Former Senator Sam Nunn …

                               Former Senator Sam Nunn
                       Co-Chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative
                  "The Mountaintop: A World Free of Nuclear Weapons"
                              Council on Foreign Relations
                                     June 14, 2007


       I. The nuclear age ­ the first 60 years

       On Veterans Day in 1948 ­ at the dawn of the nuclear age after the devastation of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki--General Omar Bradley said in a speech:

        "The world has achieved brilliance without wisdom, power without conscience.
Ours is a world of nuclear giants and ethical infants. We know more about war than we
know about peace, more about killing than we know about living."

       It might surprise General Bradley, if he were alive today, to know that we have
made it sixty years without a nuclear catastrophe. Thousands of men and women thought
deeply and worked diligently on both sides of the Iron Curtain to prevent nuclear war, to
avoid overreacting to false warnings and to provide safety mechanisms and joint
understanding to reduce risk.

       We were good, we were diligent, but we were also very lucky. We had more than
a few close calls, including: the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962; the 1979 scare when a
technician at Omaha accidentally loaded a simulated attack into our warning system; the
1983 Soviet warning glitch which falsely showed 5 nuclear missiles launched against it
by the U.S. India and Pakistan have already had more than one close call ­ and their
nuclear age has just begun.

       II. The nuclear age today ­ the tipping point

       Making it through 60 years without a nuclear attack should not make us
complacent. In the future, it won't be enough to be lucky once or twice. If we're to
avoid a catastrophe, all nuclear powers will have to be highly capable, careful,
competent, rational, and lucky ­ every single time.

       We do have important preventive efforts underway and some successes --
including the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the Global Threat
Reduction Initiative, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Proliferation
Security Initiative, the rollback of Libya's nuclear program and UN Resolution 1540.
These all mark progress and potential, but from my perspective, the risk of a nuclear
weapon being used today is growing, not receding. The storm clouds are gathering:


   ·   Terrorists are seeking nuclear weapons and there can be little doubt that if they
       acquire a weapon that they will use it.

   ·   There are nuclear weapons materials in more than 40 countries, some secured by
       nothing more than a chain link fence, and, at the current pace, it will be several
       decades before this material is adequately secured or eliminated globally.

   ·   The know-how and expertise to build nuclear weapons is far more available today
       because of an explosion of information and commerce throughout the world.

   ·   The number of nuclear weapons states is increasing. Iran and North Korea's
       nuclear programs threaten to spark a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and
       Asia.

   ·   A world with 12 or 20 nuclear weapons states will be immeasurably more
       dangerous than today's world and make it more likely that weapons or materials
       to make them will fall into the hands of terrorists.

   ·   Our worst nightmare -- the spread of nuclear capability to terrorist groups, with no
       return address and little way of being deterred ­ will become more likely.

   ·   With the growing interest in nuclear energy, a number of countries are
       considering developing the capacity to enrich uranium ostensibly to use as fuel for
       nuclear energy, but this would also give them the capacity to move quickly to a
       nuclear weapons program if they chose to do so. The New York Times recently
       reported that roughly a dozen states in the Middle East have recently turned to the
       IAEA for help in starting their own nuclear programs.

   ·   Meanwhile, the nuclear giants, the United States and Russia, continue to deploy
       thousands of nuclear weapons on ballistic missiles that can hit their targets in less
       than 30 minutes ­ a short warning time, prompt launch capability that carries with
       it an increasingly unacceptable risk of an accidental, mistaken or unauthorized
       launch.

       The bottom line: the accelerating spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear know-how
and nuclear material has brought us to a nuclear tipping point. The world is heading in a
very dangerous direction.

       III. The need for a new direction

      The greatest dangers of the Cold War we addressed primarily by confrontation
with Moscow. The greatest threats we face today: catastrophic terrorism, a rise in the


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number of nuclear weapons states, increasing danger of mistaken, accidental or
unauthorized nuclear launch ­ we can prevent only in cooperation with Moscow, Beijing
and many other capitals.

       We must change direction. The good news is that I believe the security and
economic interests of the great powers ­ the U.S., Russia, China, Europe, Japan, India ­
have never been more aligned. As Henry Kissinger says ­ "the great powers have
nothing to gain by military conflict with each other. They are all dependent on the global
economic system." Old rivalries should not keep us from seeing common interests.

       Both leaders and citizens here and abroad must reflect on what is at stake.

         If Al Qaeda had hit the trade towers with a small crude nuclear weapon instead of
two airplanes, a fireball would have vaporized everything in the vicinity. Lower
Manhattan and the financial district would be ash and rubble. Tens of thousands of
people would have been killed instantly. Those who survived would have been left with
no shelter, no clean water, no safe food, no medical attention. Telecommunications,
utilities, transportation, and rescue services would be thrown into chaos.

        That would have been just the physical impact. If you were trying to draw a
circle to mark the overall impact of the blast ­ in social, economic, and security terms --
the circle would be the equator itself. No part of the planet would escape the impact.
People everywhere would fear another blast. Travel, international trade, capital flows,
commerce would initially stop, and many freedoms we have come to take for granted
would quickly be eroded in the name of security. The confidence of America and the
world would be shaken to the core.

       From my perspective, we are in a race between cooperation and catastrophe.

       IV. The Vision of Ending This Threat to the World

        With these growing dangers and stakes in mind, George Shultz, Bill Perry, Henry
Kissinger and I published an article in January in The Wall Street Journal that called for a
different direction for our global nuclear policy with both vision and steps.

        We said that U.S. leadership will be required to take the world to the next stage ­
to a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally. We see that as a
vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and
ultimately ending them as a threat to the world. We underscored the importance
of intensive work with leaders of the countries in possession of nuclear weapons to turn
the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise.

       We made the point that terrorist groups are "conceptually outside the bounds of a
deterrent strategy" and even among states ­ "unless urgent new actions are taken," the
U.S. will find itself in a nuclear era "more precarious, psychologically disorienting, and
economically even more costly than was Cold War deterrence."



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        The four of us and the many other former security leaders who joined us are
keenly aware that the quest for a nuclear weapons free world is fraught with practical and
political challenges. As The Economist magazine wisely said last year: "By simply
demanding the goal of a world without nuclear weapons without a readiness to tackle the
practical problems raised by it ensures that it will never happen."

       We have taken aim at the "practical problems" by laying out a series of steps that
we believe constitute the `urgent new actions' for reducing the nuclear dangers and lay
the groundwork for building a world free of the nuclear threat.

       The specific steps are as follows:

   1. The United States and Russia should move to change the Cold War posture of
      their deployed nuclear weapons to greatly increase warning time in both countries
      and ease our fingers away from the nuclear trigger.

   2. Nuclear forces should be reduced substantially in all states that possess them.

   3. We must eliminate short-range "tactical" nuclear weapons, the bombs most likely
      to be targeted for theft or purchase by terrorists ­ beginning with accountability
      and transparency between the United States and Russia.

   4. We must work to bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force ­ in the
      United States and in other key states.

   5. We must secure nuclear weapons and materials around the world to the highest
      standards.

   6. We must get control of the uranium enrichment process for civil nuclear fuel
      production, phase out the use of highly enriched uranium in civil commerce, and
      halt the production of fissile material for weapons.

   7. We must redouble efforts to resolve the regional confrontations that increase
      demand for nuclear weapons.

   8. We must enhance our verification capabilities. President Reagan's credo "trust,
      but verify" has been largely forgotten. We must make at least as much effort in
      building verification procedures and technology as we are now making in missile
      defense technology.

       Each step will help reverse the spread of nuclear weapons. Each step is valuable
not only for its ability to inspire greater cooperation, but for its own sake. Each step
represents a move in the right direction. Each step reduces the risk of nuclear use.




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       V. No Security Without Cooperation; No Cooperation Without Non-nuclear
Vision -- The Core Argument

       None of these steps can be taken by the United States alone. Strategic
cooperation must become the cornerstone of our national defense against nuclear
weapons. This is not because cooperation gives us a warm feeling of community, but
because every other method will fail.

       I have concluded that we cannot defend America without taking these steps; we
cannot take these steps without the cooperation of other nations; we cannot get the
cooperation of other nations without the vision and hope of a world that will someday
end these weapons of mass destruction as a threat to the world.

         The vision and action must go together. Without the bold vision, the actions will
not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as
realistic or possible.

        This cannot happen overnight. It will be a long process, done in stages. The
United States must keep our nuclear weapons as long as other nations do. But we will be
safer, and the world will be safer, if we are working toward the goal of deemphasizing
nuclear weapons and ultimately ridding our world of them.

       VI. The vision of a world without nuclear weapons ­ a long and
distinguished history

        The vision of a nuclear-free world is not new. In his memoirs, President Reagan
wrote: "For the eight years I was president, I never let my dream of a nuclear-free world
fade from my mind."

        In the 1960s, at an earlier tipping point in the nuclear age, it was the vision of a
nuclear weapons free world that pulled us back from the edge. It came in the form of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was the grand bargain of the nuclear age, designed
to limit the number of nuclear weapons-states in the world. The Treaty was built on
three promises:

           o The Article VI commitment of nuclear weapons states to move toward
             nuclear disarmament;
           o The commitment of non-nuclear weapons states to forego nuclear
             weapons;
           o The commitment that all nations should have access to nuclear technology
             for peaceful purposes.

        This Treaty ­ and its vision of a world free of nuclear weapons ­ has been
successful in keeping the number of nuclear weapons states below what almost anyone in
the 1960s expected by the turn of the 20th century. But today, the Treaty is in trouble.
In the eyes of its critics, the Treaty has served to enshrine the nuclear weapons



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inequalities that existed the day it was signed. As they see it, those who had nuclear
weapons on that day continue to keep them; those who didn't ­ tough luck. There can be
endless argument about exactly what the Article VI commitment means and the
timetable, but it must mean at least this: Nuclear weapons nations must visibly and
steadily reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons. Today the world believes they are not
­ and that belief has a clear and increasingly negative impact on our efforts to prevent the
spread and use of nuclear weapons. As IAEA Director ElBaradei recently said: "It's
hard to tell people not to smoke when you have a cigarette dangling from your mouth."


       VII. The First Steps in the Ascent

        Recently, former President Gorbachev endorsed the views expressed in our
opinion piece, and stated: "The members of the nuclear club should formally reiterate
their commitment to reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons. As a token of
their serious intent, they should without delay take two crucial steps: ratify the
comprehensive test ban treaty and make changes in their military doctrines, removing
nuclear weapons from the Cold War-era high alert status." I believe the world should
take up President Gorbachev's challenge.

        We should ask ourselves a long overdue question: "Sixteen years after the Cold
War, is it in the United States' national security interest for the President of Russia to
have only a few minutes to decide whether to fire his nuclear weapons or lose them in
response to what could be a false warning?" How can anyone think this is in our security
interest? I would hope that this question would be asked in reverse in Russia and that we
would begin to ask it together.

        If both the United States and Russia altered their Cold War alert postures and
significantly increased warning and decision time, we could dramatically reduce the
chance of an accidental, mistaken, or unauthorized launch.

       The benefits of working with Russia to remove our weapons from hair trigger
alert would have benefits beyond reducing the risk we pose one another. If we remove
our nuclear missiles from hair-trigger ­ and at the same time reduce our numbers of
nuclear weapons -- it will strengthen our fight against the spread of nuclear weapons.

        This is not because our example will inspire Iran, North Korea or al Qaeda to say
"we have seen the light," but because many more nations will be willing to join us in a
firm and vigorous approach to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials
and prevent catastrophic terrorism.

       The power of this kind of international pressure is crucial. If a strong coalition of
nations bands together, it can exert powerful economic, diplomatic and military pressure
to prevent new nuclear weapons states and make it much less likely that terrorists can get
the materials they need to build a nuclear weapon.




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   VIII. The Mountaintop

       The reaction of many people to the vision and steps to eliminate the nuclear threat
comes in two parts ­ on the one hand they say "that would be great." And their second
thought is: "we can never get there."

       To me, the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is like the top of a very tall
mountain. It is tempting and easy to say: "We can't get there from here." It is true that
today in our troubled world we can't see the top of the mountain.

       But we can see that we are heading down -- not up. We can see that we must turn
around, that we must take paths leading to higher ground and that we must get others to
move with us. We can see that there are trails leading upward:

   1. We can work with the Russians to remove weapons from hair trigger alert and
      increase warning and decision time for both Russia and the United States.

   2. We can work with other nations to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the
      world.

   3. We can work harder and faster to secure and eliminate nuclear weapons materials
      that could be bought or stolen by terrorists.

   4. We can agree on transparency accountability and near-term elimination of short
      range battlefield nuclear weapons ­ a terrorist's dream.

   5. We can greatly strengthen our verification capabilities.

   6. We can redouble our efforts to ease regional confrontations which greatly
      increase the demand side of the nuclear equation.

    Tough steps yes, but doable. Once we get to higher ground there will remain serious
obstacles between us and the top. We must develop ironclad verification procedures and
assurances for monitoring and enforcing a prohibition on nuclear weapons. We must be
able to respond quickly and decisively to any attempt to cheat. Today it is very apparent
that our capability in this regard needs considerable strengthening.

   Both the good and bad news is that, given the big steps required to move upward, we
have time to work on the transition from higher ground to the top. It is not too soon to
begin.

       IX. A Parable of Hope

       Let me close with a parable of hope. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, when
the United States began funding Russia's work to dismantle Soviet nuclear missiles and




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warheads, our countries struck a deal called the U.S. ­ Russian Highly Enriched Uranium
Agreement.

        Under this agreement which was signed in 1993, 500 tons of highly enriched
uranium from former Soviet nuclear weapons is being blended down to low enriched
uranium, and then used as fuel for nuclear power plants in the United States. Shipments
began in 1995 and will continue through 2013. When you calculate that 20% of all
electricity in the US comes from nuclear power plants, and 50% of the nuclear fuel used
in the US comes from Russia through the HEU Agreement ­ you have an interesting fact:
roughly speaking ­ one out of every ten light bulbs in America today is powered by
material that was in Soviet nuclear warheads pointed at us a few years ago.

       From swords to ploughshares. Who would have thought this possible in the
1950s, 1960s, 1970s, or 1980s? It would have certainly been seen as a mountain too high
to climb.

        Nearly 20 years ago, President Reagan asked his audience to imagine that "all of
us discovered that we were threatened by a power from outer space--from another
planet." The President then asked: "Wouldn't we come together to fight that particular
threat?" After letting that image sink in for a moment, President Reagan came to his
point: "We now have a weapon that can destroy the world -- why don't we recognize that
threat more clearly and then come together with one aim in mind: How safely, sanely,
and quickly can we rid the world of this threat to our civilization and our existence."

       If we want our children and grandchildren to ever see the mountaintop, our
generation must begin to answer this question.




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