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A U.S.-Europe Statement on Iran
On February 17, 2005, a group of prominent European and American foreign policy
experts issued the "Compact between the United States and Europe," a detailed and
comprehensive proposal for transatlantic cooperation on the key foreign policy issues of
the day. The premise of the Compact was that the split that had emerged between the
two sides of the Atlantic in recent years was deeply damaging to the interests of both
sides, and that specific agreements on common policy challenges was both necessary
and possible. We remain convinced that the partnership between the United States and
Europe is critical to world security and stability and that the toughest problems we face
are better dealt with when the United States and Europe stand together.
In that light, all of us were deeply disappointed by Iran's rejection of the August 2005
offer by Britain, France, and Germany to provide Iran with support for a civilian nuclear
energy program--as well as far-reaching political and economic incentives--in
exchange for Tehran's agreement not to develop its capacity for nuclear enrichment and
reprocessing. The EU-3 proposal, which had explicit support from the United States,
would have made it possible for Iran to acquire Western nuclear reactors and fuel for the
civilian nuclear energy program Iran claims to need. Yet Iran rejected it out of hand,
removed International Atomic Energy Agency seals at its nuclear facility in Isfahan, and
resumed the process of uranium conversion.
As European and American leaders have said many times, an Iranian nuclear weapons
capability would be dangerous and destabilizing. It could lead to further nuclear
proliferation (in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey for example); it could provide cover
for Tehran to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy (including through support for
terrorism or armed intervention in neighboring countries); and it could be a fatal blow to
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Given Iran's past track record of hiding
significant aspects of its nuclear program, moreover, allowing Iran to develop
enrichment and reprocessing capabilities--even under an international inspection
regime--would be extremely risky. Doing so would leave Iran one short step away
from a nuclear weapons capability--with which it could easily proceed, once the full
fuel cycle was in hand, by withdrawing from the NPT and asking inspectors to leave.
The credibility of western nonproliferation policy is now clearly on the line. The
European Union and the United States have a strong common interest in bringing Iran
back to the negotiating table and persuading it to change course. The best way to do that
is to make clear to Iran that it can win significant political and economic benefits if it
foregoes a nuclear weapons program, but that it will pay a very big political and
economic price if it does not. Such an effort will only work if America and Europe
stand united.
Therefore, the United States and the European Union should endorse the following:
· The United States and European Union reaffirm their determination to
prevent nuclear proliferation and their insistence that Iran abide by its
obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, including by
providing full information about its past and present nuclear program. They
regret Iran's August 2005 decision to resume its nuclear conversion
activities and call upon Iran to suspend such activities and to send overseas
all materials produced since the breaking of seals at Isfahan as a basis for
resuming nuclear discussions with the EU-3. The U.S. and EU insist that
only a permanent and verifiable end to Iran's nuclear fuel cycle (enrichment
and reprocessing) program can provide an objective guarantee that Iran is
not working toward a nuclear weapons option.
· The United States reiterates its support for the European Union's nuclear
dialogue with Iran. If Iran permanently and verifiably ends its fuel cycle
programs, the United States would support Iran's right to import technology
for a civilian nuclear energy program (including the provision of fuel and
fuel-cycle services on a commercial basis); not impose sanctions against
European companies that engage in civilian trade and investment with Iran;
and enter into a dialogue with the Iranian government on regional security
issues. The United States reiterates its intention to deal with the Iranian
nuclear issue through diplomatic means while leaving all options open if
diplomatic efforts fail.
· The United States declares its willingness to explore directly with Iran other
areas of concern. These include the issue of bilateral diplomatic and
economic relations; U.S. economic sanctions against Iran; Iranian support
for terrorist groups such as Hizbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad; Iran's
opposition to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process; Iran's membership in the
World Trade Organization; and financial disputes dating back to the Iranian
revolution. The United States and European Union will continue to support
the efforts of the Iranian people to secure basic human rights and to build a
functioning democracy in Iran.
· The European Union countries reiterate their willingness to provide Iran
with support for a civilian nuclear energy program and offer far-reaching
political and economic incentives in exchange for Tehran's agreement not to
develop its capacity for nuclear enrichment and reprocessing. At the same
time, they declare their readiness to impose meaningful penalties on Iran if it
refuses to end its fuel cycle programs or withdraws from the NPT. If Iran
refuses to reestablish the full suspension of all enrichment related activities
and to send overseas the materials produced at Isfahan since August 1, EU
leaders will support taking the issue to the United Nations Security Council
and support a mandatory resolution requiring Iran to do so. If Iran refuses
to comply with this resolution, the EU countries will support a UNSC
resolution imposing economic and diplomatic sanctions on Iran, including a
ban on new foreign investment in Iran's energy sector. The EU countries
will seek consensus at the Security Council, but Russian or Chinese
opposition would not prevent them from imposing sanctions on their own,
together with the United States and Japan, if Iran refuses to end its fuel cycle
program and live up to its NPT obligations. The EU will consider additional
steps should Iran proceed with nuclear enrichment, withdraw from the IAEA
Additional Protocol, or withdraw from the NPT.
SIGNATORIES (UNITED STATES)
Affiliations are for purpose of identification only.
Ronald Asmus, Executive Director, Transatlantic Michael O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow, The Brookings
Center, German Marshall Fund of the United States Institution
Samuel R. Berger, Chairman, Stonebridge International; William J. Perry, former Secretary of Defense under
former National Security Adviser to President Bill Clinton President Bill Clinton
Richard Burt, Chairman, Diligence LLC; former U.S. Thomas Pickering, former Undersecretary of State for
Ambassador to Germany under President Ronald Reagan Political Affairs
Ivo H. Daalder, Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution Susan Rice, Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution
Francis Fukuyama, Professor of International Political Gary Samore, former Senior Director for Non-
Economy, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Proliferation and Export Controls at the National
Studies Johns Hopkins University Security Council
Leslie Gelb, President Emeritus, Council on Foreign David Sandalow, Senior Fellow, The Brookings
Relations Institution
Robert Gelbard, Chairman, Washington Global Simon Serfaty, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair, Center for
Partners former Special Envoy to the Balkans and Strategic and International Studies
Ambassador to Indonesia
Jeremy Shapiro, Director of Research, Center on the
John Gibson, former NSC Senior Director for Foreign United States and Europe, The Brookings Institution
Policy Speechwriting in the George W. Bush
Administration Anne-Marie Slaughter, Dean, Woodrow Wilson School
of Public Affairs, Princeton University
Philip H. Gordon, Director of the Center on the United
States and Europe and Senior Fellow, The Brookings James B. Steinberg, Vice-President and Director of
Institution Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution; former
Deputy National Security Adviser to President Bill
Robert Hutchings, Professor, Princeton University; Clinton
former Chairman, National Intelligence Council under
George W. Bush Strobe Talbott, President, The Brookings Institution,
former Deputy Secretary of State under President Bill
G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Clinton
Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University
Robert Kagan, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace and Transatlantic Fellow,
German Marshall Fund
Anthony Lake, Georgetown University; former National
Security Adviser to President Bill Clinton
Andrew Moravcsik, Professor of Politics, Princeton
University
Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Dean, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University
SIGNATORIES (EUROPE)
Affiliations are for purpose of identification only.
Urban Ahlin, Chairman of Foreign Relations Committee, Mark Leonard, Director of Foreign Policy, Centre For
Swedish Parliament European Reform, London
Giuliano Amato, former Italian Prime Minister Kalypso Nicolaidis, University Lecturer in International
Relations, University of Oxford
Gerassimos Arsenis, former Greek Defense Minister
Soli Özel, Professor of International Relations, Bilgi
Jean-Claude Casanova, editor, Commentaire, Paris University, Istanbul; Columnist, Sabah
Marta Dassú, Director General, International Programs, Ana Palacio, former Spanish Foreign Minister
Aspen Italia, Rome
George Robertson, former NATO Secretary General and
Thérèse Delpech, Senior Research Fellow, Center for British Defense Secretary
International Studies and Research; former UNMOVIC
Commissioner Narcís Serra, President, CIDOB Foundation, Madrid;
former Minister of Defense of Spain
Lawrence Freedman, Professor of War Studies, King's
College, London Stefano Silvestri, President, Institute of International
Affairs, Rome
Nicole Gnesotto, Director, EU Institute for Security
Studies, Paris Antonio Vitorino, former Portuguese Minister of
Defense and European Commissioner for Justice and
Charles Grant, Director, Centre For European Reform, Home Affairs
London
Joris Vos, former Dutch Ambassador to the United States
Ulrike Guérot, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German
Marshall Fund of the United States
David Hannay, former British Ambassador to the United
Nations and the European Union
Douglas Hurd, former British Foreign Secretary
Josef Janning, Head of International Relations,
Bertelsmann Foundation; Deputy Director, Center for
Applied Political Research, Munich
Géza Jeszensky, former Hungarian Foreign Minister
Daniel Keohane, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for
European Reform, London
Ivan Krastev, Chairman of the Board and Research
Director, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia
Mart Laar, former Estonian Prime Minister