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                                                                                                             CWC




                CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE
             DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING AND
               USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON THEIR
                         DESTRUCTION (CWC)
Opened for Signature: 13 January 1993.                      The Convention identifies and categorizes toxic
Entered into Force: 29 April 1997.                          chemicals and precursors according to their potential
Duration: indefinite                                        for chemical weapons application and extent of in-
Signatories: 188                                            dustrial applications. Schedule 1 lists chemicals with
States Parties: 183                                         high potential weapons utility and little or no indus-
Depositary: UN Secretary-General.                           trial utility. Schedule 2 singles out chemicals with
                                                            some degree of commercial application and signifi-
                                                            cant potential for use in weapons. Schedule 3 chemi-
Excerpts of Treaty Text                                     cals are generally produced in large quantities for
                                                            industrial purposes and have some potential for
Obligations: States Parties are required not to de-         chemical weapons application. Declarations and veri-
velop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain      fication requirements are the most stringent for
chemical weapons (CW), or transfer, directly or indi-       Schedule 1 and the least so for Schedule 3 (Arti-
rectly, chemical weapons to anyone; not to use              cle II).
chemical weapons; not to engage in military prepara-        Verification and Compliance: Verification: Verifi-
tions for use of chemical weapons; not to assist, en-       cation is conducted through a combination of report-
courage, or induce anyone to engage in any activity         ing and routine on-site inspections of declared sites.
prohibited to a State Party under the convention.           To ensure the implementation of the Convention's
Each State Party is required to destroy all chemical        provisions, including those on verification and com-
weapons and chemical weapons production facilities          pliance, the Organization for the Prohibition of
it owns or possesses or that are located in any place       Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was established upon
under its jurisdiction or control, as well as any           the entry into force of the Convention (29 April
chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of           1997). In addition to routine verification and recourse
another State Party no later than 10 years after entry      to a procedure for consultations, cooperation, and
into force of the Convention or as soon as possible in      fact-finding, each State Party has the right to request
the case of States ratifying or acceding more than 10       an on-site challenge inspection of any facility or loca-
years after entry into force. Each State Party also         tion in any other State Party for the purpose of clari-
undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method       fying and resolving questions concerning possible
of warfare (Article I). The Convention defines a            non-compliance. The challenge inspection team is
chemical weapon as the following, together or sepa-         designated by the Director General of the OPCW and
rately:                                                     dispatched as quickly as possible.

a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except             Compliance: Compliance measures under the OPCW
where intended for purposes not prohibited under the        include: the OPCW may request that a party take
Convention, as long as the types and quantities are         measures to redress a situation in a specific period;
consistent with such purposes; b) Munitions and de-         the OPCW may restrict or suspend a party's rights
vices, specifically designed to cause death or other        and privileges; the OPCW may recommend collec-
harm through the toxic properties of those toxic            tive measures to States Parties, including sanctions;
chemicals specified in Subparagraph (a), which              the OPCW may ask for an advisory opinion from the
would be released as a result of the employment of          ICJ. There is also the option to refer serious viola-
such munitions and devices; c) Any equipment spe-           tions to the UN General Assembly and Security
cifically designed for use directly in connection with      Council. Incentives to comply with the CWC include
the employment of munitions and devices specified           assistance and protection against attack, such as the
in subparagraph (b).                                        dispatch of emergency aid; economic and technologi-
                                                            cal benefits, including the fullest possible exchange
                    Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes
                                © James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
                                              Last Update: 3/16/2008
                                                                                                            CWC

of chemistry information and technology, removal of          of old chemical weapons in Germany by the govern-
trade and other restrictions.                                ment-owned company, GEKA, charged with the de-
                                                             struction of the last two old chemical weapons muni-
Declarations: Eleven countries have declared pos-
                                                             tions stockpiles from World War II.
session of existing or former CW-production facili-
ties: Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, France, India,
                                                             2006: The following states have ratified/acceded to
Iran, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation,
                                                             the Chemical Weapons Convention: Djibouti (25
United Kingdom, United States, and Yugoslavia.
                                                             January), Haiti (22 February), Liberia (23 February),
Four countries have declared CW stocks: India, Re-
                                                             Comoros (17 August), Central African Republic (20
public of Korea, Russia, and United States. Nine
                                                             September), and Montenegro (23 October).
countries have declared old CW on their territory:
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,              As of the 23 October 2006 deposit of the instrument
Slovenia, United Kingdom, and United States. Four            of succession by Montenegro (the entry-into-force of
countries have declared abandoned CW on their terri-         the convention for Montenegro is retroactive to the
tory: China, Italy, Panama, and Poland.                      country's date of independence on 3 June 2006),
Other Main Provisions: The Convention provides               there are 181 state parties to the Chemical Weapons
for the rendering to States Parties of protection            Convention and the same number of member states to
against chemical weapons and assistance in the event         the OPCW.
of a chemical attack. States Parties undertake to fa-
cilitate the fullest possible exchange of chemicals,         In November, Bangladesh announced the approval of
equipment, and scientific and technical information          comprehensive implementing legislation, later con-
relating to the development and application of chem-         firmed to be in place in December. Saint Kitts and
istry for purposes not prohibited under the Conven-          Nevis reported their Chemical Weapons (Prohibition
tion. States Parties are obliged to provide data on the      and Control) Bill had been passed and was going
import and export of scheduled chemicals, as well as         through the necessary administrative processes before
on facilities and chemical production. Restrictions on       it enters into force. The United Arab Emirates sub-
transfers of Schedule 1 and 2 chemicals to States not        mitted a copy of their recently adopted implementing
party to the Convention entered effect at entry into         legislation.
force and on 29 April 2000, respectively. Those on
Schedule 3 transfers will be considered effective five       In December, during the eighth annual meeting of
years from entry into force. Each State Party is re-         National Authorities, Andorra submitted a copy of
quired to enact national implementing legislation to,        comprehensive legislative measures to implement the
inter alia, prohibit individuals under its jurisdiction      Convention. Belize reported their enactment of im-
or control from engaging in activities prohibited by         plementing legislation; however, no submission un-
the Convention. Each State Party is obligated to des-        der Article VII (5) has been received yet. Comoros
ignate or establish a national authority to serve as the     reported that it has a National Authority in place;
focal point for liaison with the OPCW and with other         however, formal notification has yet to be received.
States Parties.                                              Fiji announced that they have enacted implementing
                                                             legislation pending a commencement order that will
Developments:                                                be issued when regulations are in place. Senegal
2007:                                                        submitted a copy of its implementing legislation
                                                             which was adopted on 16 October.
Barbados acceded to the Convention on 7 March.
Congo deposited its instrument of ratification on 4          2005: The following states ratified/acceded to the
December. As of December 2007, there were 183                CWC: Niue (21 April), Grenada (3 June), the King-
state parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention.            dom of Cambodia (19 July), the Kingdom of Bhutan
                                                             (18 August), the Republic of Honduras (29 August),
In January, Turkey reported that its implementing            Antigua and Barbuda (29 August), the Republic of
legislation had entered into force on December 2006.         Vanuatu (16 September), and the Democratic Repub-
On 27 March 2007, the United Kingdom of Great                lic of the Congo (12 October).
Britain and Northern Ireland announced that it had
                                                             As of 11 November 2005, the OPCW will number
destroyed all old chemical weapons stocks declared
                                                             175 States Parties when the CWC will enter into
to the OPCW.
                                                             force for the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
From 23 to 26 April, Director-General of the OPCW,           2004: The following states have ratified/acceded to
Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter, attended the destruction         the CWC: Libya (5 February), Tuvalu (18 February),

                     Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes
                                 © James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
                                               Last Update: 3/16/2008
                                                                                                            CWC

Rwanda (30 April), Saint Kitts and Nevis (21 May),          of their activities against terrorism. The First Review
Marshall Islands (18 June), Solomon Islands (23 Sep-        Conference noted that a large part of the OPCW's
tember), Sierra Leone (30 September), Madagascar            verification resources had been spent on the verifica-
(20 October).                                               tion of chemical weapons destruction operations.
                                                            Given the increase in chemical destruction that will
2003: Afghanistan deposited its instrument of ratifi-       take place in the coming years, the Conference em-
cation to the Convention with the Secretary General         phasized the importance of reviewing current verifi-
of the United Nations on 24 September 2003                  cation methodology in an effort to optimize the
The First Review Conference of the CWC was held             CWC's verification regime. The First Review Con-
from 28 April to 9 May 2003 in The Hague. From the          ference noted that current confidentiality guidelines
151 States Parties to the CWC, 110 delegations at-          provide neither for the destruction of confidential
tended the Conference. The States Parties adopted           documents and other data, including those kept on the
both a Political Declaration and a Review Document          Secretariat's Security Critical Network, nor for the
at the end of the Conference.                               downgrading of their classification levels over the
                                                            long term. The First Review Conference encouraged
The Political Declaration evaluated the operation of        the OPCW to take steps to reach agreement on devel-
the Convention. The declaration stressed the impor-         oping and implementing guidelines regarding the
tance of the timely destruction of chemical weapons,        long-term handling of confidential information. It
a credible verification regime related to the chemical      also noted that no challenge inspections or investiga-
industry and other facilities used for purposes not         tions of alleged use had been requested of the OPCW
prohibited under the Convention, and increased effec-       since its entry into force.
tiveness and efficiency, to achieve the nonprolifera-       The second Review Conference is scheduled for 7
tion and confidence-building aims of the Convention.        April 2008.
The CWC also recognized the role of the United Na-
tions in the fight against global terrorism and empha-      Point of Contact:
sized the importance universal adherence to the Con-
                                                            Director-General Rogelio Pfirter (Argentina)
vention could play in preventing access to chemical
weapons by terrorists. The States Parties also stressed     Johan de Wittlaan 32
the need for the OPCW to continue promoting the             2517 JR, The Hague
free trade of chemicals as well as international coop-      The Netherlands
eration and the exchange of scientific and technologi-      Tel: 31-70-416-33-00
cal development.                                            Fax: 31-70-306-35-35
                                                            E-mail: webmaster@opcw.org
The Review Document assessed the implementation             Website: http://www.opcw.org/
of specific provisions of the Convention during its
first six years. The document reviewed the CWC's
role in enhancing international peace and security,
universality of the treaty, declarations and verifica-
tion, inspections of chemical weapons and industrial
facilities, and the OPCW's ability to assist and pro-
tect States Parties from use or threat of use of chemi-
cal weapons attacks. It took into consideration eco-
nomical and technological developments within the
chemical industries. The document encouraged States
Parties to provide assistance upon request to other
CWC States Parties in the destruction of chemical
weapons stockpiles, while also stressing the impor-
tance of enhanced cost effectiveness of the verifica-
tion measures applied to stockpiles and destruction
facilities.
The Review Document also recognized the request of
the UN Security Council that international organiza-
tions whose activities relate to the control of or of
access to chemical and other deadly materials evalu-
ate ways in which they can enhance the effectiveness

                    Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes
                                © James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
                                              Last Update: 3/16/2008