studies,
to all legal community members, appears to reduce University of Leeds, United Kingdom
inequality within the communities.
As a development practitioner and social researcher,
I can completely relate with David Barton Bray's
The Mexican case suggests that communities with strong argument that collective action should not be remote
traditional forms of enforcing behavioral norms of from the concept of community or communities. I
cooperation, when given forests valuable for their appreciate his assertion that the community is an
commercial timber, can evolve institutional innovations important level of analysis, where community can be
that allow them to use political governance practices as a bearers of social norms and institutional arrangements
platform to develop internationally competitive forms of as it constitutes cooperative behavior and collective
indigenous enterprise management. The "network action. In response to Bray's argument, I wish to
density" of conditional cooperators in traditional rural flesh out the concept of community organizing which
Page 4
Summer 2008
fundamentally relates to the dynamics of collective action. from mining activity, and water siltation due to illegal
I will highlight the important contribution of community- quarrying. The tragedy of the environment not only
based approach from a community-based coastal endangered the health of the community, but also
resource management (CBCRM) project in the fishing damaged the traditional fishing grounds at Honda Bay,
community of Honda Bay in Puerto Princesa Philippines, forcing the local fishermen into the open sea to sustain
as a result of the community's collective action. their livelihood.
CBCRM is essentially based on the inherent capacities The fishing village of Honda Bay encountered immense
and practical experience of the community to collectively livelihood difficulties. This situation motivated the
address their needs and problems in commons community members to organize themselves against the
management. CBCRM programs in the Philippines have development plans for the island. The community
emerged from Robert Chambers' idea of people's members of Honda Bay worked with a local NGO, the
participation and empowerment, and have been inspired Environmental Legal Assistance Center (ELAC), for
by the movement for greater community control and developmental legal assistance and they lobbied for
democratization of access to natural resources. proper consultation by the city government to regard
According to Ferrer and Nozawa, CBCRM effectively alternative livelihood for marginal fishing communities.
employs community organizing (CO) as its core strategy The strategies of the local NGO have involved local
to ensure that participation is fostered on a collective people's participation in community development work,
basis so that the majority of the members of the public and policy advocacy and capacity building for
community, if not all, will have equal opportunity in establishment of co-management structures in
decision-making and project benefits. community resources management. Through community
In Honda Bay, the community effort and the collective organizing strategy, leadership formation and core
action of fisher folks in organizing themselves into groups were organized and later expanded into peoples'
people's organization have effectively increased their organizations. The community has increased their
legitimacy in matters relating to the management and capability and confidence in forming organizations and in
sustainable use of natural resources. Honda Bay is a institutionalizing participatory governance mechanisms to
home to rich and diverse flora and fauna found in both manage its natural resources.
land and sea. Until now, there are sporadic sightings of Community mobilization in Honda Bay has empowered
rare and endemic species such as seacows, dolphins, the community to influence structures and processes
whale sharks and green marine turtles in Honda Bay toward achieving economic, political, and social
which tourists and divers enjoy. Because of the beauty transformation. The fisher folks found themselves in the
of the island, the Department of Tourism (DOT), Japan ELAC office writing letters to the City Council
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), City Tourism members, preparing speeches for city council meetings,
Office (CTO) in cooperation with boat operators, resort and reviewing drafted ordinance of the City Tourism
owners, real estate developers and other private business Office. The community organizing initiative, and the
groups, formulated a master plan to develop the island as increased participation of the community towards
one of the major ecotourism destinations in the country. CBCRM also started the establishment of community
However, the influx of eco-tourism and the managed marine sanctuaries, watershed system,
commercialization of the island have caused distress livelihood-support projects, regular fish catch monitoring
among the marginal communities in the island. The activities and continuous lobbying and advocacy work at
national plan for real estate development and private the community level and city level planning for policies
investment have resulted in land tenure issues, violation of that support marginal fisher folks agenda.
community property rights and human rights. The Furthermore, the city government also recognized the
increasing amount of waste due to the commercialization community fisher folks as Volunteer Community
of the city, and the inappropriate location of the sanitary Paralegals (VCPs). They have been acknowledged as a
landfill in Honda Bay contributed to excruciating water co-management structure of the Local Government Unit
and land pollution in the area. Other environmental (LGU) in matters relating to the management and
concerns in resource use also afflicted the village of sustainable use of natural resources. The VCPs have
Honda Bay, such that of mercury contamination resulting been authorized to apprehend environmental law
violators. They have taken part in the documentation of
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The Commons Digest
the impact of mining, tourism and commercial activities to developing networks that will allow exchange of
biodiversity and have worked with government agencies information or dialogue in commons management.
to stop illegal quarrying operations in affected For further reading: Chambers, R. (1997). Editorial: Responsible
communities. People's collective action provided the Well-Being A Personal Agenda in Development. World
community a vital ground with which to establish their Development [online]. 25(11). [Accessed 8 March 2008]. p. 1743-
1754 Available from World Wide Web: http://0-
tenure in the area, making the municipal government's www.sciencedirect.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/
recent attempts at relocating residents politically Ferrer, E. and Nozawa C. (1997). Community-based Coastal
unfavourable and highly questionable. Resources Management in the Philippines: Key Concepts,
Methods and Lessons Learned.
The organizing effort of the fishing community in Honda
Ferrer, E. Cabaces, R and dela Cruz, L. (2002). "Affirming the
Bay enhanced the capacities of community groups to Forces that Give Life and Energy: Revisiting the Theory and
develop environment-friendly systems, establish Practice of CBCRM in the Philippines." In Ferrer, etal. (eds).
networks with other communities, groups and partners in Community-Based Coastal Resources Management Festival:
Celebrating the Gains, Reflecting on Challenges and Advancing the
order to advance its vision and goals, and eventually CBCRM Movement. Quezon City, Philippines: CBCRM Resource
manage their resources for the benefit of the greater Center: 90-101.
majority through collective action and pursuit of common Pomeroy, R and Guieb, R. (2006). Fishery Co-Management: A
interests. The experience of Honda Bay has shown that Practical Handbook. Oxfordshire and Cambridge: CABI Publishing
and International Development Research Centre.
community organizing and collective action can facilitate
Rivera-Guieb, R. 2002. "A Reflection on the Hopes, Inspirations
the creation of community institutions, structures, and Limitations of the Community-based Approach in the
programs and systems which are important elements in Philippines." In Newkirk, G. (ed.) CBCRM Learning and Research
commons management. However critiques have been Network (CBCRM LeaRN) Promoting and Disseminating Research
Results in CBNRM. IDRC [online]: [Accessed 3 March 2008].
raised about the limitation of community-based Available from World Wide Web: https://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/
approaches in addressing more complex ecological and handle/123456789/27867
socio-political relationships, such as resolving disputes kathy_hilario@yahoo.com
that extend beyond the community's territory, particularly
conflict of interests within national, regional and
international levels. This implies a challenge to scale up
community participation and people's collective action at
a global level.
COMMONS FORUM
Co-management and collective governance of common
RESPONSE
property resources are analogous terms providing a
framework for common property theory. The idea of Challenges for collective action in
collective action based on communal property, which community forestry enterprises
begins with a set of priorities and specific issues within a
Naya Sharma Paudel
small and geographically defined community is an
Political Ecologist, ForestAction Kathmandu,
important level of analysis in looking at access and
Nepal
control of common pool of resources. Collective action
does not occur where there is no organized body that David's argument in favor of primacy of cooperative
sets the rules concerning resource management and behavior against self-interested rational choices in the
resource use. This may also be identified by a community context of community forestry enterprises sets an
of users. The process in CBCRM, according to David important scene for advancing the debate about
Korten, concerns a group of people with common commons. His observation of the community enterprises
interests in creating mechanisms to reach consensus in in Mexican community forests clearly supports the claim
management of conflict, community control and that community institutions are strong enough to compete
management of productive resources, establishing local in the global market. His conclusion provides a strong
systems or mechanisms in utilizing available resources, optimistic message to many of the rural poor in forested
local accountability and broadly distributed participation areas in developing countries who have set their future
of stakeholders in community-based management. A on the realization commercial value of their forests.
concern for global governance needs to be replicated My response to David's argument is based on my
from CBCRM by expanding collective action and analysis of the evolution of community institutions under
Page 6
Summer 2008
the community forestry in Nepal, particularly the mode though institutions have successfully managed the
emerging challenges related to increased commons- forests for subsistence purposes. The complexities
market interface. Nepal's community forestry is a well- associated with the enterprises are new set of
known example of a modern community institution that technologies, a large number of actors along the value
has successfully reversed the deforestation in the chain, critical attention required to ensure quality
Himalayan region and turned barren hills into forested products and the system for fair distribution of costs and
areas. Apart from enhancing ecosystem health, these benefits among the members. As a result, it has not been
institutions are serving as a vehicle for rural development able to exploit the full commercial potential of the forest
including providing services on health, education and products and services. Despite well recognized
local infrastructure. Moreover, these institutions are successful story of over 27 years, community forestry in
regarded as the most conflict resilient since they were the Nepal has appeared weak in the face of market
least affected and were functioning fairly well during intervention.
Maoist led armed conflict. What could be the plausible explanation of the
Following David's point, the local community's role in contrasting experience between the successful
protecting and rehabilitating degraded hill forests can community forestry management in a subsistence mode
largely be attributed to the historical harmony, and the failure stories of community enterprises? One of
cooperation, mutual trust and care. After handing over the arguments could be that communities need entirely
the management responsibility, the local communities put new sets of institutional arrangements and expertise to
strong sanctions and surveillance for any offences that deal with the complex situation in the global market. An
discouraged any egoistic activities. They see their shared enterprise oriented management must embrace
prospects in improving the forest condition and take competition and profit as the fundamental principles
caution against any short term vested interests. Even the which are at odd with principles of harmony, cooperation
powerful local elites had little opportunity to subvert the and mutual care that are at the core of community
community enthusiasm. In fact, as argued by David, forestry. As they have to deal with customers and other
these well defined and time-tested rules have proved to market agents based on the market principles it is likely
be more effective than the government's formal legal that those principles get reproduced within their internal
system that adopted the fine and fence approach to relations. Unfortunately these issues are not adequately
protect forests. The local communities as the great addressed in David's paper.
reservoir of tolerance, peace, mutual respect and care Secondly, in contrast to the Mexican case, the weak
are able to develop resilience against the political unrest community tenure, particularly the regulatory restriction
and violent conflict that raged the country for over a on trade and enterprises of forest products in Nepal,
decade. may have inhibited these initiatives. Many of the reviews
In recent years, particularly after the adoption of liberal have highlighted negative impacts of constraining
economic policy by the Nepalese government, government provisions in limiting market transactions. If
community forestry management is increasingly coming at this is the case then we can argue that these state
the interface with market. Community based enterprises impositions undermine community autonomy that
have become the dominant discourse so that local ultimately encroaches to the unique characteristics of the
communities are shifting their priorities towards exploiting commons. A complementary argument is that there is
commercial value of forest resources. Many have huge gap in access to information, entrepreneurial
established community enterprises on collecting, culture, and supportive environment for rural
processing and trading timber and NTFP (non-timber communities. They are too weak in front of the national
forest products) products. There are however, little and global market networks.
encouraging examples. Although it might be too early to The increasing commons-market interface, particularly
conclude it as many of these enterprises are in their early community forestry enterprise is an emerging issue in
stage, the nature of challenges for these enterprises are forested areas of developing countries. New innovations
quite visible. From the present state of community are required to find solutions on how communities can
forestry enterprises it can be fairly concluded that run viable forest based enterprises. The discussion above
community forestry institutions are less equipped to leads to the conclusion that though rural communities
handle the governance complexities in the enterprising function as a rich reservoir of rules, norms and practices
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The Commons Digest
to manage the commons for subsistence use, there are Fontamara captures the hopelessness of a community,
critical gaps in their capacity to run enterprises. Strong like a deer caught in the headlights, when the collective
tenure security over resources, relaxed regulatory mafia of property developers, concession holders,
mechanism and supportive macro environment may corrupt politicians and crass bureaucrats "legally" invade
create conducive environment for community enterprises. and take over a traditionally community owned
However, in the context of global market, communities community governed common property resource (be it
cannot successfully run forestry enterprises without forest resources , water or mineral wealth) which the
major changes in the existing institutional arrangement, community is deemed "unable to manage" (despite
particularly the repressive state institutions, exclusionary several centuries of management!). The community is
community processes, and ineffective service delivery well able to manage, but not to exploit as it views the
systems, etc. In other words, there is a need for resource as an ongoing means of sustainable livelihood.
redefining relationships between local communities and The reader is informed in advance that this document is
the structured state, market and civil society. This will written from a practitioner perspective and does not
also include redefining many of the characteristics of presume to comment on the theoretical underpinnings.
success in traditional communities that we have Having said so it will not be a surprise that I feel that
acknowledged and appreciated for long in the new since this essay is appearing in the Commons Digest,
context of market economy. (whose readers are presumably the cognoscenti) the long
nspaudel@gmail.com theoretical preamble seems to be have taken up valuable
space which could have been used to shed light on some
of the following intriguing, and from a personal
COMMONS FORUM perspective, the more interesting questions which are
RESPONSE raised briefly but not dealt with fully (possibly due to lack
of space ).
The Study of Commons - for whose The following intriguing questions are raised by mainly
benefit? from the perspective of one who has little familiarity with
the Mexican context and the history of its struggles
Kusum Athukorala
regarding the commons.
Chair, NetWwater (Network of Women Water
Professionals) What are the socio-cultural factors which led to the success
stories in the forest communities in Mexico?
SC Member Outreach (Women for Water Part-
nership) What was the actual role of the activists in supporting the
Colombo, Sri Lanka communities attain a greater measure of self governance of
resources?
David Bray's essay makes reference to a success story
What were the constraints within the legal systems which
in Mexican forest communities in accessing and needed to be overcome by the government based
governing common property resources. It is interesting reformists?
and infact energizing reading; most of the cases of Has the "new social order" which has evolved through "a
commons study do not highlight the level of success complex political process of social reengineering" also
attained by the Mexican forest communities who are promoted new internal inequities? Has it perpetuated old
now empowered to become global players. Most inequities?
studies of the struggle for common property rights do not Within this "new social order" which groups continue to
end "happily ever after." Far from it. receive minimal benefits or continue to be marginalized?
Read the final paragraph of Ignazio Silone's Fontamara For example what would be the access of marginalized
(also woven round a water transfer out of agriculture, groups such as female headed families who may lack the
now an escalating phenomenon issue affecting common strength to ascertain their right to the benefits?
property resources) which reflects the common fate of Bray writes "Growing up and living in a relatively isolated
the affected communities... "After so much strife and rural community with millennial traditions is to play a
anguish and tears, and wounds and blood, and hatred game with extremely well-defined and time-tested rules.
and despair what are we to do?" A strong culture of cooperation and reciprocity in
traditional communities emerges, not as an inevitable
Page 8
Summer 2008
tendency, but because they are also well aware of the groups who bring in with them an array of action re-
problem of the "rational egoists" in their midst. sources. Increasingly, the commons battles are fought on
Threats to the commons is not only due to the internal websites. The third factor is the importance of constitu-
"rational egoists" who break rules; most threats more tional reforms (1992) which gave them full ownership,
often come from the external forces who do not know or "with substantial autonomy in their internal institutional
accept the "rules" at all. arrangements for how they manage their natural re-
sources." Some in-depth insights into the legal and
A study that I carried out some time ago in the North
institutional process which led to the greater autonomy
Central Province of Sri Lanka comes to mind. Sri
("full operational and collective-choice governance,")
Lanka has a centuries old hydraulic civilization where
and thereby paved the way for forest communities
irrigation through manmade reservoirs (called tanks)
becoming global players would have been welcome
have withstood the ravages of time and continue to be
reading.
the source of livelihood for rural peasantry in the to Dry
Zone. Many of these tanks are now being tapped to Bray's study comments as follows on the rise in sophisti-
provide drinking water supply for the urban sector. In cation of the community leaders and presumably their
one such case observed in Sri Lanka, the Purana enhanced coping skills. "After several decades of
(ancient village) of Thuruwila, the community was faced developing their forest industries, and with a three-year
with a water transfer to the neighboring city and rotation of responsibilities for many positions in both the
pilgrimage centre "played the game" in accordance with political and enterprise governance systems, most legal
a 2500 yrs old tradition and Buddhist principles of members of the community have a working knowledge
nonviolence. They supported, as did the Mexican forest of the problems and issues of industrial forest
communities the "norms of community solidarity, production." In some cases of study of commons, it is
consensus and harmony." They did not oppose the also observed that the community leaders with enhanced
transfer as giving water to pilgrims is a meritorious act skills, the so-called gate openers could also become the
according to Buddhism. The perceived threat for them gate keepers. Farmer organizations set up to enhance
came from external sources that did not "play the game community wellbeing have in some cases become a
"or else shifted the goal posts. The external players (state stepping stone to local politics where the primary aim of
and private sector) are usually better connected, better enhancing community gains becomes subsumed in the
funded and more savvy in negotiating the rules of wider more political gains for "rational egoists." The example
context can harness the support of the "rational egoists" quoted from Adhikari in Nepal indicates that poor
as they did in Thuruwila. The community was forced to households continue to be losers- "common property
"play "according to the externally imposed rules and go resource management can exacerbate distribution
to the Supreme Court for redress, a long time consuming problems." This issue has been very lightly touched
and stressful process . The "network density" of upon in the paper which goes to say that the process
conditional cooperators cannot always with stand the has" appears to reduce inequality within the
onslaught of external forces (as Bray terms them "the communities." Some how one is left with the impression
variety of political forms that have sought to control them that the writer sees all are winners, in some way or the
for their own purposes.") The forest communities of the other in the Mexican case. And this is a little difficult to
Sierra Juarez have been successful in maintaining or buy.
enhancing their independence in access to forest The Mexican case suggests that communities with strong
resources. The main reasons given are the building up of traditional forms of enforcing behavioral norms of
an enabling environment supportive of such a cooperation, when given forests valuable for their
development. Another factor is that the forest commercial timber, can evolve institutional innovations
communities in Mexico had successfully allied with that allow them to use political governance practices as a
activists and government reformers to gain effective platform to develop internationally competitive forms of
control of their forests, since the legal framework still indigenous enterprise management.
defined the government as the ultimate owner. Most What is of particular interest to the practitioner is the
community struggle to gain control over community mention of the coalition of reformist, community and
resources depend on an alliance of external forces, activist in Mexico which facilitated the turn around ,
social auditors, legal activists, socially conscious religious
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The Commons Digest
enhancing the Mexican forest resources to full opera-
tional level. The positive which resonates most is the COMMONS FORUM
implied comment that the researchers in the Sierra Norte
have provided through their studies a cross fertilization of
RESPONSE
ideas and actions to the ongoing community struggles Communities, institutions and institutional
which supports community building and strengthening trajectories
governance of the commons.
Ashwini Chhatre
This says much about the current need for a researcher Assistant Professor, Department of Geography
and activist nexus, translating academic work into University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
positive action for the communities themselves. Too
many academic ventures lack an advocacy perspective The crucial element in David Bray's arguments is
which refuels supportive initiatives within the communities `innovation.' Armed with cultural, legal, and economic
they study. As a researcher I myself have received resources, communities in Mexico described by Bray
hospitality, security and acceptance from the have `evolved' to exploit market opportunities without
communities I worked in. I wish I could be sure whether losing internal cohesion. However, the language we use
my work always had reciprocal benefits for the to understand, or even describe, this process has lagged
communities. One of the more interesting books I read behind. David Bray takes an important step towards
recently was Water conflicts in India: a million revolts in correcting that gap by moving beyond `conditional
the making which has a number of cases where cooperators' and `dominant strategies' in the essay. My
collective action was undertaken by Indian communities response seeks to push it a little bit further. Institutions
where not all cases had a satisfactory ending- happily, if are most commonly understood as equilibria. This
not "ever after" for the community. conceptualization, borrowed from game theory, has
dominated the theoretical literature on collective action
In the global crisis the threats stress and tensions and common property, with good effect. It has helped us
embattled communities face in maintaining their understand the internal dynamics of groups, and to
traditional right and access to common property predict success and failure (variously defined along many
resources should not only be a source of research dimensions) within a broad range of initial conditions. But
studies for conferences but have a practical value of institutions-as-equilibria alone does not help us in
defusing tensions, upholding community rights and investigating change. An evolutionary game-theoretic
supporting preservation of commons. I think we need to perspective, such as the one pioneered by Samuel
question the research which ends in conference papers Bowles and Herbert Gintis, for example, also only takes
and is not translated into action in preserving the us so far in understanding the nature and direction of
commons and the rural communities they study. institutional change. We know institutions change in
Commons researchers need to decide is it to be study response to specific stimuli but we are still at a loss for
of commons for the sake of enhancing knowledge or for words to theorize the relationship of this change to
building a researcher activist continuum for defending the outcomes we are interested in, such as equity and/or
communities who are currently faced with the million sustainability. The language of institutions, which
local battles, skirmishes and encounters to save their constrains us to think of institutions as either the cause of
heritage and livelihood? I hope that in the forthcoming sustainability or the effect of inequality, gets in the way.
IASC conference in Cheltenham there will be time and There may be cause-and-effect relationships; I do not
space to debate this issue. wish to deny their importance. But there may be more to
For further reading: institutions than just causing this or being the effect of
Athukorala, Kusum "Water Transfers out of Agriculture: towards a Win that. A crucial dimension is missing. I want to suggest that
Win Solution ? A case study of Thuruwila" in Integrated Water Resources
Management Global Theory, Emerging Practice and Local Needs, institutions not only evolve, but they co-evolve with the
SaciWATERs Water in South Asia Volume 1 Sage India 2006. outcomes we are interested in. In a simple, but hopefully
Ignazio Silone, Fontamara, Penguin Books 1934 not simplistic, portrayal, institutions mediate the influence
K J Joy, Suhas Paranjape, Biksham Gujja, Vinod Goud and Shruti Vispute of macro-processes such as demography, markets, and
(eds.) Water conflicts in India: A million revolts in the Making, Taylor and technology on outcomes on multiple dimensions.
Francis books India Pvt. Ltd 2007.
Following the call for simplicity, let us assume there are
kusum@itmin.net two dimensions of interest equity and sustainability.
Page 10
Summer 2008
These could be environment and development, or within-
group and over-time distribution; the point is the same. RECENT PUBLICATIONS
After mediating the influence of macro-processes,
institutions themselves change in response to the new
outcomes. This is the pathway of institutional change, Chalotte Hess and Emily Castle
working through the reconfiguration of the preferences of
the agents. We could just as well call them identities or
Books
subjectivities instead of preferences; they relate to how Alexander, W. L. 2008. Resiliency in Hostile Environments: A
Comunidad Agrícola in Chile's Norte Chico. Bethlehem, PA:
agents interact with each other under constraints defined
Lehigh University Press.
by the rules of the game (or institutions!). Over a long
Boyle, J. 2008. The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of
period of time, institutions co-evolve with the outcomes, a
the Mind. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
movement which can be described as a trajectory. Some
Dahlman, C. J. 2008. The Open Field System and Beyond: A
of these institutional trajectories will be characterized by Property Rights Analysis of an Economic Institution.
improvements in both equity and sustainability, while Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
others would describe improvements in one or neither. Dawes, R. M. and J. I. Krueger. 2008. Rationality and Social
The communities described by David Bray, if I interpret Responsibility: Essays in Honor of Robyn Mason Dawes. New
correctly, would fall into the first category, which could be York: Psychology Press.
labeled as sustainable development under certain Galvin, K. A. and J. Ellis et al. 2008. Fragmentation in Semi-arid
circumstances. Our task is to compare institutional and Arid Landscapes: Consequences for Human and Natural
trajectories that correspond to such positive and not-so- Landscapes. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer.
positive outcomes on multiple dimensions of interest, and Gardner, G. T., T. Prugh, and L. Starke. 2008. State of the World
identify the conditions that facilitate positive outcomes. 2008: Innovations for a Sustainable Economy. New York: W.W.
Norton.
The missing part in David Bray's essay, perhaps of future
interest, is a comparison with the failures. Clearly, the Ghate, R., N. S. Jodha, and P. Mukhopadhyaya. 2008. Promise,
Trust, and Evolution: Managing the Commons of South Asia.
institutional trajectories described by Bray are not the New York: Oxford University Press.
same, and neither would be the outcomes. Therein lays a
Godden, L. and M. Tehan. 2008. Sustainable Futures:
fruitful source of comparison. David Bray's essay begins Comparative Perspectives on Communal Lands and Individual
the process of describing the trajectories of institutional Ownership. London: Routledge-Cavendish.
change in Mexico. Holland, Dorothy et al. 2007. Local Democracy under Siege:
achhatre@illinois.edu Activism, Public Interests, and Private Politics. New York
University Press.
Lebel, L. J. D., D. Rajesh, and Y. S. Koma eds. 2007.
Democratizing Water Governance in the Mekong Region.
Chiang Mai, Thailand: Mekong Press.
Lessig, L. 2008. Dot Commons. New York: Penguin. Manning,
R.E. 2007. Parks and Carrying Capacity: Commons without
Tragedy. Washington, DC: Island Press.
Mansfield, B. 2008. Privatization: Property and the Remaking of
Nature-Society Relations. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Tansey, G. and T. Rajotte. 2008. The Future Control of Food: A
Guide to International Negotiations and Rules on Intellectual
Property, Biodiversity and Food Security. Sterling, VA:
Earthscan.
Tucker, Catherine M. 2008. Changing Forests: Collective
Action, Common Property, and Coffee in Honduras. Berlin:
Springer.
Webb, E. L., and G. P. Shivakoti, eds. 2008. Decentralization,
Forests and Rural Communities: Policy Outcomes in South and
Southeast Asia. Los Angeles, CA: Sage.
Wiegandt, E. 2008. Mountains: Sources of Water, Sources of
See you there! Knowledge. Dordrecht: Springer.
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The Commons Digest
Articles Bonnell, J., and T. Koontz. 2007. "Stumbling Forward: The
Aase, T. H., and O. R. Vetaas. 2007. "Risk Management by Organizational Challenges of Building and Sustaining
Communal Decision in Trans-Himalayan Farming: Manang Collaborative Watershed Management." Society and Natural
Valley in Central Nepal." Human Ecology 35:453-460. Resources 20:153-167.
Agrawal, A., and L. Garlappi 2007. "Public Sector Science and Brockington, D. 2007. "Forests, Community Conservation,
the Strategy of the Commons."