CHAPTER 2 THE BIG PICTURE ON "SECURITY BY OTHER MEANS" …

CHAPTER 2

THE BIG PICTURE ON "SECURITY BY OTHER MEANS"




     Traditionally States have entrusted their security to national military
means. These provide States with the tools with which to resist attack and
even discourage it by lowering the benefits expected to accrue from
aggression. However, they also can give rise to dangerous arms races that
have the potential to lead to war, and make war more destructive should it
occur.

     The unrestricted deployment of national military means can trigger
destabilizing arms races which in turn can be a major cause of war. Arms
races are action-reaction phenomena whereby countries locked in political
conflict steadily augment their military capabilities in response to a perceived
growth in each other's military preparations. They exacerbate tensions
among States and can contribute to the outbreak of armed conflict by
heightening pressures for pre-emptive attack, and by raising the danger of
accidental war. Because identical military capabilities can be used for
defensive or offensive purposes alike, growing national armaments as
characteristic of arms races, are generally taken as evidence of aggressive
intent. As tensions mount and the perceived likelihood of war increases,
States are more likely to decide in favour of pre-emptive attack, especially
if prevailing circumstances such as existing military technologies or a
temporary position of superiority are thought to reward offensive action.
Such pressures are particular manifest in times of crisis when decisions
about military action are aggravated by great uncertainty and severe time
constraints. Likewise heightened tensions and the anticipation of war can
increase the potential for misperception and hence for accidental war due
to political or military miscalculation, or technical accident.

     In addition to contributing to armed conflict, arms races can create
conditions which threaten to raise drastically the scale of violence
associated with war. As adversaries race one another to deploy ever more

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    potent military means, the potential destructiveness of war increases
    commensurately. When the military instruments deployed include
    weapons capable of mass destruction, the potential destructiveness in the
    event of war becomes tremendous.

          To alleviate the problems associated with the uncontrolled
    deployment of national military means, States have evolved measures that
    restrict the unilateral accumulation of arms and limit the scope of their use.
    These measures, which share the same objectives as the deployment of
    national military means, can rightly be construed as the pursuit of national
    security by other means.


    2.1     HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES OF ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE THE
            ACCUMULATION AND USE OF MILITARY FORCE

         The history of modern efforts to regulate the deployment and use of
    military arms is characterized by a steady growth in the range and scope of
    arms regulation instruments over time. Since the First World War arms
    regulation measures have assumed a growing number of forms, applied to
    a growing number of areas, and become increasingly elaborate and
    stringent.

         Contemporary efforts to restrict armaments began at the turn of the
    20th century with attempts to establish international norms for the conduct
    of States. The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 sought to constrain
    national military expenditure and to regulate the conduct of war by
    delineating the rights and obligations of belligerents and non-belligerents in
    combat.

         In the wake of the First World War, attempts to restrict national
    armaments turned to arms reductions. At the end of the war, arms
    reduction measures were imposed on all the defeated countries, while the
    goal of reducing armaments was inscribed in the Charter of the newly
    established League of Nations. During the 1930s, negotiations on arms
    reductions across all weapon categories were carried out at the World
    Disarmament Conference. The Conference's collapse in 1937, however,
    brought these to an end.
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      After the Second World War, arms regulation efforts focused on the
control of nuclear weapons. Globally this was addressed by the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signed by participants to the Conference of the
Committee on Disarmament in 1968. Under the Treaty, so-called non-
nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) committed not to acquire nuclear
weapons, while so-called nuclear-weapons States (NWS) committed not to
aid NNWS to acquire such weapons. Furthermore, both NNWS and NWS
pledged to negotiate in good faith measures for complete nuclear
disarmament. Bilaterally the control of nuclear weapons was the object of
several treaties negotiated between the Soviet Union and the United States.
Foremost among these, the Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) Treaty and the
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT) I and II, sought to quell the nuclear
rivalry of the two countries by limiting their deployment of strategic nuclear
weapons and missile defences.

      The end of the Cold War has brought a fleury of arms regulation
activities aimed at cementing the relaxation of international tensions.
Globally nuclear controls have been strengthened by the conclusion of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which prohibits the field-
testing of all nuclear explosive devices. In addition, the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) which bans the development, possession and use of
chemical weapons, has eliminated an entire class of weapons. Regionally
conventional weapons in Europe have been brought under control through
the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and its
complements. These restrict the deployment of conventional arms in the
area from the Atlantic to the Urals. Bilaterally the Soviet Union and the
United States have started to dismantle their accumulated nuclear arsenals.
Under the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the two
countries have eliminated all their land-based intermediate-range nuclear
weapons, while under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) I and
II they have agreed to reduce drastically their strategic nuclear weapons
under strict verification


2.2     APPROACHES ON HOW TO LIMIT ARMS AND ACTIVITIES

     Conceptually measures designed to limit arms and military activities
divide into two categories: arms control and disarmament. Arms control
measures place political or legal constraints on the deployment and/or
disposition of national military means. Their aim is to reduce the risk of
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    inadvertent war by improving the capacity of adversaries to formulate more
    accurate assessments of each other's intentions, and by restricting their
    range of available military options. In practice, arms control measures may
    take numerous forms. For example, they may place quantitative or
    qualitative restrictions on the fielding of military equipment. They may
    entail non-proliferation agreements and export controls which regulate or
    prohibit the development or transfer of particular weapons and their
    components. They may comprise confidence- and security-building
    provisions which constrain military activities, increase mutual knowledge
    about the disposition of national military forces, and enhance the capacity
    of parties to communicate with one another. Or they may take the form of
    rules of war which restrict or prohibit certain methods of warfare, or even
    regulate the conditions under which arms may be used. Arms control
    measures may be implemented on an unilateral basis though most
    commonly they are applied on the basis of mutual agreement. They may
    cover any type of armaments and/or military activities. Although arms
    control measures do not necessarily seek to lower national military
    capabilities, they do aim to reshape these in accordance with their purpose.

         Disarmament measures seek to reduce the level of national military
    capabilities or to ban altogether certain categories of weapons already
    deployed. The disarmament approach to arms limitations is premised on
    the assumption that armaments in and of themselves are the main source
    of tension and war. Disarmament, hence, aims to preclude or at least
    reduce the likelihood of military conflict by depriving parties, in full or in
    part, of their military capabilities. Measures consistent with disarmament
    include any provisions that eliminate national military capabilities either
    partially or completely, either at the macro or micro level. Disarmament
    measures may be imposed following armed conflict as a means of
    sanctioning a country, they may be undertaken unilaterally as a means of
    signalling benevolent intentions, or they may be mutually agreed upon as a
    result of negotiations as a means of creating more stable military balances
    (in the case of partial disarmament), or of eliminating military balances
    altogether (in the case of complete disarmament).


    2.3     WHAT KINDS OF ARMS TO LIMIT?

        Both arms control and disarmament measures may be applied with
    respect to any type of weapons and/or military activities. States attempting
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to negotiate such measures, however, must first agree on just what kind of
arms and/or activities to limit. Since countries tend to have different
preferences as to what precisely ought to be subject to limitations--usually
preferring to limit those arms and activities in which others have an
advantage--this decision is hardly trivial or straightforward. Prior to the
Second World War arms limitations were primarily related to the rules of
war and reductions in aggregate military capabilities. Since then, however,
arms limitations have been addressed mostly in terms of weapon categories.
This shift was due mainly to the advent of nuclear weapons which brought
to the fore the distinction between so-called weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) defined by the United Nations as "atomic explosive weapons,
radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical or biological weapons, and
any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable
in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons
mentioned above," and so-called conventional weapons. Weapons of mass
destruction severely complicate calculations of aggregate military
capabilities, while their great potential destructiveness, it is often argued,
makes their control more pressing.


2.4     TIMING: ARMS LIMITATIONS BEFORE PEACE OR AFTER?

     Whether associated with arms control or disarmament, the adoption of
arms limitation measures requires a practical decision as to the timing of
their implementation. Here three different arguments can be distinguished.
According to one view, because arms limitations are expected to attenuate
military rivalries, they should be implemented as a means of opening the
way to formal political settlement. An opposing view holds that since the
success of arms limitations depends on a minimum level of mutual
cooperation, they can be implemented only after formal political settlement
has been reached, as a means of confirming and reinforcing the latter. A
middle position sees a tangled relationship between arms limitations and
formal political settlement, and argues that efforts in both areas should be
carried out concomitantly, with advances in one area fostering advances in
the other and vice-versa.
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     2.5     IMPLEMENTING ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS:
             VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS

          Typically arms limitation measures take the form of mutually agreed
     upon accords resulting from multilateral or bilateral negotiations. These
     accords, once entered into force, need to be implemented. The
     implementation of arms limitation agreements refers to the compliance of
     the parties with their obligations under the accord. Prior to the Second
     World War, the implementation of arms limitation agreements was
     premised mostly on the basis of trust. Since the Second World War,
     however, implementation has become increasingly subject to verification
     which monitors and assesses the parties' compliance with the accord.
     Verification may be carried out unilaterally through so-called national
     technical means, and/or cooperatively through cooperative measures.

          As a complement to verification requirements, many arms limitation
     agreements provide for conflict resolution mechanisms. Typically these
     specify procedures for mediating disputes arising from the verification of
     parties' compliance, and take the form of some sort of deliberative forum
     such as for instance a consultative commission. Consultative commissions
     allow parties to express and explore concerns about the implementation or
     the need for amendment of accord provisions, and to seek to address these
     jointly on the basis of common understanding. In some cases, consultative
     commissions are supplemented or substituted by procedures for referring
     disputes for mediation to an a priori designated international body such as
     the United Nations Security Council.


     2.6     CONTROVERSY ABOUT THE OBJECTIVE OF TRYING
             TOLIMIT ARMS AND WARFARE

           Despite their prevalence, measures regulating arms and military
     activities are often subject to critique. Criticism of attempts to limit national
     armaments typically revolves around six main points. First, the arguments
     in favour of arms limitation are based on a set of assumptions about the
     relation between armaments and war which may not be true. Second,
     because successful arms limitations imply a minimum mutual interest in the
     avoidance of war, such measures are altogether inappropriate in cases
     where this is absent. Third, because successful arms limitations imply at
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least tacit mutual cooperation which is more likely to occur when relations
between countries are good, it is likely that such measures are going to be
more effective in times of decreasing tensions when they are less needed,
and less effective in times of rising tensions when they are most needed.
Fourth, arms limitations may fuel rather than cool down arms races as
countries strive to acquire "bargaining chips" to be traded at the negotiation
table, or they may merely redirect arms races as countries steer their military
preparations towards non-regulated areas. Fifth, if arms limitations are
intended to attenuate military rivalries, their rationale loses impetus in a
context in which either there are no military rivals or it is unclear who the
military rivals are. Finally, arms limitations may well be afflicted by a vicious
paradox, namely, that in making war potentially less destructive, they might
also make it potentially more likely.


2.7     CONCLUSION: ARMS LIMITATIONS BECOMING A
        NORMAL STATE-TO-STATE ACTIVITY

     Arms limitations place deliberate constraints on the range and scope of
national military policies. Their application has grown significantly over
time, and has now become well established. After the First World War
disarmament efforts played a major role in attempts to preserve
international peace. Since the Second World War arms control and
increasingly disarmament measures have been used widely as tools of
conflict management and prevention at the global, regional, and bilateral
levels. Increasingly arms limitation efforts of growing range and scope are
becoming a normal State-to-State activity and a prevalent feature of
international relations.