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Confidence Motions
Standard Note: SN/PC/2873
Last updated: 23 January 2004
Author: Thomas Powell
Parliament and Constitution Centre
This Standard Note provides background information on the practice of confidence motions
in Parliament as well as a history of confidence motions since 1895, the date of the last defeat
of a Government with a working majority on such a motion. It lists the last four Government
defeats on confidence motions (1895, 1924 (twice) and 1979), and debates on confidence
motions since 1945, with related information, such as the day(s) of the week in which they
took place, and the full terms of the motion(s).
This Note updates Library Research Paper 1995/19, Confidence Motions.
Contents
A. Introduction 2
B. Forms of Confidence Motions 3
C. Constitutional Practice Relating to Confidence Motion 6
D. The Result of Government Defeat on a Confidence Motion: Previous Cases 8
Appendix - List of Confidence Motions 11
Standard Notes are compiled for the benefit of Members of Parliament and their personal staff. Authors are
available to discuss the contents of these papers with Members and their staff but cannot advise others.
A. Introduction
Votes of confidence or no-confidence (also known as censure motions) are perhaps the most
important Parliamentary procedural devices, as in the `Westminster model' the fate of a
Government is ultimately dependent on the support of a majority of MPs. In British
Government and the Constitution Colin Turpin writes that `...the requirement that the
government must retain the confidence of the House of Commons is still a fundamental
principle of the Constitution. In the last resort it is sustained by the government's
dependence on the House of Commons for `supply' (finance) and the passing of legislation'.1
Obviously confidence motions are particularly significant where a government defeat is
possible (where there is a minority Government, one with a fragile majority, or where there is
considerable internal party dissent). In these circumstances a Government may seek
understandings (formally or otherwise) with other parties, groups or Members in an effort to
secure victory, and thereby remain in office. The most recent example of their decisive
impact was on 28 March 1979 when an Opposition motion of no confidence in the Callaghan
Government was carried with a majority of one; the result led to the dissolution of Parliament
and the victory of the Conservative Party in the following general election.
Yet, despite their central importance, there is no certainty about the rules on the form and
applicability of confidence motions in the UK Parliament, as it is established by convention
rather than by statute or standing order of the House.
Not all motions are stated in the terms `That this House has (no) confidence in HMG'; some
refer to (no) confidence in particular policies. Furthermore, any motion, however innocuous,
can be made an issue of confidence by the Government. Equally as noted in Griffith and
Ryle `Many motions tabled on opposition days censure the government in highly critical
terms, but do not count as censure motions'.2 Although there is no generally accepted and
comprehensive definition of a confidence motion, there are certain characteristics which may
identify those which are not expressly declared to be such. These include timing, speakers
and, most importantly, terms of the motion. The different forms of confidence motion are
examined in section B.
A confidence defeat for a Government will lead either to a request for a dissolution, or to the
resignation of the Government. Modern practice, based on the four instances since 1895,
suggests that dissolution rather than resignation is the result of a defeat. In current practice a
Government is only obliged to resign or to seek a dissolution after being defeated on a
confidence motion, although a significant defeat on any other motion may lead to a
confidence motion. Section C of this note will look in detail at the constitutional practice
following government defeat on a confidence motion.
1
Turpin, C (2002) British Government and the Constitution 5th Ed p487
2
Blackburn, R and Kennon, A (2003) Griffith & Ryle on Parliament p484
2
Rodney Brazier has effectively highlighted the fundamental constitutional importance of
confidence motions:
The real significance of the general requirement that a government retain the
confidence of the House of Commons is not in the rare loss of a vote of confidence or
in the somewhat more frequent legislative defeat, but rather that it obliges every
government to defend itself, explain its policies, and justify its actions, to its own
back-benchers, to the opposition parties, and through them to the country as a whole.3
B. Forms of Confidence Motions
Broadly speaking there are three main types of motion which act as tests of the House of
Commons' confidence in the Government: `confidence motions' initiated by the
Government, `no confidence motions' initiated by the Opposition and other motions where
because of the particular circumstances can be regarded as motions of censure or confidence.
Whereas Government initiated confidence motions are effectively dissolution threats,
Opposition `no confidence motions' represent the ultimate expression of the Westminster
model of `parliamentary opposition' or, as Punnett describes it, `office-seeking Opposition'4 -
the attempt by the Opposition to remove the present Government and, directly or otherwise,
replace it by itself. Of course, while one would expect that a Government, save in the most
extraordinary of circumstances, will resort to a test of Parliament's confidence only when it
has the expectation of success, the majority of censure motions moved by an Opposition will
be in circumstances when the parliamentary arithmetic can provide it with no real prospect of
winning the vote.
There is no standard formulation for confidence motions. There are, however, certain
characteristics which are usually present and which may indicate that a motion is one of
confidence:
(a) Timing:
A debate on a confidence motion will generally take precedence over the normal business for
that day. Griffith and Ryle state that `By convention... if the official opposition tables a
motion of censure on the government, the government provides time for it to be debated'.5
As such they may be contrasted with critical motions debated, for example, on Opposition
Days or private Members' days. Parliament may even be recalled from a recess for such a
debate to take place.
(b) Speakers:
3
Brazier, R (1994) Constitutional Practice, 2nd ed. pp212-13
4 Punnett, R M (1973) Front-Bench Opposition, p4
5
Blackburn, R and Kennon, A (2003) Griffith & Ryle on Parliament p484
3
A debate on a confidence motion will usually include speeches (normally the opening
speeches) by the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, rather than, say, the
Government and Opposition frontbenchers with responsibility for the policy area which may
be the subject of that particular motion. The list of confidence motions at the end of this
Paper notes whether and where, in Commons confidence debates, the Prime Minister and/or
the Leader of the Opposition spoke (excluding interventions) in each debate.
(c) Terms of the motion:
A confidence motion will usually include terms such as `confidence' or `censure', and a
substantive motion may refer, in critical or supportive terms, to an issue of current political
importance or to one central to the Government's policy. However, apparently innocuous
motions, such as the adjournment motions of 11 March 1976 and 20 July 1977, can also be
issues of confidence.
Motions can be ones of `confidence', that is, supportive of the Government, or of `no-
confidence'. The latter can be particularly difficult to distinguish from other forms of
Opposition motion, many of which would normally be critical of the Government or its
policies. No-confidence motions are often described as `censure motions' (see pp280-81
Erskine May), although `censure motion' can also apply to a broader category of motion
which may have some of the characteristics of a confidence motion described above, but
which does not appear from all the circumstances to have the intention of bringing about
directly, by its passing, the removal of the Government.
Sometimes the terms of a censure motion acknowledge this, as on 28 October 1981 where,
after stating that `this House has no confidence in the economic policies of Her Majesty's
Government' the motion concluded by calling upon the Government `to present to
Parliament before the end of the year' new economic policies (emphasis added). This
motion demonstrates the risks inherent in regarding all motions expressed in `confidence'
terms as being necessarily confidence motions.
This suggests that there are two forms of confidence motion. There is the clear, unambiguous
confidence motion, which can be defined as a motion upon which the House of Commons, by
its vote, knowingly and directly determines the continued existence of the Government. This
includes bare motions of confidence or no-confidence in the Government itself (or, in many
cases, in the policies of the Government), and any motion whatever its terms, where the
House of Commons has been made aware that it is voting on the immediate fate of the
Government. The second, broader category includes `censure motions' as described above,
as well as the perhaps rarer examples of motions supportive of the Government and its
policies which betray similar characteristics.
The list at the end of this paper includes both the narrow and broader forms of confidence
motion of the following type:
(i) Motions of confidence put down by the Government:
A motion in the form `That this House has confidence in Her Majesty's Government' (no
direct examples since 1945, although the 14 December 1978 motion did express confidence
4
plus a reference to policy), or in relation to a particular policy or issue (e.g.
24 September 1992, 23 July 1993);
(ii) Motions of no confidence put down by the Opposition:
A motion in the form `That this House has no confidence in Her Majesty's Government'
(four examples since 1945: 9 June 1976, 23 March 1977, 28 March 1979,
22 November 1990). Other motions essentially express the same sentiment but in different
wording, sometimes with elaboration: 26 July 1962, 2 February 1965, 2 August 1965,
29 July 1980, 27 July 1981, 27 March 1991, or in relation to a particular policy or issue (e.g.
28 February 1980);
(iii) Other motions put down by the Government or the Opposition treated by the
Government (whether expressly declared as such or not) as, or because of the particular
circumstances can be regarded as, motions of censure or confidence.
This category includes:
· substantive motions (e.g. 1 November 1956 and 5-6 December 1956 on Suez;
February 1972, 2R European Communities Bill);
· motions to reduce a minister's salary (e.g. 21 June 1895)
· technical motions such as Government motions to adjourn (e.g. 11 March 1976,
where both the Leader of the House and the Prime Minister stated that the House's
rules did not, in the circumstances, permit a substantive motion to be put down in time
for a debate the day after the defeat giving rise to the motion).
In addition, both Government and Opposition may put amendments to such motions (see
below), which may themselves be regarded as confidence motions according to the above
criteria. Governments have amended Opposition motions on 3 occasions since 1945
1 November 1956, 2 February 1965 (censuring the previous Government), and 31 January
1985. Oppositions have amended Government motions on 2 occasions - 5&6 November
1956, 24 September 1992 - as well as one occasion, 10 November 1964, by an amendment to
the Loyal Address.
Erskine May describes the parliamentary treatment of censure motions6:
From time to time the Opposition put down a motion on the paper expressing lack of
confidence in the Government - a `vote of censure' as it is called. By established
convention the Government always accedes to the demand from the Leader of the
Opposition to allot a day for the discussion of such a motion. In allotting a day for
this purpose the Government is entitled to have regard to the exigencies of its own
business, but a reasonably early day is invariably found. This convention is founded
on the recognised position of the Opposition as a potential Government, which
guarantees the legitimacy of such an interruption of the normal course of business.
For its part, the Government has everything to gain by meeting such a direct
challenge to its authority at the earliest possible moment.
6
22nd ed, 1997, p.280-81
5
Confidence motions may be debated on any sitting day, although rarely on a Friday
(traditionally a private Members' day). The list at the end of this Paper notes the day of each
debate.
The fact that the Official Opposition has precedence over other opposition parties in censure
debates is demonstrated by the fact that two SNP motions in the late 1970s, to reduce the
Prime Minister's salary by half (HC Deb vol. 934 cc890, 4 July 1977), and a motion on 22
March condemning the Government's policy following the 1979 devolution referendum
(EDM 349, 1978-9, NQM 6076, 22 March 1979) were not treated as motions of censure
presumably because they did not emanate from the Official Opposition. In the latter case the
Official Opposition put down a no-confidence motion later that day, and this was debated on
28 March.
At the start of the 9 June 1976 debate, the Speaker emphasised the special position of the
Official Opposition when refusing to call a Liberal amendment to the motion of no
confidence7:
I gave considerable and careful thought to this question, but I must tell the House that
if the Government give time for the discussion of a motion of no confidence or
censure put down by the official Opposition the Government themselves do not table
an amendment to the motion, and any amendment tabled by any other party or group
in the House is not called. I take it that the purpose of that convention is to allow an
unimpeded and clear decision to be taken for and against the motion. Although it has
weighed in my mind that in the present Parliament the number of smaller opposition
parties is somewhat larger than it has been in other Parliaments for many years past,
that does not affect the principle which I have stated. Therefore, I am unable to
accept the amendment today.
Despite the fact that in this statement the Speaker said that it was `a long-standing
convention' that `the Government themselves do not table an amendment to the motion' in a
debate on a censure motion on 31 January 1985 the Government did move an amendment.
C. Constitutional Practice Relating to Confidence Motion
The current constitutional practice requires a Government to resign or seek a dissolution
following a defeat in Parliament only when it is clearly on a confidence motion. A defeat on
any other procedural or substantive motion may lead to a confidence motion being tabled by
either the Government itself (e.g. 23 July 1993) to demonstrate the House's confidence in the
Government notwithstanding the defeat, or by the Opposition seeking to prove that the defeat
demonstrated the removal of the House's confidence in the Government.
7
HC Deb vol 912 c1445, 9 June 1976
6
Rodney Brazier has stated that `it used to be the case that a defeat on a major matter had the
same effect as if an explicit vote of confidence had carried'.8 However during the 1970s a
development in constitutional practice took place. In March 1974, Harold Wilson made a
statement to the House concerning how his new minority government would view defeats in
divisions:
The Government intend to treat with suitable respect, but not with exaggerated
respect, the results of any snap Division... In case of a Government defeat, either in
such circumstances or in a more clear expression of opinion, the Government will
consider their position and make a definitive statement after due consideration. But
the Government will not be forced to go to the country except in a situation in which
every hon. Member in the House was voting knowing the full consequences of his
vote... What I am trying to say is that a snap division or even, perhaps in some cases,
a more substantial one... would not necessarily mean, and would not, indeed,
immediately mean, any fundamental decision about the future of the Government or
about a Dissolution. I am saying that if there were to be anything put to the House
which could have those consequences, every hon. Member would have it explained to
him in the House by the Government before he voted. 9
During the short 1974 Parliament the Labour Government lost seventeen divisions, and
between the second 1974 election and dissolution in 1979 it lost a further forty-two divisions
and several major Bills. Even the Thatcher Government with its large majority was defeated
at the Commons Second Reading of the Shop Bill in 1986; none of these legislative defeats
were treated as matters of confidence by Labour or Conservative governments. Given this
narrower current interpretation of what constitutes a loss of confidence in the Government,
Marshall comments that `only votes specifically stated by the Government to be matters of
confidence, or votes of no confidence by the Opposition are allowed to count'.10
It may be that this perceived constitutional development is simply a confirmation that what is
involved is essentially a Government's ability to carry on in office, and that that ultimately
must depend on it maintaining the confidence of the House of Commons. A confidence
motion is a device which directly tests that confidence. If the result demonstrates that the
Government has lost the confidence of the House, and cannot therefore continue to govern
effectively, it must resign or seek a dissolution of Parliament. No other parliamentary event
requires such an outcome, and suggestions that various other important occasions such as the
Queen's Speech or the second reading of the Finance Bill, are tantamount to confidence
motions remain speculative. However the Government may choose to resign or seek a
dissolution for other reasons, including one or more defeats on motions that are not in
themselves confidence motions, or even where it still retains the numerical confidence of the
8
Brazier, R (1994) Constitutional Practice, 2nd ed. p209
9
HC Deb vol 870 cc70-72, 12 March 1974
10
Marshall, G (1984) Constitutional conventions, pp55-56. See also the statement (and subsequent debate) by
Balfour on 24 July 1905 following a Commons defeat inflicted on his Government, HC Deb vol 150 cc49-
124.
7
House but has suffered a significant rebellion from within its own ranks (as in the May 1940
vote which led to Chamberlain's resignation).
It is always for the Government to decide when and under what circumstances an issue of
confidence arises, unless its opponents choose to put down a motion of no-confidence in
unambiguous terms. This is of particular importance during periods of minority government,
and in the past Prime Ministers faced with this situation have indicated which issues they
would regard as ones of confidence which would force Parliament to decide whether it
wished the Government to remain in office.
In summary the precedents and conventions suggest that the confidence of Parliament in the
Government of the day can be assumed to exist, even in periods of minority government,
unless and until it is shown to be otherwise, and that can only be demonstrated conclusively
and unambiguously by way of a confidence vote. A Government is entitled to assume the
confidence of Parliament even if it is faced with defeats or significant rebellions in the
division lobbies. The Government may decide to put Parliament's confidence to the test by
moving a motion of confidence or by expressly treating a motion put down by itself or by
others as a confidence motion, or it can refuse to do this and put the onus on its opponents to
provoke such a test by moving a no-confidence motion.
D. The Result of Government Defeat on a Confidence Motion: Previous
Cases
As stated above, a Government that has been defeated on a confidence motion can either
decide to resign or the Prime Minister can request the dissolution of Parliament. The theory
and practice of dissolution - the rights of the Prime Minister to request a dissolution, and the
obligation or discretion of the Monarch to grant or refuse such a request is an important and
complicated topic in its own right and falls substantially beyond the scope of this Standard
Note.
A confidence motion, although obviously an important test of the authority of the Prime
Minister, is normally seen as testing confidence in the Government as a whole and the
consequence of a defeat could not simply involve the resignation of the Prime Minister alone.
Before the vote of confidence in 1994, there was an attempt to decouple the issue of
confidence in the Prime Minister from confidence in the Government as a whole but have
been rejected by Ministers.
The trend of the more recent defeats suggests that a Government will be more likely to seek a
dissolution than to resign. At the outset of the 23 July 1993 confidence debate in the
Commons, the Prime Minister, John Major, set out clearly the consequences of a defeat for
the Government, in terms which appear to reflect the present practice:
We have before us a motion of confidence in the Government, with all the
implications that flow from that... At the conclusion of this debate, either the
Government will have won the vote of confidence and we can proceed with our
8
policy... or we shall have lost and I shall seek a dissolution of Parliament... This
House must decide today whether it is prepared to sustain the Government in office or
encourage me to seek a dissolution.11
This section considers the consequences of previous government defeats in confidence
motions:
(i) 21 June 1895
The Liberal Government, already suffering from internal dissension, was defeated on an
Opposition motion to reduce the salary of the Secretary of State for War. The Cabinet had to
decide whether the Government should resign or request a dissolution. B S Markesinis has
described how the Prime Minister Lord Rosebery, when setting out these alternatives to the
Queen, preferred resignation of the Government as `they had had a very bad week with
various defeats and very small majorities... [I]t would be very humiliating to go on with the
certainty of being defeated sooner or later; and ... it was very bad for the country, as well as
for our foreign relations, to have such a small majority.'12 The Leader of the House, Harcourt,
announced to the Commons on 24 June the Government's decision to resign. The incoming
Conservative Government under Lord Salisbury obtained a dissolution on 8 July.
This is the last occasion on which (a) a government with a working majority has been
defeated on a confidence motion, and (b) a government with a working majority has chosen
to resign rather than seek a dissolution following a defeat on a confidence motion. When the
House was told of the Government's resignation, Balfour, for the Opposition, said that `the
proper and constitutional course for them to have adopted would have been to advise Her
Majesty to dissolve Parliament'.13
(ii) 21 January 1924
Baldwin's minority Conservative Government decided to meet the new Parliament elected in
December 1923 rather than resign after the general election defeat. It was defeated on a
Labour amendment to the Loyal Address expressing no confidence in the Government, and
resigned the following day. MacDonald, as leader of the second largest party, formed a
minority Labour Government. No dissolution was sought by either Prime Minister arising
out of the confidence motion.14
(iii) 8 October 1924
The minority Labour Government formed after the confidence vote of January 1924 was, by
the autumn, under pressure from the Conservative and Liberal parties, especially on policy
towards the Soviet Union. However the fate of the Government was determined over the
question of its handling of `the Campbell case', concerning the abandonment of a prosecution
11
HC Deb vol 229 cc627, 633, 23 July 1993
12
The theory and practice of dissolution of Parliament, 1972, pp101-102
13
HC Deb vol 34 c1748, 24 June 1895
14
For a detailed analysis of the background to the confidence defeat see C Cook, The age of alignment: electoral
politics in Britain 1922-1929, chap 11
9
of a left-wing newspaper, the Workers' Weekly. The Conservative Opposition put down a
censure motion, to which the Liberals added an amendment. The Cabinet resolved to treat
both motions as matters of confidence, which, if carried against the Government, would lead
to a request to the King for a dissolution. The Liberal amendment was carried, and
MacDonald was granted a dissolution of Parliament the following day. 15
(iv) 28 March 1979
In the aftermath of the devolution referendums, a motion of no confidence was passed against
Callaghan's minority Labour Government. The effect of the vote is described in the
exchange between the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition immediately
following the result.16:
Mr James Callaghan: Mr Speaker, now that the House has declared itself, we shall
take our case to the country. Tomorrow I shall propose to Her Majesty that
Parliament be dissolved as soon as essential business can be cleared up, and then I
shall announce as soon as may be - and that will be as soon as possible - the date of
Dissolution, the date of the election and the date of meeting of the new Parliament.
Mrs Margaret Thatcher: As the Government no longer have authority to carry on
business without the agreement of the Opposition, I make it quite clear that we shall
facilitate any business which requires the agreement of the Opposition so that the
Dissolution can take place at the very earliest opportunity and the uncertainty ended.
This is the most recent example of a government being defeated on a confidence motion, and
follows the October 1924 precedent.
15
see Cook, op cit, chap 16
16
HC Deb vol 965 cc589-590, 28 March 1979
10
Appendix - List of Confidence Motions
The following lists provide details of the four confidence defeats since 1895 discussed above,
as well as details of confidence motions debated since 1945, extracted from Hansard, and
secondary sources such as Butler & Butler Twentieth Century British Political Facts 1900-
2000, p201.
1. Government defeats on confidence motions since 1895
21 June 1895 That Item A be reduced by £100, in respect of the salary of the
(Friday) Secretary of State.
(Opposition motion carried 132-125)
[HC Deb vol 34 cc1673-1712]
Motion to reduce salary of Secretary of State for War; Leader
of the House, Harcourt, announced Government's resignation
24 June, cc1746-9.
21 January 1924 ...but it is our duty respectfully to submit to Your Majesty that
(Monday) Your Majesty's present advisers have not the confidence of the
House.
(Opposition amendment approved 328-256; amended motion
carried 328-251)
[HC Deb vol 169 cc673-686 (divisions)]
-Opposition amendment to Loyal Address; PM, Baldwin,
announced the Government's resignation 22 January cc703-7
8 October 1924 That the conduct of His Majesty's Government in relation to
(Wednesday) the institution and subsequent withdrawal of criminal
proceedings against the editor of the `Workers' Weekly' is
deserving of the censure of this House.
(Opposition motion defeated 198-359)
...a Select Committee be appointed to investigate and report
upon the circumstances leading up to the withdrawal of the
proceedings recently instituted by the Director of Public
Prosecutions against Mr Campbell.
(Further Opposition amendment from the Liberals approved
364-198; amended motion carried without a division)
[HC Deb vol 177 cc581-704]
-`Campbell case', withdrawal by Government of sedition case
against Workers' Weekly; PM, MacDonald, declared issue a
matter of confidence, c638. Dissolution 9 October.
28 March 1979 That this House has no confidence in Her Majesty's
(Wednesday) Government.
11
(Opposition motion carried 311-310)
[HC Deb vol 965 cc461-590]
-aftermath of devolution referenda; PM, Callaghan,
immediately announced intention to seek dissolution the next
day, c589
2. Confidence motions since 1945
This list contains information on the date(s) and day(s) of each debate; the terms of each
motion and divisions thereon; the reason for the debate, if not clear from the terms of the
motion(s); the Hansard references, and (for Commons debates) whether and where the Prime
Minister (`PM') and/or the Leader of the Opposition (`LOpp') spoke.
5 & 6 December 1945 That this House regrets that His Majesty's Government are
(Wednesday/Thursday) neglecting their first duty, namely, to concentrate with full
energy upon the most urgent and essential tasks of the
re-conversion of our industries from war-time production to
that of peace, the provisions of houses, the speedy release of
men and women from the Forces to industry, and the drastic
curtailment of our swollen national expenditure and deplores
the pre-occupation of His Majesty's Ministers, impelled by
Socialist theory, with the formulation of long-term schemes for
nationalisation creating uncertainty over the whole field of
industrial and economic activity, in direct opposition to the best
interest of the nation, which demands food, work and homes.
(Opposition motion defeated 197-381)
[HC Deb vol 416 cc2334-2454, 2530-2644]
-following Leader of the House's refusal to allow a full debate
on the statement of 19 November setting out the legislative
programme for nationalisation.
- LOpp, Churchill, opened 2nd day; PM, Attlee, responded.
4 December 1952 That this House regrets that Her Majesty's Government is
(Thursday) dealing with the Business of the House incompetently, unfairly
and in defiance of the best principles of Parliamentary
democracy and the national interest, and records the view that
this is in part brought about by the efforts of Ministers to force
through measures, unrelated to the needs of the nation, for
which they have no adequate support in Parliament or the
country.
(Opposition motion defeated 280-304)
[HC Deb vol 508 cc1783-1892]
-following the interruption of the debate on the Second Reading
of the Iron and Steel Bill by an emergency debate on Kenya,
and by the House being counted out on 21 November.
12
-LOpp, Attlee, opened; PM, Churchill, responded.
1 November 1956 That this House deplores the action of Her Majesty's
(Thursday) Government in resorting to armed force against Egypt in clear
violation of the United Nations Charter, thereby affronting the
convictions of a large section of the British people, dividing the
Commonwealth, straining the Atlantic Alliance, and gravely
damaging the foundations of international order.
(Opposition motion defeated 255-324)
...approves of the prompt action taken by Her Majesty's
Government designed to bring hostilities between Israel and
Egypt to an end and to safeguard vital international and
national interests, and pledges its full support for all steps
necessary to secure these ends.
(Government amendment approved 323-255; amended motion
carried 320-253)
[HC Deb vol 558 cc1631-1744]
PM, Eden, responded to opening speech. LOpp, Gaitskell, did
not speak.
5 & 6 December 1956 That this House supports the policy of Her Majesty's
(Wednesday/Thursday) Government as outlined by the Foreign Secretary of 3rd
December, which has prevented hostilities in the Middle East
from spreading, has resulted in a United Nations Force being
introduced into the area, and has created conditions under
which progress can be made towards the peaceful settlement of
outstanding issues.
(Government motion carried 312-260)
... recognising the disastrous consequences of Her Majesty's
Government's policy in the Middle East, calls upon Her
Majesty's Government to take all possible steps to restore
Commonwealth unity, recreate confidence between our allies
and ourselves and strengthen the authority of the United
Nations as the only way to achieve a lasting settlement in the
Middle East.
(Opposition amendment defeated 260-327)
[HC Deb vol 561 cc1254-1379, 1453-1586]
-Front-bench speakers referred to `censure' and `confidence'
during debate.
- LOpp, Gaitskell, wound up; PM, Eden, was ill.
5 February 1962 That this House deplores the attack made upon the United
(Monday) Nations by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in his
13
speech at Berwick upon Tweed on 28 December 1961.
(Opposition motion defeated 228-326)
[HC Deb vol 653 cc32-172]
-regarded as censure motion by PM and Leader of Opposition.
- LOpp, Gaitskell, opened; PM, Macmillan, responded.
26 July 1962 That this House declares that Her Majesty's Government no
(Thursday) longer enjoys the confidence of the country, and accordingly
calls upon the Prime Minister to advise Her Majesty to dissolve
Parliament so that a General Election can be held.
(Opposition motion defeated 253-351)
[HC Deb vol 663 cc1735-1868]
-following the major Cabinet reshuffle, involving removal of
seven Ministers, on 13 July.
-LOpp, Gaitskell, opened; PM, Macmillan, responded.
10 November 1964 ... but have no confidence that Your Majesty's Ministers can
(Tuesday) implement their proposals without damaging the programmes
of modernisation already in train and thus imperilling the future
well-being of Your People.
(Opposition amendment to Loyal Address defeated 294-315)
[HC Deb vol 701 cc969-974 (division)]
-neither PM, Wilson, nor LOpp, Douglas-Home, spoke in the
final day of debate, when motion was moved.
2 February 1965 That this House deplores the hasty and ill-considered actions of
(Tuesday) Her Majesty's Government during their first hundred days of
office and has no confidence in their ability to conduct the
nation's affairs.
(Opposition motion defeated 289-306)
....[deplores] the irresponsibility of the former administration
leading to the serious situation which confronted Her Majesty's
Government, and pledges its support for remedial measures to
strengthen the country's economy and security and provide
rising standards for the British people.
(Government amendment approved 306-289; amended motion
carried without a division)
[HC Deb vol 705 cc897-1030]
-LOpp, Douglas-Home, opened; PM, Wilson, responded.
2 August 1965 That this House has no confidence in Her Majesty's
(Monday) Government and deplores the Prime Minister's conduct of the
nation's affairs.
14
(Opposition motion defeated 290-303)
[HC Deb vol 717 cc1070-1202]
-following the Chancellor's economic statement of 27 July.
-LOpp, Heath, opened; PM, Wilson, wound up.
26 & 27 July 1966 That this House has no confidence in the competence of Her
(Tuesday/Wednesday) Majesty's Government to manage the economic affairs of the
nation.
(Opposition motion defeated 246-325)
[HC Deb vol 732 cc1449-1580, 1725-1858]
-following the emergency economic measures of 20 July.
-LOpp, Heath, opened; PM, Wilson, opened day 2.
1 December 1966 That this House has no confidence in the economic policies of
(Thursday) Her Majesty's Government.
(Opposition motion defeated 246-329)
[HC Deb vol 737 cc642-768]
-LOpp, Heath, opened; PM, Wilson, did not speak.
24 July 1967 That this House has no confidence in the economic policies of
(Monday) Her Majesty's Government.
(Opposition motion defeated 240-333)
[HC Deb vol 751 cc68-196]
-LOpp, Heath, wound up; PM, Wilson, did not speak.
15-17 February 1972 That the [European Communities] Bill be now read a second
(Tuesday/Wednesday/ time.
Thursday) (Government motion carried 309-301)
[HC Deb vol 831 cc264-376, 443-552, 629-758]
-2R of European Communities Bill 1971-72; expressly treated
by PM, Heath, as issue of confidence (c752)
-LOpp, Wilson, opened day 3; PM, Heath, wound up.
6 March 1972 That this House condemns the action of Her Majesty's
(Monday) Government in framing its European Communities Bill with the
intention of removing the possibility of substantial amendment;
and considers this to be a gross breach of faith in the light of
undertakings previously given that the Bill and the Treaties
could be fully discussed.
(Opposition motion defeated 270-317)
[HC Deb vol 832 cc1041-1170]
15
-Neither PM, Heath, nor LOpp, Wilson, spoke.
19 November 1973 That this House has no confidence in Her Majesty's
(Monday) Government's management of the economy.
(Opposition motion defeated 286-304)
[HC Deb vol 864 cc956-1092]
-following the announcement of a state of emergency on 13
November.
-LOpp, Wilson, opened; PM, Heath, responded.
11 March 1976 That this House do now adjourn.
(Thursday) (Government motion voted down, i.e. Government victory,
280-297)
[HC Deb vol 907 cc634-758]
-following the Government's defeat the previous day on its
public expenditure White Paper. Expressly treated as
confidence motion by PM, Wilson, c634.
PM, Wilson, opened; LOpp, Thatcher, responded.
9 June 1976 That this House has no confidence in Her Majesty's
(Wednesday) Government.
(Opposition motion defeated 290-309)
[HC Deb vol 912 cc1445-1566]
-following the Chancellor's statement on 7 June announcing
measures to stabilise the pound.
-LOpp, Thatcher, opened; PM, Callaghan, responded.
23 March 1977 That this House has no confidence in Her Majesty's
(Wednesday) Government.
(Opposition motion defeated 298-322)
[HC Deb vol 928 cc1285-1418]
-following the Government's defeat on its public expenditure
plans (17 March) and the formation of the `Lib-Lab pact'.
-LOpp, Thatcher, opened; PM, Callaghan, responded.
20 July 1977 That this House do now adjourn.
(Wednesday) (Government motion voted down, i.e. Government victory, 282-
312)
[HC Deb vol 935 cc1606-1740]
16
-following the Chancellor's statement on counter-inflation
policy on 15 July. Referred to as confidence motion by Leader
of the Opposition, Thatcher, c1637, and by other frontbenchers.
-PM, Callaghan, opened; LOpp, Thatcher, responded.
14 December 1978 That this House expresses its confidence in Her Majesty's
(Thursday) Government and in its determination to strengthen the national
economy, control inflation, reduce unemployment and secure
social justice.
(Government motion carried 300-290)
[HC Deb vol 960 cc920-1049]
-following a defeat on 13 December on sanctions to enforce the
Government's counter-inflation policy.
-PM, Callaghan, opened; LOpp, Thatcher, responded.
28 March 1979 That this House has no confidence in Her Majesty's
(Wednesday) Government.
(Opposition motion carried 311-310: Government resigned)
[HC Deb vol 965 cc461-590]
-following the result of the devolution referenda
-LOpp, Thatcher, opened; PM, Callaghan, responded.
28 February 1980 That this House has no confidence in the economic and
(Thursday) industrial policies of Her Majesty's Government.
(Opposition motion defeated 268-327)
[HC Deb vol 979 cc1580-1704]
-LOpp, Callaghan, opened; PM, Thatcher, responded.
29 July 1980 That this House has no confidence in Her Majesty's
(Tuesday) Government, whose economic and social policies are spreading
mass unemployment, undermining British industry and
demoralising the country.
(Opposition motion defeated 274-333)
[HC Deb vol 989 cc1288-1422]
-LOpp, Callaghan, opened; PM, Thatcher, responded.
27 July 1981 That this House has no confidence in Her Majesty's
(Monday) Government, whose economic and social policies are spreading
mass unemployment, undermining British industry and
demoralising the country.
(Opposition motion defeated 262-334)
[HC Deb vol 9 cc820-910]
17
-LOpp, Foot, opened; PM, Thatcher, responded.
28 October 1981 That this House has no confidence in the economic policies of
(Wednesday) Her Majesty's Government which have pushed the registered
total of unemployed people to shameful levels, have dealt a
series of most damaging blows to British industry, and offer no
hope of recovery; and calls upon Her Majesty's Government to
present to Parliament before the end of the year a range of fresh
measures designed to reverse the present disastrous trends.
(Opposition motion defeated 210-312)
[HC Deb vol 10 cc872-964]
-LOpp, Foot, opened; PM, Thatcher, responded.
31 January 1985 That this House censures Her Majesty's Government for its
(Thursday) gross mismanagement of the British economy which has led to
the highest real interest rates, the worst manufacturing trade
deficit and the highest level of unemployment in the history of
Great Britain.
...supports Her Majesty's Government in its firm action to
maintain the sound financial conditions and medium-term
strategy which have brought about the lowest level of inflation
since the 1960s, nearly four years of sustained economic
growth, record output, sound exports, record investment and
record living standards, and which provide the best long-term
prospects for a fundamental improvement in the performance of
the British economy and for the creation of new jobs.
(Government amendment approved 395-222; amended motion
carried 392-221)
[HC Deb vol 72 cc418-510]
-LOpp, Kinnock, opened; PM, Thatcher, responded.
22 November 1990 That this House has no confidence in Her Majesty's
(Thursday) Government.
(Opposition motion defeated 247-367)
[HC Deb vol 181 cc439-518]
-following the Prime Minister's failure to secure re-election as
Party Leader on the first ballot.
-LOpp, Kinnock, opened; PM, Thatcher, responded.
27 March 1991 That this House has no confidence in Her Majesty's
(Wednesday) Government in the light of its inability to rectify the damage
done to the British people by the poll tax.
(Opposition motion defeated 238-358)
[HC Deb vol 188 cc964-1053]
18
-LOpp, Kinnock, opened: PM, Major, responded.
24 September 1992 That this House expresses its support for the economic policy
(Thursday) of Her Majesty's Government.
(Government motion carried 322-296)
... condemns the total collapse of the Government's entire
economic policy following their humiliating withdrawal of the
pound from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism; deplores
the Government's failed economic policies which have thrown
the United Kingdom economy into a deep and damaging
recession which has made it weak and vulnerable to speculative
attack; believes that the Government's credibility and claims
of economic competence are in tatters; demands the adoption
of an economic policy which reduces unemployment and
recognises that a strong economy can only be built by
consistent investment in manufacturing industry and the
infrastructure, by a sustained commitment to an expansion of
training, the stimulation of innovation, technology, and regional
development and by international co-operation for economic
expansion; and firmly opposes cuts in public expenditure
which will prolong the recession, increase unemployment, and
weaken the United Kingdom's vital public services.
(Opposition motion defeated 288-330)
[HC Deb vol 212 cc2-116]
-PM, Major, opened: LOpp, Smith, responded.
23 July 1993 That this House has confidence in the policy of Her Majesty's
(Friday) Government on the adoption of the Protocol on Social Policy.
(Government motion carried 339-299)
[HC Deb vol 229 cc627-725]
-following the Government's defeat the previous day on the
Maastricht Treaty Social Chapter. This is the only
confidence debate on a Friday in the period since 1945.
-PM, Major, opened; LOpp, Smith, responded.
1 December 1993 That this House has no confidence in the policies of Her
(Wednesday) Majesty's Government.
(Opposition motion defeated 95-282)
[HL Deb vol 550 cc544-554, 571-635]
-the only modern example of a confidence motion in the House
of Lords.
28 November 1994 That the [European Communities (Finance)]
(Monday) (Bill now be read a second time.
(Government motion carried 329-44)
19
...this House believes that the European Communities (Finance)
Bill is not an acceptable measure as it increases United
Kingdom contributions to the European Union without action
by Her Majesty's Government to cut fraud and waste in Europe
or to reduce expenditure on the Common Agricultural Policy.
(Opposition amendment defeated 303-330)
[HC Deb vol 250 cc932-1034]
-PM, Major, made passage of Bill "in all its essentials" an issue
of confidence, which may have made some or all of the 4 votes
in Committee of the Whole House, and the third reading vote,
all on 7 December, confidence occasions [HC Deb vol 251 cc
327-447, 7.12.94]. Note that the Opposition abstained, and the
PM did not vote, on third reading.
-Neither PM, Major, nor LOpp, Blair, spoke in the debate.
20