Bibliography Tim Abbott, Daniel Kane, and Paul Valiant. On the…

Bibliography

Tim Abbott, Daniel Kane, and Paul Valiant. On the complexity of two-player win-lose games. In
  Proceedings of the Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2005.

Nir Ailon, Moses Charikar, and Alantha Newman. Aggregating inconsistent information: Ranking
  and clustering. In Proceedings of the Annual Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), 2005.

K. Akcoglu, J. Aspnes, B. DasGupta, and M. Y. Kao. Opportunity cost algorithms for combinatorial
  auctions. Applied Optimization: Computational Methods in Decision-Making, Economics and
  Finance, pages 455­479, 2002.

Noga Alon. Ranking tournaments. SIAM Journal of Discrete Mathematics, 20:137­142, 2006.

Martin Andersson and Tuomas Sandholm. Time-quality tradeoffs in reallocative negotiation with
 combinatorial contract types. In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence
 (AAAI), pages 3­10, Orlando, FL, 1999.

Martin Andersson and Tuomas Sandholm. Contract type sequencing for reallocative negotiation.
 In Proceedings of the Twentieth International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems,
 Taipei, Taiwan, April 2000.

Krzysztof R. Apt. Uniform proofs of order independence for various strategy elimination proce-
  dures. Contributions to Theoretical Economics, 4(1), 2004.

Aaron Archer and Eva Tardos. Frugal path mechanisms. In Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on
  Discrete Algorithms (SODA), pages 991­999, 2002.

Aaron Archer, Christos Papadimitriou, K Tawar, and Eva Tardos. An approximate truthful mecha-
  nism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents. In Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium
  on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2003.

S. Areborg, D. G. Corneil, and A. Proskurowski. Complexity of finding embeddings in a K-tree.
   SIAM Journal on Algebraic and Discrete Methods, 8:277­284, 1987.

Mark Armstrong. Optimal multi-object auctions. Review of Economic Studies, 67:455­481, 2000.

Kenneth Arrow. Social choice and individual values. New Haven: Cowles Foundation, 2nd edition,
  1963. 1st edition 1951.

                                               299
300                                                                               BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kenneth Arrow. The property rights doctrine and demand revelation under incomplete information.
  In M Boskin, editor, Economics and human welfare. New York Academic Press, 1979.

Lawrence Ausubel and Paul Milgrom. Ascending auctions with package bidding. Frontiers of
  Theoretical Economics, 1, 2002. No. 1, Article 1.

Lawrence M. Ausubel and Paul Milgrom. The lovely but lonely Vickrey auction. In Peter Cramton,
  Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg, editors, Combinatorial Auctions, chapter 1. MIT Press,
  2006.

Christopher Avery and Terrence Hendershott. Bundling and optimal auctions of multiple products.
  Review of Economic Studies, 67:483­497, 2000.

Jorgen Bang-Jensen and Carsten Thomassen. A polynomial algorithm for the 2-path problem for
  semicomplete digraphs. SIAM Journal of Discrete Mathematics, 5(3):366­376, 1992.

Yair Bartal, Rica Gonen, and Noam Nisan. Incentive compatible multi-unit combinatorial auctions.
  In Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK), Bloomington, Indiana, USA, 2003.

Yair Bartal, Rica Gonen, and Pierfrancesco La Mura. Negotiation-range mechanisms: Exploring
  the limits of truthful efficient markets. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic
  Commerce (ACM-EC), pages 1­8, New York, NY, 2004.

John Bartholdi, III and James Orlin. Single transferable vote resists strategic voting. Social Choice
  and Welfare, 8(4):341­354, 1991.

John Bartholdi, III, Craig Tovey, and Michael Trick. The computational difficulty of manipulating
  an election. Social Choice and Welfare, 6(3):227­241, 1989.

John Bartholdi, III, Craig Tovey, and Michael Trick. Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to
  tell who won the election. Social Choice and Welfare, 6:157­165, 1989.

Nivan A. R. Bhat and Kevin Leyton-Brown. Computing Nash equilibria of action-graph games. In
  Proceedings of the 20th Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI), Banff,
  Canada, 2004.

Darse Billings, Neil Burch, Aaron Davidson, Robert Holte, Jonathan Schaeffer, Terence Schauen-
  berg, and Duane Szafron. Approximating game-theoretic optimal strategies for full-scale poker.
  In Proceedings of the Eighteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJ-
  CAI), Acapulco, Mexico, 2003.

Ben Blum, Christian R. Shelton, and Daphne Koller. A continuation method for Nash equilibria in
  structured games. In Proceedings of the Eighteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial
  Intelligence (IJCAI), Acapulco, Mexico, 2003.

Avrim Blum, Jeffrey Jackson, Tuomas Sandholm, and Martin Zinkevich. Preference elicitation
  and query learning. Journal of Machine Learning Research, 5:649­667, 2004. Early version in
  COLT-03.
BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                                                  301

Tilman Borgers. Pure strategy dominance. Econometrica, 61(2):423­430, 1993.

Craig Boutilier. Solving concisely expressed combinatorial auction problems. In Proceedings of the
  National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 359­366, Edmonton, Canada, 2002.

Sylvain Bouveret and J´ r^ me Lang. Efficiency and envy-freeness in fair division of indivisible
                       eo
  goods: logical representation and complexity. In Proceedings of the Nineteenth International
  Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 935­940, Edinburgh, UK, 2005.

Felix Brandt and Tuomas Sandholm. (Im)Possibility of unconditionally privacy-preserving auc-
  tions. In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS),
  pages 810­817, New York, NY, USA, 2004.

Felix Brandt and Tuomas Sandholm. On correctness and privacy in distributed mechanisms. In
  Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC) workshop, pages 1­14, New York, NY, 2004.

Felix Brandt and Tuomas Sandholm. Decentralized voting with unconditional privacy. In Inter-
  national Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), Utrecht, The
  Netherlands, 2005.

Felix Brandt and Tuomas Sandholm. Efficient privacy-preserving protocols for multi-unit auc-
  tions. In Proceedings of the Financial Cryptography and Data Security conference(FC), Springer
  LNCS, 2005.

Felix Brandt and Tuomas Sandholm. Unconditional privacy in social choice. In Theoretical Aspects
  of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK), Singapore, 2005.

Andrew Byde. Applying evolutionary game theory to auction mechanism design. In Proceedings
  of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), pages 192­193, San Diego, CA,
  2003. Poster paper.

Ruggiero Cavallo. Optimal decision-making with minimal waste: Strategyproof redistribution of
  VCG payments. In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
  (AAMAS), Hakodate, Japan, 2006.

Xi Chen and Xiaotie Deng. 3-Nash is PPAD-complete. Electronic Colloquium on Computational
  Complexity, Report No. 134, 2005.

Xi Chen and Xiaotie Deng. Settling the complexity of 2-player Nash equilibrium. Electronic
  Colloquium on Computational Complexity, Report No. 150, 2005.

Ed H. Clarke. Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice, 11:17­33, 1971.

Dave Cliff. Evolution of market mechanism through a continuous space of auction-types. Technical
  Report HPL-2001-326, HP Labs, 2001.

William Cohen, Robert Schapire, and Yoram Singer. Learning to order things. Journal of Artificial
 Intelligence Research, 10:213­270, 1999.
302                                                                            BIBLIOGRAPHY

Wolfram Conen and Tuomas Sandholm. Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions: Extended
 abstract. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), pages 256­
 259, Tampa, FL, October 2001. A more detailed description of the algorithmic aspects appeared
 in the IJCAI-2001 Workshop on Economic Agents, Models, and Mechanisms, pp. 71­80.

Wolfram Conen and Tuomas Sandholm. Partial-revelation VCG mechanism for combinatorial auc-
 tions. In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 367­
 372, Edmonton, Canada, 2002.

Vincent Conitzer and Nikesh Garera. Learning algorithms for online principal-agent problems (and
  selling goods online). In International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML), Pittsburgh, PA,
  USA, 2006.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Complexity of manipulating elections with few candi-
  dates. In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 314­
  319, Edmonton, Canada, 2002.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Complexity of mechanism design. In Proceedings of the
  18th Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI), pages 103­110, Edmon-
  ton, Canada, 2002.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Vote elicitation: Complexity and strategy-proofness. In
  Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 392­397, Ed-
  monton, Canada, 2002.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Applications of automated mechanism design. In UAI-03
  workshop on Bayesian Modeling Applications, Acapulco, Mexico, 2003.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Automated mechanism design: Complexity results stem-
  ming from the single-agent setting. In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Elec-
  tronic Commerce (ICEC-03), pages 17­24, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, 2003.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Automated mechanism design with a structured outcome
  space, 2003.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. BL-WoLF: A framework for loss-bounded learnability
  in zero-sum games. In International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML), pages 91­98,
  Washington, DC, USA, 2003.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Complexity results about Nash equilibria. In Proceedings
  of the Eighteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 765­
  771, Acapulco, Mexico, 2003.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Definition and complexity of some basic metareasoning
  problems. In Proceedings of the Eighteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelli-
  gence (IJCAI), pages 1099­1106, Acapulco, Mexico, 2003.
BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                                                   303

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation
  hard. In Proceedings of the Eighteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
  (IJCAI), pages 781­788, Acapulco, Mexico, 2003.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. An algorithm for automatically designing deterministic
  mechanisms without payments. In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-
  Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 128­135, New York, NY, USA, 2004.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning
  in games. In International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML), pages 185­192, Banff,
  Alberta, Canada, 2004.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Computational criticisms of the revelation principle. In
  The Conference on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT-04), Leipzig,
  Germany, 2004. Earlier versions appeared as a short paper at ACM-EC-04, and in the workshop
  on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC-03).

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Computing Shapley values, manipulating value division
  schemes, and checking core membership in multi-issue domains. In Proceedings of the National
  Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 219­225, San Jose, CA, 2004. Earlier version:
  IJCAI-03 workshop on Distributed Constraint Reasoning (DCR-03), Acapulco, Mexico.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Expressive negotiation over donations to charities. In
  Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), pages 51­60, New
  York, NY, 2004.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Self-interested automated mechanism design and impli-
  cations for optimal combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic
  Commerce (ACM-EC), pages 132­141, New York, NY, 2004. Early version appeared as a poster
  in the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003, pp. 232­233.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Common voting rules as maximum likelihood estimators.
  In Proceedings of the 21st Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI),
  pages 145­152, Edinburgh, UK, 2005.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Communication complexity of common voting rules. In
  Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), pages 78­87, Vancou-
  ver, Canada, 2005.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Complexity of (iterated) dominance. In Proceedings
  of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), pages 88­97, Vancouver, Canada,
  2005.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Expressive negotiation in settings with externalities. In
  Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 255­260, Pitts-
  burgh, PA, 2005.
304                                                                              BIBLIOGRAPHY

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. A generalized strategy eliminability criterion and compu-
  tational methods for applying it. In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelli-
  gence (AAAI), pages 483­488, Pittsburgh, PA, 2005.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm
  that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents. Machine
  Learning, 2006. Short version in ICML-03.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based
  on synergies among coalitions. Artificial Intelligence, 170(6-7):607­619, 2006. Earlier version
  appeared in IJCAI-03, pages 613­618.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Computing the optimal strategy to commit to. In Pro-
  ceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), Ann Arbor, MI, 2006.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions
  and exchanges. In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
  (AAMAS), pages 521­528, Hakodate, Japan, 2006. Early versions appeared at the AAMAS-04
  Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC) workshop, and (as a short paper) at ACM-EC-
  04.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Incrementally making mechanisms more strategy-proof.
  In Multidisciplinary Workshop on Advances in Preference Handling, Riva del Garda, Italy, 2006.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to
  manipulate. In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), Boston,
  MA, 2006.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. A technique for reducing normal-form games to compute
  a Nash equilibrium. In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
  (AAMAS), pages 537­544, Hakodate, Japan, 2006. Early version appeared in IJCAI Workshop
  on Game Theoretic and Decision Theoretic Agents (GTDT), 2005.

Vincent Conitzer, J´ r^ me Lang, and Tuomas Sandholm. How many candidates are needed to make
                   eo
  elections hard to manipulate? In Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK),
  pages 201­214, Bloomington, Indiana, USA, 2003.

Vincent Conitzer, Jonathan Derryberry, and Tuomas Sandholm. Combinatorial auctions with struc-
  tured item graphs. In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI),
  pages 212­218, San Jose, CA, 2004.

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, and Paolo Santi. Combinatorial auctions with k-wise depen-
  dent valuations. In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI),
  pages 248­254, Pittsburgh, PA, 2005. Draft in Oct., 2003.

Vincent Conitzer, Andrew Davenport, and Jayant Kalagnanam. Improved bounds for computing
  Kemeny rankings. In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI),
  Boston, MA, 2006. Early version presented at INFORMS-05.
BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                                                     305

Vincent Conitzer. Computing Slater rankings using similarities among candidates. In Proceedings
  of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), Boston, MA, 2006. Early version
  appeared as IBM RC 23748, 2005.

Don Coppersmith, Lisa Fleischer, and Atri Rudra. Ordering by weighted number of wins gives a
  good ranking for weighted tournaments. In Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algo-
  rithms (SODA), 2006.

Thomas Cormen, Charles Leiserson, and Ronald Rivest. Introduction to Algorithms. MIT Press,
  1990.

George Dantzig. Linear Programming and Extensions. Princeton University Press, 1963.

R. K. Dash, S. D. Ramchurn, and N. R. Jennings. Trust-based mechanism design. In International
  Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 748­755, New
  York, NY, USA, 2004.

Constantinos Daskalakis and Christos Papadimitriou. Three-player games are hard. Electronic
  Colloquium on Computational Complexity, Report No. 139, 2005.

Constantinos Daskalakis, Paul Goldberg, and Christos Papadimitriou. The complexity of computing
  a Nash equilibrium. Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity, Report No. 115, 2005.

Claude d'Aspremont and Louis-Andre G´ rard-Varet. Incentives and incomplete information. Jour-
                                       e
  nal of Public Economics, 11:25­45, 1979.

Andrew Davenport and Jayant Kalagnanam. A computational study of the Kemeny rule for prefer-
  ence aggregation. In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI),
  pages 697­702, San Jose, CA, 2004.

Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat (Marquis de Condorcet). Essai sur l'application de l'analyse
 `              e      e                 `
 a la probabilit´ des d´ cisions rendues a la pluralit´ des voix. 1785. Paris: L'Imprimerie Royale.
                                                      e

Sven de Vries and Rakesh Vohra. Combinatorial auctions: A survey. INFORMS Journal on Com-
  puting, 15(3):284­309, 2003.

Sven de Vries, James Schummer, and Rakesh V. Vohra. On ascending auctions for heterogeneous
  objects, 2003. Draft, Nov.

Christine DeMartini, Anthony Kwasnica, John Ledyard, and David Porter. A new and improved
  design for multi-object iterative auctions. Technical Report 1054, California Institute of Technol-
  ogy, Social Science, September 1999.

John Dickhaut and Todd Kaplan. A program for finding Nash equilibria. The Mathematica Journal,
  pages 87­93, 1991.

Cynthia Dwork, Ravi Kumar, Moni Naor, and D. Sivakumar. Rank aggregation methods for the
  web. In Proceedings of the 10th World Wide Web Conference, pages 613­622, 2001.
306                                                                           BIBLIOGRAPHY

eBay UK. Proxy bidding. 2004. http://pages.ebay.co.uk/help/buyerguide/bidding-prxy.html.

Edith Elkind and Helger Lipmaa. Hybrid voting protocols and hardness of manipulation. In Annual
  International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC), 2005.

Edith Elkind and Helger Lipmaa. Small coalitions cannot manipulate voting. In Proceedings of the
  Financial Cryptography and Data Security conference(FC), 2005.

Elaine Eschen and Jeremy Spinrad. An O(n2 ) algorithm for circular-arc graph recognition. In
  Annual SIAM-ACM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), pages 128­137, 1993.

Joan Feigenbaum, Christos Papadimitriou, and Scott Shenker. Sharing the cost of muliticast trans-
  missions. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 63:21­41, 2001. Early version in STOC-00.

Lance Fortnow, Joe Kilian, David M. Pennock, and Michael P. Wellman. Betting boolean-style:
  a framework for trading in securities based on logical formulas. In Proceedings of the ACM
  Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), pages 144­155, San Diego, CA, 2003.

Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole. Game Theory. MIT Press, 1991.

Yuzo Fujishima, Kevin Leyton-Brown, and Yoav Shoham. Taming the computational complexity
  of combinatorial auctions: Optimal and approximate approaches. In Proceedings of the Sixteenth
  International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 548­553, Stockholm,
  Sweden, August 1999.

David Gale, Harold W. Kuhn, and Albert W. Tucker. Linear programming and the theory of games.
  In Tjalling Koopmans, editor, Activity Analysis of Allocation and Production. 1951.

Michael Garey and David Johnson. Computers and Intractability. W. H. Freeman and Company,
 1979.

Michael Garey, David Johnson, and Larry Stockmeyer. Some simplified NP-complete graph prob-
 lems. Theoretical Computer Science, 1:237­267, 1976.

Allan Gibbard. Manipulation of voting schemes. Econometrica, 41:587­602, 1973.

Allan Gibbard. Manipulation of schemes that mix voting with chance. Econometrica, 45:665­681,
  1977.

Itzhak Gilboa and Eitan Zemel. Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations.
   Games and Economic Behavior, 1:80­93, 1989.

Itzhak Gilboa, Ehud Kalai, and Eitan Zemel. On the order of eliminating dominated strategies.
   Operations Research Letters, 9:85­89, 1990.

Itzhak Gilboa, Ehud Kalai, and Eitan Zemel. The complexity of eliminating dominated strategies.
   Mathematics of Operation Research, 18:553­565, 1993.
BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                                                  307

Andrew Gilpin and Tuomas Sandholm. A competitive Texas Hold'em poker player via automated
  abstraction and real-time equilibrium computation. In Proceedings of the National Conference
  on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), Boston, MA, 2006.

Andrew Gilpin and Tuomas Sandholm. Finding equilibria in large sequential games of imperfect
  information. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), Ann
  Arbor, MI, 2006.

Andrew Goldberg and Jason Hartline. Envy-free auctions for digital goods. In Proceedings of the
  ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), pages 29­35, San Diego, CA, 2003.

Devorah Goldburg and Shannon McElligott. Red cross statement on official donation locations.
  2001. Press release, http://www.redcross.org/press/disaster/ds pr/011017legitdonors.html.

Rica Gonen and Daniel Lehmann. Optimal solutions for multi-unit combinatorial auctions: Branch
  and bound heuristics. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-
  EC), pages 13­20, Minneapolis, MN, October 2000.

Georg Gottlob, Gianluigi Greco, and Francesco Scarcello. Pure Nash equilibria: hard and easy
  games. In Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK), pages 215­230, Bloom-
  ington, Indiana, USA, 2003.

J Green and J-J Laffont. Characterization of satisfactory mechanisms for the revelation of prefer-
  ences for public goods. Econometrica, 45:427­438, 1977.

Theodore Groves. Incentives in teams. Econometrica, 41:617­631, 1973.

Hongwei Gui, Rudolf M¨ ller, and Rakesh Vohra. Characterizing dominant strategy mechanisms
                       u
  with multi-dimensional types, 2004. Working Paper.

E. Hemaspaandra and L. Hemaspaandra. Dichotomy for voting systems. Technical Report 861,
  University of Rochester, Department of Computer Science, 2005.

E. Hemaspaandra, L. Hemaspaandra, and J. Rothe. Exact analysis of Dodgson elections: Lewis Car-
   roll's 1876 voting system is complete for parallel access to NP. Journal of the ACM, 44(6):806­
   825, 1997.

John Hershberger and Subhash Suri. Vickrey prices and shortest paths: What is an edge worth? In
  Proceedings of the Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2001.

Douglas Hofstadter. Metamagical Themas. Basic Books, 1985.

Bengt Holmstr¨ m. Groves' scheme on restricted domains. Econometrica, 47(5):1137­1144, 1979.
             o

Holger Hoos and Craig Boutilier. Solving combinatorial auctions using stochastic local search. In
  Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 22­29, Austin,
  TX, August 2000.
308                                                                           BIBLIOGRAPHY

Benoit Hudson and Tuomas Sandholm. Effectiveness of query types and policies for preference
  elicitation in combinatorial auctions. In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
  Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 386­393, New York, NY, USA, 2004. Early versions:
  CMU tech report CMU-CS-02-124, AMEC-02, SITE-02.

Nathana¨ l Hyafil and Craig Boutilier. Regret-based incremental partial revelation mechanisms. In
       e
  Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), Boston, MA, 2006.

Takayuki Ito, Makoto Yokoo, and Shigeo Matsubara. Designing an auciton protocol under asym-
  metric information on nature's selection. In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
  Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 61­68, Bologna, Italy, 2002.

Takayuki Ito, Makoto Yokoo, and Shigeo Matsubara. Toward a combinatorial auction protocol
  among experts and amateurs: The case of single-skilled experts. In International Conference on
  Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 481­488, Melbourne, Australia,
  2003.

Takayuki Ito, Makoto Yokoo, and Shigeo Matsubara. A combinatorial auction among versatile ex-
  perts and amateurs. In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
  (AAMAS), pages 378­385, New York, NY, USA, 2004.

Sergei Izmalkov, Matt Lepinski, and Silvio Micali. Universal mechanism design. In Proceedings of
  the Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2005.

Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu. How (not) to sell nuclear weapons. American Economic
  Review, 86(4):814­829, 1996.

Radu Jurca and Boi Faltings. Minimum payments that reward honest reputation feedback. In
  Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), Ann Arbor, MI, 2006.

Richard Karp. Reducibility among combinatorial problems. In Raymond E Miller and James W
  Thatcher, editors, Complexity of Computer Computations, pages 85­103. Plenum Press, NY,
  1972.

Michael Kearns, Michael Littman, and Satinder Singh. Graphical models for game theory. In
 Proceedings of the Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI), 2001.

John Kemeny. Mathematics without numbers. In Daedalus, volume 88, pages 571­591. 1959.

Leonid Khachiyan. A polynomial algorithm in linear programming. Soviet Math. Doklady, 20:191­
  194, 1979.

Christopher Kiekintveld, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, and Michael Wellman. An analysis of the 2004
  supply chain management trading agent competition. In IJCAI-05 Workshop on Trading Agent
  Design and Analysis, Edinburgh, UK, 2005.

Donald E. Knuth, Christos H. Papadimitriou, and John N Tsitsiklis. A note on strategy elimination
  in bimatrix games. Operations Research Letters, 7(3):103­107, 1988.
BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                                                 309

R Kohli, R Krishnamurthi, and P Mirchandani. The minimum satisfiability problem. SIAM Journal
  of Discrete Mathematics, 7(2):275­283, 1994.
Daphne Koller and Avi Pfeffer. Representations and solutions for game-theoretic problems. Artifi-
  cial Intelligence, 94(1):167­215, July 1997.
Norbert Korte and Rolf Mohring. An incremental linear-time algorithm for recognizing interval
  graphs. SIAM Journal on Computing, 18(1):68­81, February 1989.
Anshul Kothari, David Parkes, and Subhash Suri. Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multi-
  unit auctions. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), pages
  166­175, San Diego, CA, 2003.
Sebasti´ n Lahaie and David Parkes. Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation. In
       e
  Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), New York, NY, 2004.
Kate Larson and Tuomas Sandholm. Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilib-
  rium. Artificial Intelligence, 132(2):183­217, 2001. Short early version appeared in the Pro-
  ceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pp. 48­55, Austin, TX,
  2000.
Kate Larson and Tuomas Sandholm. Costly valuation computation in auctions. In Theoretical
  Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK VIII), pages 169­182, Siena, Italy, July 2001.
Kate Larson and Tuomas Sandholm. Mechanism design for deliberative agents. In International
  Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), Utrecht, The Nether-
  lands, 2005. Early versions appeared as Designing Auctions for Deliberative Agents at AMEC-
  04, and Strategic Deliberation and Truthful Revelation: An Impossibility Result at ACM-EC-04
  (short paper).
Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'Alem, and Noam Nisan. Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial
  auctions. In Proceedings of the Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS),
  pages 574­583, 2003.
Daniel Lehmann, Lidian Ita O'Callaghan, and Yoav Shoham. Truth revelation in rapid, approxi-
  mately efficient combinatorial auctions. Journal of the ACM, 49(5):577­602, 2002. Early version
  appeared in ACMEC-99.
Carlton Lemke and J. Howson. Equilibrium points of bimatrix games. Journal of the Society of
  Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 12:413­423, 1964.
Kevin Leyton-Brown and Moshe Tennenholtz. Local-effect games. In Proceedings of the Eighteenth
  International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), Acapulco, Mexico, 2003.
Anton Likhodedov and Tuomas Sandholm. Auction mechanism for optimally trading off efficiency
  and revenue. In Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC) workshop, Melbourne, Australia,
  2003. A short version also appeared in the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003. The
  extension to multi-unit auctions has been accepted as a short paper in the ACM Conference on
  Electronic Commerce, 2004.
310                                                                               BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anton Likhodedov and Tuomas Sandholm. Methods for boosting revenue in combinatorial auctions.
  In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 232­237, San
  Jose, CA, 2004.

Anton Likhodedov and Tuomas Sandholm. Approximating revenue-maximizing combinatorial auc-
  tions. In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), Pittsburgh, PA,
  2005.

Richard Lipton, Evangelos Markakis, Elchanan Mossel, and Amin Saberi. On approximately fair
  allocations of indivisible goods. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
  (ACM-EC), pages 125­131, New York, NY, 2004.

William S. Lovejoy. Optimal mechanisms with finite agent types. Management Science, 53(5):788­
 803, 2006.

Leslie M. Marx and Jeroen M. Swinkels. Order independence for iterated weak dominance. Games
  and Economic Behavior, 18:219­245, 1997.

Leslie M. Marx and Jeroen M. Swinkels. Corrigendum, order independence for iterated weak dom-
  inance. Games and Economic Behavior, 31:324­329, 2000.

Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael Whinston, and Jerry R. Green. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford Uni-
  versity Press, 1995.

Eric Maskin and John Riley. Optimal multi-unit auctions. In Frank Hahn, editor, The Economics of
  Missing Markets, Information, and Games, chapter 14, pages 312­335. Clarendon Press, Oxford,
  1989.

Andrew McLennan and In-Uck Park. Generic 4x4 two person games have at most 15 Nash equilib-
  ria. Games and Economic Behavior, pages 26­1,111­130, 1999.

Andrew McLennan. The expected number of Nash equilibria of a normal form game. Econometrica,
  1999.

Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz. Asymptotically optimal multi-object auctions for risk-
  averse agents. Technical report, Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion,
  Haifa, Israel, February 1999.

Herv´ Moulin. Serial cost-sharing of excludable public goods. Review of Economic Studies, 61:305­
    e
  325, 1994.

Ahuva Mu'alem and Noam Nisan. Truthful approximate mechanisms for restricted combinatorial
  auctions. In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages
  379­384, Edmonton, Canada, July 2002.

Roger Myerson and Mark Satterthwaite. Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. Journal of
  Economic Theory, 28:265­281, 1983.

Roger Myerson. Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem. Econometrica, 41(1), 1979.
BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                                                311

Roger Myerson. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operation Research, 6:58­73, 1981.

Roger Myerson. Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1991.

John Nash. Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proc. of the National Academy of Sciences,
  36:48­49, 1950.

George Nemhauser and Laurence Wolsey. Integer and Combinatorial Optimization. John Wiley &
  Sons, 1999. Section 4, page 11.

Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen. Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms. In Proceedings of the
  ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), pages 242­252, Minneapolis, MN, 2000.

Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen. Algorithmic mechanism design. Games and Economic Behavior,
  35:166­196, 2001. Early version in STOC-99.

Noam Nisan and Ilya Segal. The communication requirements of efficient allocations and support-
  ing prices. Journal of Economic Theory, 2005. Forthcoming.

Noam Nisan. Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the ACM Con-
  ference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), pages 1­12, Minneapolis, MN, 2000.

Robert Nozick. Newcomb's problem and two principles of choice. In Nicholas Rescher et al.,
  editor, Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel, pages 114­146. Synthese Library (Dordrecht, the
  Netherlands: D. Reidel), 1969.

Eugene Nudelman, Jennifer Wortman, Kevin Leyton-Brown, and Yoav Shoham. Run the GAMUT:
  A comprehensive approach to evaluating game-theoretic algorithms. In International Conference
  on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), New York, NY, USA, 2004.

Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Kohki Maruono, Vincent Conitzer, and Tuomas Sand-
  holm. A compact representation scheme for coalitional games in open anonymous environments.
  In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), Boston, MA, 2006.

Martin J Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, 1994.

Christos Papadimitriou and Tim Roughgarden. Equilibria in symmetric games. 2003. Available at
  http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~ christos/papers/sym.ps.

Christos Papadimitriou. Games against nature. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 31:288­
  301, 1985.

Christos Papadimitriou. NP-completeness: A retrospective. In Proceedings of the International
  Conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP), 1997.

Christos Papadimitriou. Algorithms, games and the Internet. In Proceedings of the Annual Sympo-
  sium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pages 749­753, 2001.
312                                                                            BIBLIOGRAPHY

David Parkes and Grant Schoenebeck. GROWRANGE: Anytime VCG-based mechanisms. In
  Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 34­41, San Jose,
  CA, 2004.

David Parkes and Jeffrey Shneidman. Distributed implementations of generalized Vickrey-Clarke-
  Groves auctions. In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
  (AAMAS), pages 261­268, New York, NY, USA, 2004.

David Parkes, Jayant Kalagnanam, and Marta Eso. Achieving budget-balance with Vickrey-based
  payment schemes in exchanges. In Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Joint Conference
  on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 1161­1168, Seattle, WA, 2001.

David Parkes, Ruggiero Cavallo, Nick Elprin, Adam Juda, Sebastien Lahaie, Benjamin Lubin,
  Loizos Michael, Jeffrey Shneidman, and Hassan Sultan. ICE: An iterative combinatorial ex-
  change. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), Vancouver,
  Canada, 2005.

David Parkes. iBundle: An efficient ascending price bundle auction. In Proceedings of the ACM
  Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), pages 148­157, Denver, CO, November 1999.

David Parkes. Optimal auction design for agents with hard valuation problems. In Agent-Mediated
  Electronic Commerce Workshop at the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
  Stockholm, Sweden, 1999.

David G. Pearce. Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection. Econometrica,
  52:1029­1050, 1984.

Michal Penn and Moshe Tennenholtz. Constrained multi-object auctions and b-matching. Informa-
 tion Processing Letters, 75(1­2):29­34, July 2000.

Adrian Petcu, Boi Faltings, and David Parkes. Mdpop: Faithful distributed implementation of
  efficient social choice problems. In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-
  Agent Systems (AAMAS), Hakodate, Japan, 2006.

Steve Phelps, Peter McBurnley, Simon Parsons, and Elizabeth Sklar. Co-evolutionary auction mech-
  anism design. Lecture Notes in AI, 2531, 2002.

M. S. Pini, F. Rossi, K. B. Venable, and T. Walsh. Aggregating partially ordered preferences: pos-
 sibility and impossibility results. In Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK),
 Singapore, 2005.

Ryan Porter, Amir Ronen, Yoav Shoham, and Moshe Tennenholtz. Mechanism design with exe-
  cution uncertainty. In Proceedings of the 18th Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial
  Intelligence (UAI), Edmonton, Canada, 2002.

Ryan Porter, Eugene Nudelman, and Yoav Shoham. Simple search methods for finding a Nash
  equilibrium. In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages
  664­669, San Jose, CA, 2004.
BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                                                  313

Ryan Porter. Mechanism design for online real-time scheduling. In Proceedings of the ACM Con-
  ference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), pages 61­70, New York, NY, 2004.

Ariel D. Procaccia and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. Junta distributions and the average-case complexity
  of manipulating elections. In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent
  Systems (AAMAS), pages 497­504, Hakodate, Japan, 2006.

F. Rossi, M. S. Pini, K. B. Venable, and T. Walsh. Strategic voting when aggregating partially or-
   dered preferences. In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
   (AAMAS), pages 685­687, Hakodate, Japan, 2006.

J. Rothe, H. Spakowski, and J. Vogel. Exact complexity of the winner problem for Young elections.
   In Theory of Computing Systems, volume 36(4), pages 375­386. Springer-Verlag, 2003.

Michael Rothkopf, Thomas Teisberg, and Edward Kahn. Why are Vickrey auctions rare? Journal
 of Political Economy, 98(1):94­109, 1990.

Michael Rothkopf, Aleksandar Peke , and Ronald Harstad. Computationally manageable combina-
                                 c
 torial auctions. Management Science, 44(8):1131­1147, 1998.

Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig. Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach. Prentice Hall, 2nd
  edition, 2003.

Tuomas Sandholm and Andrew Gilpin. Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: Near-optimal auc-
  tions without full valuation revelation. In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
  Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1127­1134, Hakodate, Japan, 2006.

Tuomas Sandholm and Victor R Lesser. Issues in automated negotiation and electronic commerce:
  Extending the contract net framework. In Proceedings of the First International Conference on
  Multi-Agent Systems (ICMAS), pages 328­335, San Francisco, CA, June 1995. Reprinted in
  Readings in Agents, Huhns and Singh, eds., pp. 66­73, 1997.

Tuomas Sandholm and Victor R Lesser. Coalitions among computationally bounded agents. Ar-
  tificial Intelligence, 94(1):99­137, 1997. Special issue on Economic Principles of Multiagent
  Systems. Early version appeared at the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
  (IJCAI), pages 662­669, 1995.

Tuomas Sandholm and Victor Lesser. Leveled commitment contracting: A backtracking instrument
  for multiagent systems. AI Magazine, 23(3):89­100, 2002.

Tuomas Sandholm and Subhash Suri. BOB: Improved winner determination in combinatorial auc-
  tions and generalizations. Artificial Intelligence, 145:33­58, 2003. Early version: Improved
  Algorithms for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions and Generalizations.
  National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-00), pp. 90­97, Austin, TX, July 31 ­ Au-
  gust 2.
314                                                                              BIBLIOGRAPHY

Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri, Andrew Gilpin, and David Levine. Winner determination in
  combinatorial auction generalizations. In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
  Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 69­76, Bologna, Italy, July 2002. Early version appeared at
  the AGENTS-01 Workshop on Agent-Based Approaches to B2B, pp. 35­41, Montreal, Canada,
  May 2001.

Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer, and Craig Boutilier. Automated design of multistage mecha-
  nisms. In First International Workshop on Incentive Based Computing, at the IEEE / WIC / ACM
  International Conference on Web Intelligence (WI), Compiegne, France, 2005.

Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin, and Vincent Conitzer. Mixed-integer programming methods
  for finding Nash equilibria. In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence
  (AAAI), pages 495­501, Pittsburgh, PA, 2005.

Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri, Andrew Gilpin, and David Levine. CABOB: A fast optimal
  algorithm for winner determination in combinatorial auctions. Management Science, 51(3):374­
  390, 2005. Special issue on Electronic Markets. Early version in IJCAI-01.

Tuomas Sandholm, David Levine, Michael Concordia, Paul Martyn, Rick Hughes, Jim Jacobs,
  and Dennis Begg. Changing the game in strategic sourcing at Procter & Gamble: Expressive
  competition enabled by optimization. Interfaces, 36(1):55­68, 2006. Edelman award competition
  finalist writeup.

Tuomas Sandholm. An implementation of the contract net protocol based on marginal cost cal-
  culations. In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages
  256­262, Washington, D.C., July 1993.

Tuomas Sandholm. An implementation of the contract net protocol based on marginal cost cal-
  culations. In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages
  256­262, Washington, D.C., 1993.

Tuomas Sandholm. Necessary and sufficient contract types for optimal task allocation. In Proceed-
  ings of the Fifteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), page 87,
  Nagoya, Japan, 1997. Poster session abstracts.

Tuomas Sandholm. Issues in computational Vickrey auctions. International Journal of Electronic
  Commerce, 4(3):107­129, 2000. Special Issue on Applying Intelligent Agents for Electronic
  Commerce. A short, early version appeared at the Second International Conference on Multi­
  Agent Systems (ICMAS), pages 299­306, 1996.

Tuomas Sandholm. Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions. Arti-
  ficial Intelligence, 135:1­54, January 2002. First appeared as an invited talk at the First Inter-
  national Conference on Information and Computation Economies, Charleston, SC, Oct. 25­28,
  1998. Extended version appeared as Washington Univ., Dept. of Computer Science, tech report
  WUCS-99-01, January 28th, 1999. Conference version appeared at the International Joint Con-
  ference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pp. 542­547, Stockholm, Sweden, 1999.
BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                                                  315

Tuomas Sandholm. eMediator: A next generation electronic commerce server. Computational
  Intelligence, 18(4):656­676, 2002. Special issue on Agent Technology for Electronic Commerce.
  Early versions appeared in the Conference on Autonomous Agents (AGENTS-00), pp. 73­96,
  2000; AAAI-99 Workshop on AI in Electronic Commerce, Orlando, FL, pp. 46­55, July 1999;
  and as a Washington University, St. Louis, Dept. of Computer Science technical report WU-CS-
  99-02, Jan. 1999.

Tuomas Sandholm. Expressive commerce and its application to sourcing. In Conference on Inno-
  vative Applications of Artificial Intelligence, Boston, MA, July 2006.

Paolo Santi, Vincent Conitzer, and Tuomas Sandholm. Towards a characterization of polynomial
  preference elicitation with value queries in combinatorial auctions. In Conference on Learning
  Theory (COLT), pages 1­16, Banff, Alberta, Canada, 2004.

Mark Satterthwaite. Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence the-
 orems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. Journal of Economic Theory, 10:187­
 217, 1975.

Rahul Savani and Bernhard von Stengel. Exponentially many steps for finding a Nash equilibrium in
  a bimatrix game. In Proceedings of the Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
  (FOCS), pages 258­267, 2004.

Grant Schoenebeck and Salil Vadhan. The computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concisely
  represented games. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC),
  pages 270­279, Ann Arbor, MI, 2006.

Jiefu Shi and Michael Littman. Abstraction methods for game theoretic poker. In Computers and
   Games, pages 333­345. Springer-Verlag, 2001.

John Tagliabue. Global AIDS Funds Is Given Attention, but Not Money. The New York Times, 2003.
  Reprinted on http://www.healthgap.org/press releases/a03/060103 NYT HGAP G8 fund.html.

Moshe Tennenholtz. Some tractable combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the National Con-
 ference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), Austin, TX, August 2000.

Leslie Valiant. The complexity of computing the permanent. Theoretical Computer Science, 8:189­
  201, 1979.

Stan van Hoesel and Rudolf M¨ ller. Optimization in electronic marketplaces: Examples from
                               u
  combinatorial auctions. Netnomics, 3(1):23­33, June 2001.

William Vickrey. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance,
 16:8­37, 1961.

Rakesh Vohra. Research problems in combinatorial auctions. Mimeo, version Oct. 29, 2001.

John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton
  University Press, 1947.
316                                                                             BIBLIOGRAPHY

John von Neumann. Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele. Mathematische Annalen, 100:295­320,
  1927.

Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Christopher Kiekintveld, and Michael Wellman. Empirical mechanism de-
  sign: Methods, with application to a supply chain scenario. In Proceedings of the ACM Confer-
  ence on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), Ann Arbor, MI, 2006.

Peter Wurman and Michael Wellman. AkBA: A progressive, anonymous-price combinatorial auc-
  tion. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), pages 21­29,
  Minneapolis, MN, October 2000.

Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, and Shigeo Matsubara. Robust combinatorial auction protocol
 against false-name bids. Artificial Intelligence, 130(2), 2004.

Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, and Atsushi Iwasaki. Coalitional
 games in open anonymous environments. In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
 Intelligence (AAAI), pages 509­514, Pittsburgh, PA, 2005.

Makoto Yokoo. The characterization of strategy/false-name proof combinatorial auction protocols:
 Price-oriented, rationing-free protocol. In Proceedings of the Eighteenth International Joint Con-
 ference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 733­742, Acapulco, Mexico, August 2003.

Peyton Young. Optimal voting rules. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(1):51­64, 1995.

Martin Zinkevich, Avrim Blum, and Tuomas Sandholm. On polynomial-time preference elicitation
 with value queries. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC),
 pages 176­185, San Diego, CA, 2003.

Edo Zurel and Noam Nisan. An efficient approximate allocation algorithm for combinatorial auc-
  tions. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), pages 125­
  136, Tampa, FL, 2001.