Atoms for the Sustainable Future: Recommendations on Nuclear…

        Atoms for the Sustainable Future:
Recommendations on Nuclear Energy in the 21st Century




                           January 2008




               Japan Institute of International Affairs
           Taskforce on Atoms for the Sustainable Future
I.      Growing Hope for Nuclear Energy and Deepening Concerns over Nuclear
        Threats


Nuclear energy has two facets. When it is used for peaceful purposes such as power generation,
medical services, agriculture and industry, it can make a contribution to the betterment of the
quality of life. However, it also could be used for military or criminal purposes. Thus, there are
both great opportunities and great risks.


Nuclear energy can ease energy security competition. As economies grow, energy demands
also increase. For example, in Asia where there are rising energy- consuming countries such as
China and India, it is predicted that meeting the demand for energy will become a serious
challenge not only to each country but to the region as a whole. In other regions such as Africa
and Middle East, plans and express of interest in nuclear energy has been increasing. The
expectation that nuclear energy will fill the gap between energy demand and supply has
become very high.


Nuclear energy is also expected to contribute to global efforts to cope with the global warming
problem as its carbon dioxide emissions are much smaller than fossil fuel sources. Comparing
among major energy sources including non-fossil fuels, nuclear power is one of the most
effective energy sources to reduce CO2 emissions.


Given the energy security and environmental challenges that we face, we believe that
promoting nuclear energy globally would provide an effective way to cope with these
challenges. To this end, international cooperation should be deepened and expanded.


While we expect nuclear energy to play an increasing role that will better our lives, nuclear
energy also poses serious security challenges.


The world has had to live for more than sixty years with the serious threat of nuclear
devastation, a threat that is the result of the huge number of nuclear weapons that could destroy
the earth several times over. While this danger continues, we also face rising nuclear
proliferation threats caused by the diversion of peaceful nuclear programs to military use, or
withdrawal from international non-proliferation treaties and agreements, nuclear terrorism and
thefts or illicit trade of nuclear materials by non-state actors.
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It is our hope that all nuclear threats will be reduced and eventually eliminated. All human
beings should remember that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the goal of every
civilization. All nations must share a common goal regarding nuclear disarmament and make
every effort to achieve it, while the legitimate security concerns of every nation must be
addressed in the course of achieving this goal.


We also recognize that no other actor, either state or non-state, should be allowed to possess
nuclear weapons and weaponization capabilities. Neither should any state and non-state actor
assist others' proliferation activities. As the use of nuclear energy spreads, risks and threats that
arise from such activities would also rise. In particular, recent challenges such as cases of North
Korea and Iran present great risks of proliferation, illustrating insufficiency in international
mechanisms to oversee and prevent exploitation of peaceful nuclear activities for military
purposes.


One could divert peaceful nuclear facilities into military ones without detection, if safeguards
are not properly functioned for such facilities. One could use peaceful nuclear program to
accumulate materials and capabilities for military purposes, hiding such intentions, before it
would withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other international non-proliferation
obligations. Or, one might use peaceful nuclear program to cover clandestine nuclear activities.


Therefore, our great challenge is to establish universal principles for the promotion of nuclear
energy to contribute to sustainable growth of the global economy, solution of global warming
problems, and meeting energy security needs, in well balance with furthering efforts to pursue
the reduction of risks posed by threats of nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism, and existing
nuclear weapons. We also need to be reminded that concerns over safety of nuclear activities
have become further important for maintaining credibility and sustainability of nuclear energy
activities. The peaceful use of nuclear energy should not be exploited to acquire nuclear
weapons capabilities.


Nuclear terrorism is now perceived as one of the gravest security threats in nuclear-related
activities as it is an event with high intensity consequence. While the probability of such event
is not so high, once it happens, it would cause a serious damage on society in its economy,


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social life, and security order. The security of nuclear materials and facilities must become a
priority.


It is extremely important for the international community to make a long-term, sustained
commitment to a `balanced' approach to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in a world that is
safer from nuclear risks. And we believe that various international fora including G8 Summit
meetings should provide platforms for discussing ways to cooperate toward this common goal.


Therefore, we recommend the international community to urgently address the following
issues.



II.       Toward a More Balanced Approach to Promoting Peaceful Use of Nuclear
          Energy with Strengthening Global Nuclear Non-Proliferation


We reaffirm that each nation has the "inalienable right" to enjoy the benefits of the peaceful
use of nuclear energy in conformity with the provisions of non-proliferation and safeguards
obligations in the NPT and the IAEA Statute. This `inalienable' right should not permit the
acquisition of sensitive nuclear materials and technology without transparent and plausible
plans for strictly peaceful programs.


Since nuclear energy promotes energy security and better protects the environment, we
recognize the importance of international cooperation in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear
energy. At the same time, it is important that all nations be aware of the risks related to the
introduction of nuclear power.


Recommendation 1: Establish the "Three S" as universal guiding principles for safe and
secure development of nuclear energy activities
            Due to dual nature and necessity of risk management of nuclear energy, states that
            intend to introduce peaceful nuclear activities must take into account; a) Safety of
            their facilities and operation; b) Security of facilities and materials; and c)
            non-proliferation (or Safeguards). ("Three S": Safety, Security, and Safeguards) There
            is a new international environment for nuclear activities in which the threat of
            terrorism is rising, and the needs for nuclear energy have been increasing in
            developing countries. Therfore, demand is increasing for wider and clear awareness of
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        the indispensability of "Three S" for the introduction and operation of nuclear power
        and for the harmonization and , where necessary, strengthening of the rules and
        regulations governing the "Three S" in an integrated manner, so that the world can
        enjoy the benefits of nuclear energy while minimizing the nuclear risks. With such
        integrated, where necessary strengthened and streamlined framework of the "Three S",
        prerequisite for the introducing and operating nuclear energy activities will become
        clearer, and the transparency and sustainability of international cooperation and
        technology transfer for the peaceful use of nuclear energy will be enhanced.


        The G8 should endorse the "Three S" for strengthening nuclear security, nuclear
        safety and non-proliferation rules and guidelines, and appropriate international fora
        such as the IAEA could discuss and decide details. It would also be useful to invite
        nuclear industry into discussion on "Three S" as they have expertise, and are, in many
        cases, primarily responsible for building and operating nuclear facilities.


        It is not our desire to discriminate between `haves' and `have-nots' by setting up this
        framework. Rather, we propose that the international community (in particular G8
        countries) should provide necessary assistance (both technically and financially) to
        states which have nuclear power plants, or have plans to introduce nuclear power
        programs to meet requirements of "Three S". For safe and peaceful promotion,
        mechanisms for international cooperation should be established in the areas of
        technical assistance such as human resource development as well as sharing best
        practice in safety, security and non-proliferation activities.


Recommendation 2: Provide appropriate international financial assistance schemes to
nuclear energy programs and projects in developing countries
        Capital procurement would be a key to expand nuclear energy worldwide. Nuclear
        power generation needs a large initial capital investment and requires a long-term
        payback period. Developing countries need to attract international capital for their
        nuclear programs. Therefore, the international community should offer innovative
        financial mechanisms, with which private and public investment for the construction
        of nuclear reactors would be facilitated, as the IAEA General Conference requested to
        the Director General of the IAEA (cf. GC(50)/res/13, September 2006 and
        GC(51)/res/14, September 2007). Other existing financal mechanisms such as World


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        Bank loans and OECD guidelines for export credit, which currently discriminate
        against nuclear projects, should be made available for nuclear power projects.


        It may also be worth examining the linking of financial support through mechanisms
        mentioned above with the fulfillment of "Three S" guidelines since it would
        contribute to enhancing safety and security of nuclear activities, and non-proliferation.


Recommendation 3: Address nuclear energy as an effective tool for coping with global
warming and make appropriate schemes to incorporate nuclear energy into such efforts.
        Currently, there is no incentive or mechanism to facilitate the utilization of nuclear
        energy for environmental purposes while nuclear energy is quite effective in terms of
        reducing CO2 emission. Such discrimination against nuclear energy might undermine
        international efforts to cope with global warming. We urge the international
        community to acknowledge that nuclear energy would be an effective way to
        contribute to containing the increase of CO2 emissions. Relevant mechanisms should
        be available for nuclear energy projects. In particular, we back the creation of a policy
        mechanism to systematically incorporate the promotion of nuclear energy in the
        efforts to tackle global warming in the new round of negotiations.


Recommendation 4: Address safety and liability properly both in the domestic regulatory
framework and in international cooperation
        We recognize that nuclear safety and liability are important issues when introducing
        nuclear energy program. Confidence in the safety of nuclear power operation is an
        indispensable basis for promoting nuclear energy. Obtaining such confidence should
        be put a high priority by government and industry in introducing nuclear power
        plants.


        Lack of a nuclear liability scheme could also be a serious obstacle for states which
        would provide cooperation and assistance in peaceful nuclear activities. All states
        should establish liability legislation and a mechanism for compensation related to
        nuclear accidents, which would be in conformity to internationally established norms
        and principles for nuclear liability.




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         The international community should provide cooperation with states which would like
         to introduce nuclear energy, in establishing a regulatory framework and administrative
         capacities in properly addressing safety and liability.


Recommendation 5: Universalize the Additional Protocol and enhance the export control
regime
         (1) Pursue universalization of the Additional Protocol
         We believe that universalization of the Additional Protocol (AP) to IAEA safeguards
         agreements is one of the most important and effective ways to check nuclear
         proliferation. We recognize that it would be difficult to make the AP obligatory now.
         However, in the spirit of cooperation, and given the shared interests in reducing
         nuclear threats, the international community must create a more effective way to
         utilize the AP in multilateral and bilateral ways, for the objective of non-proliferation.


         (2) Make adherence to Additional Protocol a condition for nuclear trade
         Strengthening export control measures is essential for preventing proliferation. We
         strongly encourage the NSG to adopt adherence to the AP as an additional condition
         for supplying nuclear related materials and technology in the NSG guidelines. If it is
         difficult, G8 countries may voluntarily declare that concluding the AP will be a
         condition for the supply of nuclear materials and technology.


         While we are aware of concerns over its unconditional extension, a moratorium by the
         G8 regarding the transfer of sensitive technology and materials to additional states
         should be extended until a proper guideline or mechanism to regulate nuclear trade is
         established. In the meantime, we encourage the G8 and NSG to continue to discuss
         this issue.


Recommendation 6: Explore ways to utilize Assurance of Fuel Supply and Multilateral
Approaches to nuclear fuel cycle for promoting non-proliferation and sharing nuclear
energy opportunities.
         (1) Reliable assurance of supply as key to effective multilateral mechanisms
         Assurance of fuel supply for non-nuclear fuel cycle states (or multilateral approaches
         to nuclear fuel cycle) has significance in shaping and embedding robust
         non-proliferation norms and habits in the international community. The introduction
         of such mechanisms would contribute to non-proliferation.
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Given Article IV of the NPT, it would be impossible to force all states to join a fuel
supply mechanism. But it is important to discuss assurance of supply and multilateral
approaches as it would contribute to strengthening international non-proliferation
norms. Reliable fuel supply assurance mechanisms are a realistic option to keep
nations from developing their own enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.


(2) Multilateral mechanisms should not create new nuclear `haves' and
`have-nots'
International interdependence is already a fact in the area of nuclear fuel supply, and it
will be increasingly important as most `national' fuel cycle programs have
international elements. Therefore, for some countries -- such as those with small scale
nuclear programs -- it would be more efficient to rely on an international mechanism
as a backup to fuel procurement through market mechanisms. Multilateral approaches
may provide an alternative measure for states to procure nuclear fuels. Furthermore,
international interdependence would help ensure that `national' programs would not
divert into military purposes as interdependence could function as a mutual oversight
mechanism.


We are aware of concerns about these mechanisms. First, such multilateral fuel cycle
arrangements should not distort existing, relatively well-functioning market
mechanisms for fuel procurement. Second, consumer states would be concerned over
whether they could become a producers' cartel for nuclear energy, which would
extend control over not only the fuel market, but also consumer states' sovereignty
over nuclear programs. There is also concern that such mechanisms could fix the
status of supplier states (or `nuclear haves') and consumer states (or `nuclear
have-nots') ­ in other words, they could create another form of discrimination in the
international nuclear order. Therefore, it is necessary for such a mechanism to be
flexible enough to accept various types of contribution by member states, depending
on what they can provide to the mechanism. Such mechanisms must be inclusionary
rather than exclusionary. Third, Focusing on enrichment service in the multilateral
approaches or assurances of supply is not sufficient in coping with the risk of fuel
supply disruption. Envisioning such mechanisms should also pay attention to other
functions in the front end process, such as mining, conversion, and fuel fabrication.


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Recommendation 7: Address concerns over the backend of fuel cycle
        We should also look at the entire nuclear fuel cycle, from mining to spent fuel
        management. Most countries with civilian nuclear reactors face problems related to
        management of spent fuel. To make international assurance of supply credible and
        attractive, we need to address the management of the backend of the fuel cycle.
        Providing viable spent fuel management options would further increase the reliability
        of international mechanisms for managing the nuclear fuel cycle.


        We also should be reminded that effective management of backend of fuel cycle is
        important in the context of both non-proliferation as well as nuclear security, and
        utilization of resources. Measures should be taken for increasing transparency on
        stockpile of recovered uranium and plutonium. The stockpiles of plutonium should be
        maintained at appropriate size, and they must be properly protected. For the sake of
        utilizing them as resources, we may pursue efficient use of recovered uranium and
        plutonium, such as burning at reactors. It would also contribute the reduction of the
        stockpiles of such materials.


Recommendation 8: Strengthen enforcement and implementation mechanisms for
non-proliferation
        (1) Strengthen supplementary measures
        Policy measures such as UNSCR1540 and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
        are important elements of the international non-proliferation regime. They can play a
        role in filling gaps that are not covered by other conventional non-proliferation
        mechanisms such as export controls and IAEA safeguards.


        (2) Make conditionalities for withdrawal from NPT
        The exploitation of the provision for withdrawal in the NPT (Article X) is a great
        concern, especially after North Korea's declaration of withdrawal. Exploitation of
        Article X could undermine the effectiveness of NPT norms. Conditionality for
        withdrawal from NPT may be properly addressed at the NPT Review Conference.


        (3) Strengthen the linkage between IAEA and UN Security Council for
        enforcement
        Enforcement against cases of non-compliance is necessary to maintain the credibility
        and reliability of the international non-proliferation regime. In this sense, the linkage
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        of the IAEA and the UN Security Council, which is prescribed in the IAEA Statute,
        should be reinforced in a way that strengthens the capacity for enforcing
        non-proliferation rules. The international community's demonstration that it is united
        and will not tolerate non-compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements through the
        adoption of resolutions at the UN Security Council, and imposing sanctions by
        resolutions would strengthen non-proliferation, and deter potential proliferators.


        (4) Proper combination among dialogue through ad hoc forum, incentives, and
        enforcement is important
        In the meantime, addressing region-specific or issue-specific security concerns in
        multilateral fora other than the UN or IAEA can provide effective ways to reduce
        nuclear threats, and supplement efforts through the UN or IAEA. For example, for
        imminent proliferation problems such as North Korea and Iran, multilateral
        negotiation frameworks like the Six-Party Talks and EU3 plus 3, respectively, can
        play a significant role to secure channels for dialogue with countries concerned and
        find solutions. The proper combination and balance among dialogue, incentives, and
        credible enforcement with possibility of sanctions should be utilized for resolving
        existing proliferation problems.


Recommendation 9: Deepen and widen international collaboration in developing
proliferation-resistant technology and sophisticated safeguards and verification
technology
       A proper combination of political, institutional and technological measures would
       strengthen capabilities to cope with nuclear proliferation problems. In this sense, the
       development of proliferation-resistant technology is one promising approach to
       strengthening non-proliferation efforts. The international community should be further
       engaged in developing more proliferation-resistant fuel cycle and nuclear reactor
       technologies and more effective safeguards technologies, through international
       collaborations such as INPRO, GIF and GNEP. The technological approach to nuclear
       non-proliferation is important as it might create new ways to pursue nuclear energy
       while promoting non-proliferation. The technological approach and international
       cooperation to spur innovative research and development for safer and secure nuclear
       technologies could be effective approaches as they could supplement other
       non-proliferation measures.


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III.   Reducing Nuclear Threats


In order to make the world safer from nuclear threats, all types of security threats derived from
nuclear activities should be equally addressed. While a balanced approach for promoting
peaceful use of nuclear energy with strengthening safety, security and safeguards intends to
strengthen non-proliferation and suppress nuclear terrorism, reducing existing nuclear weapons
is another important element in the pursuit of a world free from nuclear threats, enjoying
benefits of nuclear energy.


We recognize that the `grand bargain' among the three pillars of the NPT -- non-proliferation,
peaceful use of nuclear energy, and nuclear disarmament ­ continues to be a vital part of the
international non-proliferation regime, and each component should be addressed. In particular,
it should be reminded that political commitment by nuclear-weapon states of further efforts of
nuclear disarmament, which was reassured repeatedly at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension
Conference and the 2000 Review Conference, must be faithfully pursued. In order to further
widen and strengthen global non-proliferation campaign, disarmament efforts by all nuclear
armed states are indispensable. In this context, we need to revisit the importance of addressing
and adopting measures for nuclear disarmament.


Recommendation 10: Reemphasize nuclear disarmament and reaffirm the total
elimination of nuclear weapons as an important goal for human civilization
         We believe that all nuclear-weapon states, whether de facto or de jure, share a heavy
         responsibility in reducing nuclear threats from the world. They all should commit to
         further efforts toward nuclear disarmament, and take concrete steps toward total
         elimination of nuclear weapons. In this regard, we welcome the progress made by
         certain states including the United States and Russia on nuclear arms reduction and
         urge that further concrete steps would be taken by the United States and Russia in
         achieving less reliance on nuclear weapons for a stable strategic balance, especially
         through negotiation for post-START I and post-SORT strategic arms control
         arrangements of two countries. Such efforts by the United States and Russia would
         lead other countries to make their commitments to reducing nuclear weapons. We
         believe that such progress will serve to create favorable international circumstances


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        for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation toward total elimination of nuclear
        weapons.


Recommendation 11: Address security incentives for nuclear proliferation
        To that end, nuclear-weapon states should take measures that diminish the role of
        nuclear weapons in security policy to minimize the risk that such weapons would ever
        be used, and to facilitate a process that ends in their total elimination. These measures
        should include efforts to eliminate other weapons of mass destructions such as
        chemical and biological weapons and to improve regional security environments, in
        particular in conflict-stricken regions since existence of such weapons could be used
        for the justification of pursuing nuclear weapons.


        We also recognize the importance of confidence building for reducing nuclear threats
        and anxiety by increasing the transparency of both military and civilian nuclear
        activities, including nuclear doctrines and nuclear energy plans.


Recommendation 12: Achieve early entry-into-force of the CTBT and start negotiation
on an FMCT
        We recognize the importance of the CTBT and an FMCT in supplementing the NPT
        in further reducing nuclear threats. We urge states that have not signed or ratified the
        CTBT to do so swiftly. And we urge members of the Conference on Disarmament not
        to block FMCT negotiations. In the meantime, we urge all nuclear armed states both
        inside and outside NPT declaring moratorium of production of fissile materials for
        weapons purposes, respecting the spirit of an FMCT. Furthermore, we request all
        nuclear armed states strengthen accountancy and control of their fissile materials for
        nuclear weapons and disclose information on their status for confidence building
        purposes.


Recommendation 13: Strengthen international efforts to combat nuclear terrorism and
nuclear security concerns
        Coping with threats of nuclear terrorism is the current security priority. The
        international community should unite to confront these threats under the International
        Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Global Initiative to
        Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
        Material and Nuclear Facilities, and by strengthening domestic measures of control
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         and management over materials and security of facilities. Yet a global effort to cope
         with nuclear terrorism could be more effective. To do this, G8 countries should offer
         assistance to other countries to implement effective accounting and control over the
         stockpile of nuclear, radioactive and other radiological materials.


         The Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass
         Destruction (nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical) was launched at the G8
         Kananaskis Summit in June 2002 to cope with the growing threat of terrorists
         acquiring such weapons and materials. The G8 and their partners have been
         implementing specific projects, including the securing of nuclear materials, the
         dismantlement of nuclear submarines and destruction of chemical weapons, in Russia.
         Because the prospect of related materials, equipment and technology falling into the
         wrong hands is a global danger, the activities under this Partnership should be
         globally expanded in scope and membership. In this sense, the G8 Global Partnership
         could be utilized as a channel for providing necessary financial and technical
         cooperation to countries urgently necessitating measures to strengthen security and
         physical protection of nuclear and radiological materials, and implement
         UNSCR1540.


         We also take note on the importance of sharing information, expertise and best
         practice among like-minded countries on nuclear security and physical protection as
         well as protecting sensitive information. In particular, efforts to facilitate information
         sharing and mutual cooperation among nuclear operators and facilities should be
         promoted.


Conclusion


The world faces serious challenges that could threaten the survival of the human race.
Tightening energy supply and global warming are among these imminent challenges. Safe and
secure utilization of nuclear energy will play an important role in coping with these problems,
by easing pressure from energy security needs and supplying energy with much less CO2
emission than other major energy sources.


Yet, nuclear energy also poses serious security and safety challenges. It is extremely important
that peaceful use of nuclear energy takes into account nuclear security against terrorist
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activities, the safe operation of nuclear energy facilities, and preventing proliferation. Without
addressing these challenges, the peaceful use of nuclear energy cannot be promoted. Therefore,
we must take a balanced approach to strengthen nuclear safety, security, and non-proliferation
measures as well as to promote peaceful use in an appropriate, effective manner. In this regard,
the "Three S" would provide a useful conceptual framework to comprehensively deal with
nuclear risks while developing safe and secure nuclear activities. In addition, nuclear
disarmament should be further promoted. Promotion of nuclear disarmament would strengthen
norms of the international non-proliferation regime, and thus it would encourage states to be
engaged in global non-proliferation efforts. We believe that respecting the "Three S" concept
in promoting nuclear energy and sincere promotion of nuclear disarmament are essential for
the promotion of nuclear energy to gain universal legitimacy and confidence.


It may take time to realize and implement measures to meet these challenges. But risks are
imminent. The G8 must take the initiative in discussing concrete actions and taking immediate
steps to reduce such risks.




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                                 Members of the Task Force


Tetsuya Endo, Ambassador, Former Vice Chairman, Japan Atomic Energy Commission


Yumi Akimoto, Chief Executive Emeritus, Mitsubishi Materials Corporation


Masahiko Asada, Professor, Kyoto University


Takahiko Ito, Advisor, Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc.


Yoji Uchiyama, Professor, Department of Risk Engineering, University of Tsukuba


Toshio Okazaki, President, Japan Atomic Energy Agency


Shinichi Ogawa, Director of Research Department, the National Institute for Defense Studies


Hiroshi Nakanishi, Professor, School of Government, Kyoto University


Nobumasa Akiyama, Associate Professor, Hitotsubashi University




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