UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -----------…

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------------------------------------------x
Roy Den Hollander, Sean Moffett, Bruce Cardozo, and
David Brannon,
                                                                         Docket No.
                 Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves                      08 CV 01521(WHP)(ECF)
                 and all others similarly situated,

                 -against-

Secretary Michael Chertoff U.S. Dept. Homeland Security,
Director Emilio Gonzales U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
       (formerly Immigration and Naturalization Service),
U.S. Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey,
Director Kevin Ohlson Executive Office for Immigration Review
       U.S. Department of Justice,

                  Defendants.
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 MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
               DISMISS THE AMENDED COMPLAINT




                                                                         Roy Den Hollander
                                                                         Attorney and co-plaintiff
                                                                         545 East 14 Street, 10D
                                                                         New York, N.Y. 10009
                                                                         Tel.: (917) 687-0652
                                                                         Email: rdhhh@yahoo.com
                                        TABLE OF CONTENTS

                                                                                                         Page

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ......................................................................... 1

DIVORCE VAWA STYLE .............................................................................. 5

CLASS MEMBERS or GROUP A ...................................................................... 6

STANDING ................................................................................................ 7

        Procedural due process violations ............................................................... 8

        Procedural due process injuries ................................................................ 11

        Equal protection violations ..................................................................... 16

        Equal protection injury ........................................................................... 19

        Overbroad and Vague and Injury ............................................................... 20

        Bill of Attainder and Injury ..................................................................... 21

        Causation and Remedies of Injuries ............................................................ 22

RULE 12(b)(6) ............................................................................................. 23

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 25




                                                      ii
                                      TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

                                                                                                        Page

Constitution

U.S. Const. I. § 9 cl. 3 ................................................................................. 21

Cases

Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N.Y. 440, 121 N.E. 341 (1918) ....................................... 10

Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) ......................................................... 8

ATSI Communs., Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2007) ........................ 23

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007 ............................................ 23, 24

Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) ................................................................... 7

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) ............................................................... 22

Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984) ............................................................... 17

Broadrick v. Okla., 413 U.S. 601 (1973) ............................................................ 20

Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980) ............................................................... 14

Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) ............................................................... 12

Connolly v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926) ........................................... 20

Cronin v, FAA, 73 F.3d 1126 (D.C.Cir. 1996) ..................................................... 13

Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (1867) ......................................................... 21

Duke Power Co, v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) ........... 14, 22, 23

Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958) ................................................................ 12

F.E.C. v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 25 (1998) ............................................................ 22

Foretich v. United States, 351 F.3d 1198, 1213 (2003) ........................................... 13

Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) .................................................... 16




                                                       iii
Goldfine v. Sichenzia, 118 F.Supp. 2d 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ................................... 24

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) .......................................... 20, 21

Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) .......................................................... 9

Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 2001) .................................................... 24

Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) ............................... 16

Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984) ......................................................... 19

Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 2003) ............................................ 18

Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) ...................................................... 18

Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007) ...................................................... 25

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) ................. 8, 11

L'Europeene de Banque v. La Republica de Venezuela,
700 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ................................................................. 24

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) .............................................................. 1

Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1986) ..................................................... 5

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) ............................................ 11

Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) ................................................... 23

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) ........................................................ 8

M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) .............................................................. 9

Neu v. Corcoran, 869 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1989) .................................................... 10

Northeastern Fla. Assoc. Gen. Contractors Am. v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993) ...... 19

N.Y.P.I.R.G. v.Whitman, 321 F.3d 316 (2d Cir. 2003) .......................................... 15

O'Hair v. White, 675 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1982) ..................................................... 7

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)(Brandeis, J. dissenting) ..................... 10

O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) .......................................................... 8



                                                     iv
Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)(Harlan, J. dissenting) .............................. 17

Port Dock & Stone Corp. v. Oldcastle Northeast, Inc., 507 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2007) ........ 24

Robinson v. Overseas Mil. Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 1994) ........................... 8

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) ........................................................ 17

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) ........................................................ 13

Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945)(Jackson, J. concurring) .............................. 2

Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) ................................................................. 17

U.S. V. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) .............................................................3, 21

U.S. v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) ....................................................... 14, 21, 22

U. S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) ............................................................ 4

U. S. v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) ............................................................. 23

Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992 (2d Cir. 1994) ............................................... 14, 15

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) ................................................... 17, 18

Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) .................................................... 16, 17

Statutes
(The ones in bold are the challenged VAWA provisions).

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C)(F.O.I.A.) ................................................................. 14

5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(Privacy Act) ..................................................................... 23

8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii) ........................................................................ 2

8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I)(bb) ............................................................... 2

8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa)(CC)(ccc) .................................................. 2

8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(J) ......................................................................2, 9, 15

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) .......................................................................... 5




                                                       v
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(iii) ........................................................................ 5

8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) ................................................................................... 13

8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(C) ..........................................................................3, 5

8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) ..................................................................................... 3

8 U.S.C. § 1183a ..................................................................................... 12

8 USCS § 1184(d) .................................................................................... 13

8 U.S.C. § 1186a ..................................................................................... 6

8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c) .................................................................................. 5

8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(A) ........................................................................... 5

8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B) ............................................................................ 5

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H) ............................................................................ 13

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H)(ii) ......................................................................3, 5

8 U.S.C. §1229b(b)(2) ............................................................................1, 13

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i) ....................................................................... 2

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(C) ....................................................................... 2, 5

8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) ..................................................................................... 1

8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(1)(A) ...................................................................2, 3, 9, 10

8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(2) ....................................................................... 2, 3, 6, 9

8 U.S.C. § 1367(b)(2)(4)(5) & (7) .............................................................. 2, 10

8 U.S.C. § 1367(c) ................................................................................. 2, 9

8 U.S.C. § 1641(c) .................................................................................... 14

8 U.S.C. § 1641(c)(1)(A) ............................................................................ 3

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) ........................................................................... 8, 12




                                                       vi
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) .............................................................................. 23

N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 74 ......................................................................... 10

Other

8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi) ........................................................................... 3

8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(2)(iv) ..................................................................... 2, 9, 15

61 Fed. Reg. 13,065 .................................................................................. 3

61 Fed. Reg. 13,066 ..................................................................... 2, 3, 9, 15, 20

1999 National Victim Assistance Academy, chap. 8 ............................................. 21

American Journal of Public Health, May 2007, Vol. 97, No. 5, pp. 941-47 .................. 20

Baskerville, Family Violence in America, (2006) ................................................ 18

Black's Law Dictionary, 8th ed. 1999 .............................................................. 3

Family Violence Prevention Fund, Breaking the Silence - Training Manual (2006) ........ 21

Gordon, Immigration Law & Proc., revised ed. ............................................... 5, 18

H.R. Rep. No. 103-395 .............................................................................. 18

Pendleton, Immigration and Nationality Law Handbook, ed. 2001-02 ........................ 20

R.A.D.A.R.,VAWA Programs Discriminate Against Male Victims, Dec. 2007,
www.mediaradar.org ................................................................................. 19

Rotunda, Treatise on Constitutional Law, 4th ed. (2008) ..................................... 9, 10

USCIS Memorandum, HQOPRD 70/6.2.11 ...................................................... 13

Virtue, INS Memorandum, 74 Interpreter Releases 795 (1997) ................................ 2

Virtue, INS Memorandum, 76 Interpreter Releases 162 (1999) ................................ 15

Wright, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Supp. (2008) ....................................................... 7, 23




                                                      vii
                                PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

       "The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal
       rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Loving v.
       Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)(Warren, C. J.).

       This case involves two groups of adult human beings. The members of each group have,

are or will marry the members of the other group. Group A consists of citizens of the United

States, whether by birth or naturalization, who belong to the male sex and are husbands or ex-

husbands of the members of Group B. Group B consists of foreign, or alien, females who are

the wives or ex-wives of Group A members. The alien wives or ex-wives are not admitted to the

U.S. as full permanent residents and are referred to as "non-permanent" aliens even though some

are here illegally. Full permanent residency is one step away from naturalization. This case does

not involve marriages between full permanent resident aliens and other aliens.

       This putative class action is against the defendants for violating the civil rights of the

plaintiff class: Group A. Members of Group B acquire full permanent residency by simply

alleging the citizens they married mistreated them. The process was created primarily by the

Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA") and its amendments, so it is referred to as the

"VAWA process," Amended Complaint ¶¶ 32-39 and 45, and consists of (1) self-petitioning for

immediate relative classification, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii); (2) applying for cancellation of

any pending deportation proceeding, 8 U.S.C. §1229b(b)(2); and (3) applying for adjustment of

status to full permanent residency, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).

        The issues are whether certain statutory provisions and regulations--but not all the

provisions and regulations that create the VAWA process--are constitutional or their

enforcement constitutional. The statutory provisions and regulations at issue are referred to as




                                                  1
"VAWA provisions" and are in bold throughout this Opposition to the defendants' Amended

Memorandum to Dismiss, July 29, 2008, cited as "Memorandum."

       Secrecy, 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(2) & (c) make secret Federal proceedings that determine

whether Group A members committed acts of "battery," "extreme cruelty," or "overall pattern

of violence." The proceedings are kept secret from the accused, Group A, but not the accusers,

Group B, or the accusers' immigration attorneys or private feminist organizations or Federal,

State, and local public or private agencies that provide benefits to Group B members or law

enforcement. 8 U.S.C. § 1367(b)(2)(4)(5) & (7). Democracies die behind close doors.

       Turning a blind eye, 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(1)(A) requires discarding any exculpatory

evidence the accused might submit to the defendants solely because it passed through his hands.

Virtue, INS Memorandum, 74 Interpreter Releases 795 (1997). "Facts do not cease to exist

because they are ignored."--Aldous Huxley.

       Relying on untrustworthy evidence, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(J), 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(2)(iv),

and 61 Fed. Reg. 13,066 permit the defendants to arbitrarily decide, without the requirement of

normal evidentiary standards, the credibility and weight of information provided by the accusers

for finding Group A members responsible for "battery," "extreme cruelty," or an "overall pattern

of violence"--all of which are referred to as "mistreatment" in this Opposition. Since evidence

submitted by Group A is discarded, there is no adversarial process at work. The framers of the

Constitution "did not trust any government to separate the true from the false for us." Thomas v.

Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945)(Jackson, J. concurring).

         "Battery," "extreme cruelty," and "overall pattern of violence" are vague and overbroad

terms. "Self-petitioning" under 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I)(bb) & (II)(aa)(CC)(ccc),

cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i) & (C), waiver of inadmissibility




                                                2
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(C) & (i), waiver of deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H)(ii),

non-disclosure of information under 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(2), prohibition on evidence from U.S.

citizens under 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(1)(A), and definitions under 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c)(1)(A), 8

C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi) and 61 Fed. Reg. 13,061, 13,065-066 all require Group A members to

be guilty of "battering" or "extreme cruelty" or an "overall pattern of violence," but nowhere are

those terms specifically defined. Persons cannot know what not to do if there is no way of

knowing what not to do. ("Guilty" means responsibility for a crime or civil wrong. Black's Law

Dictionary, 8th ed. 1999, and is used interchangeably with "responsible" in this Opposition).

       Bill of Attainder. The VAWA provisions were enacted knowing that they would punish

without trial Group A members by violating their constitutional rights. "The vice of attainder is

that the legislature has decided for itself that certain persons possess certain characteristics and

are therefore deserving of sanction...." U.S. V. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 449 n. 23 (1965).

       The Amended Complaint does not request, as the defendants misrepresent at

Memorandum p. 1, that Group B members be required to obtain permanent residency by having

their respective citizen husbands sponsor them. Nor does the Amended Complaint request full

access to the immigration records of Group B, only records concerning findings of mistreatment.

       The Amended Complaint charges that fundamental rights are violated by the way the

defendants provide Group B members full permanent residency through the VAWA process.

Specifically, by the threshold requirement that Group A in some undefined manner mistreat

Group B members. The VAWA provisions and defendants ignore the adversarial system for

determining the truth by finding mistreatment in secret proceedings that ignore evidence from

the accused and consider information from accusers that has been vetted by Feminist counselors

and profit-driven immigration attorneys as wholly trustworthy and persuasive. The VAWA




                                                  3
provisions assume Group A members guilty without allowing them any opportunity to prove

themselves innocent. They've taken the "he said" out of the "he said, she said."

       The fundamental rights at stake are fairness in procedure, freedom of choice in marital

relations, freedom of speech, privacy, reputation as it relates to a state right, and freedom from

invidious discrimination.

       The defendants' key argument is that Group A members have not and will not suffer any

injury from enforcement of the VAWA provisions. The defendants also argue that because they

must keep secret all the proceedings from Group A, its members cannot confirm that they are

targets of the VAWA process. By this logic, proceedings created by Congress and enforced by

the Executive can make findings of fact against citizens, and those citizens cannot challenge the

constitutionality of those proceedings because secrecy laws keep the proceedings hidden from

them, regardless of what rights are violated in the process and what harms result. A classic

Catch 22, but fortunately, "[u]nder our written Constitution ... the limitation of congressional

authority is not solely a matter of legislative grace." U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616

(2000)(citation omitted).

       The VAWA provisions use the Federal Government to reshape social relations by

coercing private conduct in accordance with the Feminist Establishment's ideology.1 The

conduct regulated need not amount to criminal or civil wrongs, but even if it does, the prevention

and punishment of such more appropriately falls within family law--an area traditionally

reserved for the states. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16. The purported Federal interest of

preventing Group A from mistreating Group B members is better served by the states' police



1
 Feminist Establishment refers to the unitary belief system held by a sufficient number of
influential persons in this society such that the ideology of Feminism dominates over other
beliefs in the political, governmental, academic, media and social spheres.


                                                 4
forces, family courts, legal aid societies, women's shelters and the numerous non-profit and tax-

exempt organizations created to assist Group B.

                                    DIVORCE VAWA STYLE

        The defendants falsely claim that prior to VAWA an alien "was entirely dependent on her

husband to file an immigrant visa petition on her behalf," Memorandum p. 3, and such

dependency led to citizens pressuring alien spouses to remain in marriages in which they were

mistreated. The petition is a Joint Petition that the spouses together file for the alien to become a

full permanent resident. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c). Prior to VAWA there were two procedures that

allowed alien spouses to obtain full permanent residency without the aid of citizen spouses. The

hardship waiver, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(A), required the alien to make a showing of "extreme

hardship," which would be difficult to meet. Gordon, Immigration Law & Proc., § 42.05(4)(b),

p. 42-18. Another route was the marriage's legal termination, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B), not a

difficult task in the era of "no-fault" divorces.

        VAWA does much more than give Group B members an independent, redundant route to

full permanent residency. It allows them to acquire full permanent residency and citizenship

even when they are not of good moral character or engaged in marriage fraud. They can admit to

crimes of moral turpitude or violating drug laws; be convicted twice with a total sentence of 5 or

more years; worked as prostitutes; or used fraud to obtain admission to the U.S., providing in the

fraud situation the aliens show that some hardship would result in denying them residency. 8

U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) & (iii), 1182(h)(1)(C) and 1227(a)(1)(H)(ii). VAWA also provides

similar excuses for Group B to cancel deportation proceedings if they allege their citizen

husbands made them do the above. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(C). Ironically, the VAWA




                                                    5
provisions have pretty much negated the Government's policy of preventing marriage fraud

under the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, 8 U.S.C. 1186a.

                               CLASS MEMBERS or GROUP A

       The plaintiff class, or Group A, is not alleging "wrongs as a result of ... marriage[s] to ...

alien [wives]." (Memorandum p. 6). The wrongs are the violation and continuing violation of

the class members' constitutional rights by the defendants who execute the various VAWA

provisions. The injuries to the class members are the violations of their constitutional rights and

other harms that result from those violations.

       The defendants object that some allegations are "upon information and belief." (Id.) The

reason is that the defendants hide their activities behind close doors from Group A members but

not Group B, certain feminist groups, or some government agencies. 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(2).

Further, allegations on information and belief are permitted when the matters are peculiarly

within the opponents' knowledge--in this case the defendants. Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49,

54 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1986)(fraud allegations which require a higher standard of pleading than here).

       Four named plaintiffs represent the plaintiff class or Group A. The pattern of facts and

violation of their rights are common to all the class members: a U.S. citizen male (1) brings an

alien female to America on a fiancée visa and marries her within 90 days; or (2) marries an alien

female already in the U.S., whether she's here legally or illegally, and sponsors her for

conditional permanent residency; or (3) marries an alien female overseas and brings her here on

a conditional permanent residency visa. The citizen husband, after a period of time, realizes his

wife married him just to obtain full permanent residency in the U.S.--a prize cherished around

the world. Or the marriage just doesn't work out. The husband tells his alien wife he intends to

divorce her, which will make the prize much more difficult to obtain unless she uses the VAWA




                                                 6
process of accusing her husband of mistreatment and she creates a paper trail of documents that

the defendants consider "credible evidence."

       Some foreign females, whether in the U.S. or overseas, learn about the VAWA process

from the many Feminist groups on the Internet that explain exactly how to exploit the procedure.

Many of these foreign females then target a citizen male for a fraudulent marriage. Other foreign

females don't learn of VAWA until married to a citizen. Either way, when the marriage starts to

unravel, Feminist organizations, funded by the Federal Government or granted tax-exempt status,

intervene to provide free assistance to Group B members on the exact steps needed to take--or

create--to assure winning the prize of full permanent residency and eventually citizenship.

       Many of the specific facts pertaining to the named plaintiffs are spun by the defendants

through deletions and misstatements to create a false picture of innocent alien wives but innately

culpable and troublesome husbands. (Memorandum, pp 6-9). Culpability or vexation are not the

issues in this case. The issues are whether the VAWA provisions and their enforcement violate

the constitutional rights of Group A, thereby causing injury.

       This Court is referred to the Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 53-125 for the accurate factual

allegations concerning the class representatives.

                                           STANDING

       The U.S. Supreme Court's practice is to sustain the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue

injunctions and other relief to protect rights safeguarded by the Constitution and to restrain

government officials from doing what the Constitution forbids the Government to do. Bell v.

Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)(citations omitted). Interests and "values of an abstract nature or

esoteric nature can provide the basis for standing," O'Hair v. White, 675 F.2d 680, 687 (5th Cir.

1982), such as the highly abstract rights to speech, association and equal protection, Wright, Fed.




                                                    7
Prac. & Proc. Supp., § 3531.4, at pp. 954-55 (2008). Their importance and the protection of

individual constitutional rights is a central part of the role under separation of powers assigned to

the judiciary where "[t]he touchstone to justiciability is injury to a legally protected right ...."

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 140-41 (1951)(citations

omitted). Injuries need only be alleged--not proven, and are deemed true on the defendants'

facial Rule 12(b)(1) motion. Robinson v. Overseas Mil. Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 507 (2d Cir.

1994)(citations omitted). The alleged injuries in this case stem from what the Justice

Department ("DOJ") considers law enforcement proceedings, Exhibit 1, and include the threat of

future harm. "Past wrongs are evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat

of repeated injury." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496 (1974). The Government is not about

to stop enforcing the VAWA provisions, which creates a certainty of future injuries to Group A

members. At this very moment, some Group A members and at least two of the named plaintiffs

are having their rights violated by the defendants. (Amended Complaint ¶¶ 14-24, 95, 125).

Procedural Due Process Violations

        "VAWA cases are pretty much a joke, most of them are approved because there is
        only one side. There's a ring of groups that know what to tell the officials at the
        Vermont Service Center. There's an extremely high approval for VAWA cases."
        Dean Hove former USCIS Upper Midwest Deputy District Director.

        When the power of government is used against a person, there is a right to fair procedure

to determine the legality of the government's decision. Due process requires the opportunity to

be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner" before government burdens life,

liberty or property. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). In determining what

process is due, the courts look to three factors: (1) whether existing procedures create an

unreasonable risk of an erroneous deprivation, (2) the private interest affected by official action,

and (3) the Government's interest in the existing procedures. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.


                                                   8
319, 335 (1976). When procedures limit fundamental constitutional rights, the laws creating

them must serve compelling governmental interests. Rotunda, Treatise on Constitutional Law, §

15.7, 4th ed. 2008.

       Three VAWA procedures violate procedural due process: Secrecy, 8 U.S.C. §

1367(a)(2) & (c), provides no notice and no opportunity for Group A members to be heard at

proceedings that find them responsible for "battery," "extreme cruelty" or an "overall pattern of

violence;" and two evidentiary provisions referred to as Turning a blind eye, 8 U.S.C. §

1367(a)(1)(A), and Relying on untrustworthy evidence, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(J), 8 C.F.R. §

204.2(c)(2)(iv), and 61 Fed. Reg. 13,066, ignore evidence from Group A but rely on

incompetent evidence from Group B. All three corrupt the truth finding function and violate

fundamental constitutional rights in determining whether Group A mistreats Group B.

       Speech Where the reasonableness of the Government's decisions depend on findings of

fact, the evidence used to prove those findings must be disclosed to the adverse party so that he

can show the evidence untrue. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959). This is

especially important when the evidence consists of testimony by those who "might be perjurers

or ... motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice or jealousy." Id. The secrecy

and evidentiary provisions prevent the accused from speaking or hiring attorneys to speak for

them or presenting oral and written evidence on their behalf. It's commonly called "railroading."

       Marriage "Choices about marriage, family life, ... are among associational rights [the

Supreme] Court has ranked as `of basic importance in our society.'" M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S.

102, 116 (1996)(citation omitted). Group A members do not have the freedom of choice to

challenge the accusations and findings of marital mistreatment. Nor can Group A choose to

submit Group B's use of the VAWA process as evidence of an alien's motivation for fraud in




                                                 9
restraining order, arrest and divorce proceedings. Group A members are boxed-in between two

equally harmful alternatives: found guilty of domestic mistreatment by the Federal Government

or perjury in sponsoring alien wives for residency. A dilemma that effectively chills Group A

members' rights to choose to seek annulments or divorces.

       Privacy & Reputation The right to privacy protects one's private life from government

intrusion, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928)(Brandeis, J. dissenting), and

the right to privacy regarding family matters is inherent in the concept of liberty, Rotunda,

Treatise on Constitutional Law, § 18.26, 4th ed. 2008. The VAWA provisions result in the

wholesale intrusion by the defendants into private matters without any procedures for protecting

the privacy rights of Group A members.

       Government harm to reputation in connection with the denial of a right recognized by

state law infringes a liberty interest that triggers due process. Neu v. Corcoran, 869 F.2d 662,

669-670, & n. 2 (2d Cir. 1989). VAWA provisions prevent Group A from preventing or

correcting false findings by the defendants that are defamatory. The defamations are available to

certain Federal, State and local employees, private organizations providing benefits and

"victim's service[s]," and law enforcement officials. 8 U.S.C. § 1367(b)(2)(4)(5) & (7). Since

the defamatory statements are made in official proceedings and constitute an accurate depiction

of those proceedings, the statements are privileged under state law in defamation actions. E.g.,

Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N.Y. 440, 446, 121 N.E. 341, 343 (1918); N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 74.

The result is that the one-sided, secret VAWA proceedings eliminate the right to a state cause of

action for defamation brought by Group A members.

         The Alice in Wonderland nature of the VAWA determination of mistreatment is best

illustrated by 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(1)(A). Defendants cannot make any decisions to find Group B




                                                10
inadmissible or deportable solely from information provided by Group A members who have

mistreated their alien spouses. The threshold question is whether Group A mistreated Group B.

The defendants, however, cannot accept any evidence from Group A as to innocence because

such evidence may result in findings of no mistreatment, which means self-petitioners are

ineligible under VAWA. And VAWA ineligibility means Group B members would be

inadmissible or deportable as a result of evidence solely from Group A, which the law forbids.

So to conform to the statute, Group A members are presumed guilty and denied any opportunity

to show otherwise. That is no way to find the truth, but it is in the tradition of every kangaroo

trial, witch-hunt or "French Reign of Terror" proceeding that ever occurred.

       Government's Interest The defendants represent the Government's interest as preventing

"accused batterers" of participating in the VAWA process so as to "ensure the effectiveness of

the application procedures." (Memorandum p. 5). The focus of those procedures is determining

whether Group A members mistreated members in Group B. The same objective can be served

without the wholesale violation of the rights of Group A by providing those procedures of the

adversarial process that convince the governed that "justice has been done," Joint Anti-Fascist

Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). "The

validity and moral authority of a conclusion largely depend on the mode by which it was

reached. Secrecy is not congenial to truth-seeking and self-righteousness gives too slender an

assurance of rightness." Id. at 171.

Injuries from Procedural Due Process Violations

       The denial of procedural due process in proceedings that impact fundamental

constitutional rights injure Group A members in personal and individual ways. Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n. 1 (1992). The basic interest in notice and




                                                 11
opportunity to be heard supports standing: a plaintiff is even entitled to nominal damages on a

showing of a deprivation of procedural due process without any other actual injury because of

the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed. Carey v. Piphus,

435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978). The defendants' Rule 12(b)(1) motion claims "none of the named

plaintiffs can confirm that his ex-wife actually filed any application under VAWA,"

Memorandum p. 17, so any violations of their procedural due process rights is "conjecture." But

the Amended Complaint at ¶ 110 states that Mr. Cardozo's alien wife "used VAWA to acquire

permanent residency," and the Cardozo Affidavit confirms that, Exhibit 2. The three other co-

representatives allege their ex-wives used, are using or will use VAWA.

       Lack of procedural due process infringes speech by Group A, but not by prosecuting or

punishing speech after it occurs, Memorandum p. 22, rather by preventing speech before it

occurs--censorship.

       The VAWA provisions create on going risks that effectively limit freedom of choice in

not only whom to marry but whether to terminate a marriage. Group A members cannot divorce

without the risk of being subjected to special disabilities created by the provisions, which means

they have a substantial, immediate, and real interest in whether the provisions are valid. See

Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202, 204 (1958). VAWA secrecy prevents Group A from using

Federal records to reopen state criminal and civil cases or defend against current actions by

showing that accusations by Group B lack credibility because such claims are driven by the prize

of full permanent residency.

       When citizen men bring alien fiancées to America for marriage or sponsor their alien

wives for conditional permanent residency, they must enter into contracts with the Federal

Government, USCIS form I-864. 8 U.S.C. § 1183a. The enforceable agreement obligates Group




                                                12
A to support Group B to the amount of 125% of the poverty level if alien wives receive public

assistance. These obligations may last for 10 years and divorce does not end them. Findings by

the Government that alien wives are inadmissible or deportable will end the husband's

obligation, since the wives will no longer be in the U.S. legally. The VAWA provisions,

however, provide waivers for conduct that would normally result in inadmissibility or

deportability, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(h), 1227(a)(1)(H) and 1229b(b)(2); thereby assuring that alien

wives legally remain in the U.S. and the husbands obligated to support them.

       Many members of Group A use or will use K-1 fiancée visas to bring their future foreign

wives to America. An amendment to VAWA limits citizen husbands to sponsoring just two such

visas unless a waiver is obtained. 8 USCS § 1184(d); Memorandum USCIS, HQOPRD

70/6.2.11. An obvious factor in considering a waiver is whether a prior alien wife was adjudged

inadmissible or deportable, but the VAWA provisions effectively prevent that. So those who are

unlucky in marriage to aliens are effectively limited to two K-1 fiancées, while those who seek

only domestic spouses still have the freedom to marry as often as they wish.

       The VAWA process casts a continuing and brooding presence of risk and fear that

threatens an American man's right to marry an alien female when considering the high failure

rate of marriages, the intense desire of aliens to gain admission to the U.S., and that marriage is

fundamental to the very existence and survival of mankind, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,

541 (1942). Such risks are sufficient for standing, Cronin v, FAA, 73 F.3d 1126, 1130 (D.C.Cir.

1996) and also deter Group A members from again marrying aliens.

       Privacy and reputation injuries derive directly from unexpired and unretracted

government action, which satisfies standing. See Foretich v. United States, 351 F.3d 1198, 1213

(2003). DOJ considers the fact-findings in the VAWA process as compiled for law enforcement




                                                 13
purposes and cannot be released without constituting an "unwarranted invasion of the personal

privacy of third parties" under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). Exhibit 1. Yet, it is highly likely that

privacy and defamatory information concerning Group A will be communicated to government

or private providers of benefits to Group B because 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c) requires the providers to

verify information by accessing the defendants' findings. Such disclosures constitute publication

to third parties and create the risk of even wider publication.2 (Amended Complaint ¶¶ 21-24,

148-49, 151-55, 203). The likelihood of disclosure suffices for standing. See Bryant v. Yellen,

447 U.S. 352, 366-67 (1980). Further, the likelihood of wider disclosure is significantly greater

than the likelihood of a nuclear accident for which the Supreme Court found standing in Duke

Power Co, v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 64, 69 (1978).

       Additional reputation harm is based on Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992 (2d Cir. 1994),

where the Second Circuit found specific deprivation of plaintiff's opportunity to seek

employment caused by a statutory impediment established by government. In Valmonte, the

state determined persons were child abusers without proper due process and kept their names in a

registry unavailable to the general public. If such a person applied for employment in childcare,

the potential employer had to check the registry, which would result in denial of a job. The

person denied the job had to be told whether it was based on the registry. Under VAWA, Group

A members applying for employment with the Federal Government that requires a security

clearance will have their VAWA records checked by the FBI, which will result in a denial. But

any denial will remain secret, since disclosure to Group A is prohibited. Infringement of

opportunity to work for the Government is punishment of a most server type. U.S. v. Lovett, 328



2
  Counsel for the class has requested statistics on the release of such records. The F.O.I.A.
request is pending with USCIS and on appeal with EOIR.



                                                14
U.S. 303, 315 (1946). In Valmonte the process allowed for notifications and appeal procedures,

but was still found to create an "enormous risk of error" resulting in loss of employment.

Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 1003. The VAWA provisions provide no procedures.

         Under VAWA "credible evidence" means whatever the defendants decide it to mean. 8

U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(J), 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(2)(iv), 61 Fed. Reg. 13,066, and Virtue, INS

Memorandum, 76 Interpreter Releases 162, 168-169 (Jan 25, 1999). The defendants have no

clear cut standards for determining credible evidence while the only discernible rule for

allocating weight is that court documents, medical reports, police reports, and other official

documents will receive more weight than documents created by Group B. Id., Virtue. VAWA

has confused authentication of official documents with the truth of the matters asserted. All too

often falsehoods are inserted into court documents submitted by parties, lies told to medical

personnel, and misrepresentations made to the police. Giving additional weight to the contents

of such documents is bootstrapping, since the source of information mainly comes from Group

B. The evidentiary benefits of such documents are not lost on immigration lawyers, Feminist

groups (some of which advise withholding information from the police and courts) and Group B

members. They intentionally create a trail of official documents filled with false charges against

Group A so that those documents can be used as "primary evidence" in the VAWA process. Of

course, another very foreseeable result is that the false charges will result in jail, temporary

restraining orders, harm to occupation, lost of employment, legal fees, and pink-listing, which is

similar to the blacklists of the McCarthy era. As back then, lives are destroyed based on

unsubstantiated accusations.

       The anticipation of future injury itself can provide standing when persons reasonably

suffer fear of the risks they cannot do anything to lessen. N.Y.P.I.R.G. v.Whitman, 321 F.3d




                                                  15
316, 325-26 (2d Cir. 2003). Group A members have no legal recourse, other than this lawsuit, to

prevent the violation of their due process rights when the VAWA process deprives them of free

speech and freedom of choice in marital decisions or invades their privacy or injures their

reputation. The information held by the defendants is a ticking time bomb.

Equal Protection Violations

       The VAWA provisions classify persons so as to prevent the exercise of fundamental

rights on equal terms: (1) Americans v. different nationalities, (2) U.S. citizens v. non-

permanent aliens, and (3) males v. females. "[W]here fundamental rights and liberties are

asserted under ... Equal Protection ... classifications which might invade or restrain them must

be closely scrutinized and carefully confined. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383

U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).

       Nationality & Alienage: Nationality arises from a person belonging to a nation.

Alienage means a foreign born person who has not yet qualified for citizenship. The aliens

concerned with in this action are non-permanent; that is, not full permanent residents.

Nationality and alienage are two different classifications but both are suspect. Frontiero v.

Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973)(citations omitted).

       The VAWA provisions aim to keep American citizens who mistreat their non-American,

alien spouses from opposing a spouse's application for full permanent residency. (Memorandum

p. 5). The defendants, therefore, must find American citizens guilty of mistreating their spouses.

It is in reaching these findings that the defendants treat American citizens differently than non-

American, non-permanent aliens. The aliens know about the proceedings and can submit

evidence--the citizens are shutout. VAWA's classifications do not remotely serve the end of

truthfully determining mistreatment because participation and evidence from citizens are lacking




                                                 16
due to their American nationality and citizenship. The denial of fundamental rights to American

citizens but allowed to non-American aliens is so disconnected with finding the truth that the

provisions are inexplicable by any motive other than animus toward American citizens, mainly

men, who marry foreigners. The provisions, therefore, violate equal protection. See Zablocki,

434 U.S. at 388-89.

       The defendants focus on the "citizen v. alien" distinction and argue that the Government

can deprive citizens of fundamental rights while giving those same rights to non-permanent

aliens because citizens are not similarly situated with aliens. (Memorandum p. 23). Long ago

the U.S. Supreme Court found that rights to equal protection "are universal in their application,

to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences ...." Yick Wo

v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). The Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates classes

among citizens," Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)(Harlan, J. dissenting). Those

words are now understood to state a commitment to the law's neutrality where the rights of

persons are at stake, whether citizens, legal or illegal aliens. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623

(1996). How ironic that today, America, which has consistently granted aliens within its borders

rights similar to U.S. citizens, now deprives those citizens of rights granted aliens. The

Constitution does not allow for such; if anything, citizens have more rights. See Bernal v.

Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 221 (1984).

       Sex: The Congressional history of VAWA is not sex-neutral but shows a motivation to

burden men, and the challenged provisions are presently applied disproportionately against men.

The purpose of an act must be found in its natural operation and effect, Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.

33, 40 (1915)(citations omitted), and the purpose of VAWA is not only plainly shown by its

history, but frankly revealed in its title: The Violence Against Women Act.




                                                 17
       Congress's goal in passing VAWA was to protect "immigrant women," from citizen men,

Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 827, 840-41 (9th Cir. 2003); H.R, Rep. No. 103-395, at 25.

The Congressional history and Government documents reflect a belief in traditional stereotype

distinctions between the sexes that identify females as innocent victims and males as batterers.

Baskerville, Family Violence in America, p. 21 (2006)(domestic violence is perpetrated as often

by women as men, n. 44). Congress used the term "women" as the intended beneficiaries of the

Act, and not until 2005 did the statute, first enacted in 1994 and repeatedly amended, specifically

include men as beneficiaries rather than the culprits the legislative history reflects. VAWA's

original enactment, as evinced by the terminology used and viewed in the backdrop of prevalent

ill will toward men held by the Feminist lobbyists who created the Act, shows it was at least

partially motivated by bias against men. The Act continues to this day to have that effect, so it

violates equal protection. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985).

       Laws might not have sex classifications written in words, but they may be applied in such

a way as to create classifications. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. at 373-74. The Amended

Complaint alleges at ¶¶ 126-39 the discriminatory application of the law by the VAWA Unit at

the USCIS Vermont Service Center. Further, as Gordon's treatise on Immigration Law and

Procedure, § 41.05(1) and feminist advocates, such as Gail Pendleton of the National

Immigration Project, make clear: it is primarily alien wives who use the VAWA process and for

whom the process was intended. DOJ's Office on Violence Against Women, which administers

VAWA funds, instructed the Delaware Domestic Violence coordinating council that "states must

fund only programs that focus on violence against women"; the victims served under VAWA

programs are 90% female; DOJ's National Institute of Justice specifically prohibits "proposals

for research on intimate partner violence against ... males of any age," and requires that




                                                18
"[s]trategies for preventing intimate partner violence should focus on risks posed by men," July

2000, NCJ 181867. These are just some of the many examples of the discriminatory application

of VAWA against men as detailed by R.A.D.A.R. in VAWA Programs Discriminate Against

Male Victims, Dec. 2007, www.mediaradar.org. VAWA is presently a device used to impose

burdens primarily on males rather than females.

Injury from Equal Protection Violations

       The Amended Complaint claims the Government erected and defendants enforce

unconstitutional barriers--secrecy, evidentiary, and arbitrary definitions--that make it

impossible for Group A to obtain the same benefits of procedures in defending against

accusations as Group B members have in prosecuting those accusations. The injury is in not

being considered equally without the discriminatory obstacles, and causality exists because

plaintiffs are able and ready to defend against the accusations but the VAWA provisions prevent

them. Northeastern Fla. Assoc. Gen. Contractors Am. v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666

(1993). In other words, Group A cannot compete on an equal footing with Group B in the

mistreatment determinations. The remedy is restoring equality, which can occur by withdrawing

the benefits of procedures from the favored class, Group B, or extending the same procedures to

the excluded class, Group A. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 740 (1984)(citation omitted).

       The current climate in America in which family courts believe wives but not husbands

compounds the harm to citizen husbands from the VAWA provisions. The challenged

provisions drafted by Feminist organizations are clearly ingenious. They exploit a society biased

against men when up against their wives--not wholly unlike the societal bigotry that led to the

decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537. Today, men are stereotyped as the ones most




                                                19
likely to resort to physical violence in a domestic dispute when actually it is the female.

American Journal of Public Health, May 2007, Vol. 97, No. 5, pp. 941-47.

Overbroad and Vague and Injury

       Enactments are facially overbroad when their reach is so sweeping that they could deter

persons from engaging in protected speech, Broadrick v. Okla., 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973), and

void for vagueness when "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at [their]

meaning[s] and differ as to [their] applications," Connolly v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385,

391 (1926). Expansive scope and uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to "steer far wider

of the unlawful zone . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked" and

"delegate basic policy matters to [government employees] for resolution on an ad hoc and

subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application."

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)(citations omitted).

       The VAWA process requires that Group A members engage in "battering" or "extreme

cruelty" or an "overall pattern of violence." (Amended Complaint ¶¶ 188-204). These terms,

however, are open-ended and nebulous. Battery includes anything from plaintiffs kissing their

alien wives when they don't want to be kissed to felonious physical injury. See 61 Fed. Reg.

13,066. Extreme cruelty includes the verbal infliction of emotional distress without any physical

manifestations, verbal and other acts against third parties, and behaviors, including speech,

intended to control and exercise power over Group B. Pendleton, Immigration and Nationality

Law Handbook, p. 2, n. 5, p. 6, ed. 2001-02. Overall pattern of violence, which is a catch-all

provision, includes "name calling," "criticizing, insulting, belittling," "false accusations,"

"blaming," "ridiculing," "lying," "calling [wife] sexually degrading names," "comments about

women's bodies," "accusing [wife] of having a lover," "reminding [wife] of her duties,"




                                                 20
"threatening to leave [wife]," "calling [wife] to make sure she is okay," etc. DOJ funded studies:

1999 National Victim Assistance Academy, chap. 8; Family Violence Prevention Fund, Breaking

the Silence - Training Manual, pp 55-58 (2006).

       The words used by Group A that rise to the level of mistreatment include protected and

unprotected speech and afford little, if any, opportunity to avoid a finding of mistreatment. The

intentional vagueness and expansiveness of the terminology trap the innocent by not providing

fair warning, allow for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and inhibit the exercise of basic

First Amendment rights. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09. Any marital quarrel or effort to make-up

in which Group A members dare open their mouths can and will be held against them by the

defendants, so they remain silent--an injury of censorship.

Bill of Attainder and Injury

       U.S. Const. I. § 9 cl. 3 prohibits acts of Congress "that apply to ... easily ascertainable

members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment..." without the safeguards of a trial.

U.S. v. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 315. The severity of the punishment is irrelevant, U.S. v. Brown, 381

U.S. at 447, and "[t]he deprivation of any rights, civil or political previously enjoyed, may be

punishment...," Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 320 (1867).

       State secrecy, taking evidence from one side, and amorphous and arbitrary definitions of

mistreatment all injure Group A by depriving rights and all maximize the chances of finding

Group A members guilty as punishment for marrying aliens. Mistreatment of alien wives can

just as well be handled by allowing due process and equality of opportunity for Group A.

       The fact that the punishments are inflicted through the instrumentality of immigration

proceedings make them no less galling, effective or invalid than if they had been done by an Act

of Congress designating mere allegations of mistreatment by Group B and others in their corners




                                                 21
as actual proof of criminal and civil wrongs. Cf. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 316. "Those who wrote our

Constitution well knew the danger inherent in special legislative acts which take away the life,

liberty or property of particular ... persons, because the legislature thinks them guilty of conduct

which deserves punishment." Lovett, 328 U.S. at 317.

Causation and Remedies of Injuries

          Standing causation requires that the asserted injuries are the consequences of or fairly

traceable to the defendants' actions. Duke Power Co, v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438

U.S. 59, 72 (citations omitted). The VAWA provisions are the instruments of harm for without

them there would be no secrecy, incompetent and ignored evidence, arbitrary definitions of

mistreatment, disclosure of private matters and unchallenged falsehoods, and the violations of

rights.

          The causal connection can also result from action by third parties because fairly traceable

injuries do not require the defendants' actions to be the last step in the chain of causation,

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168-69 (1997), and it matters not whether that last step is a

discretionary decision, see F.E.C. v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 25 (1998), for standing can be based on

a prediction that remedial benefits will flow from nonparties behavior in response to a decision,

Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 74-75. The VAWA provisions lead to fraudulent police

complaints, arrests, and temporary restraining orders against Group A in order for Group B to

have official documents for gaining full permanent residency. Finding the provisions

unconstitutional would minimize fraud by increasing the chances of defrauders being caught.

          Causation is also satisfied by showing there is a substantial likelihood that the requested

relief will redress the injuries. Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 75 n. 20. The defendants'

memorandum misstates and leaves out pertinent sections of the relief sought in an effort to




                                                   22
diminish the likelihood that the requested remedies will rectify the injuries. The Amended

Complaint at ¶ 219 rather than the Defendants' Memorandum at pp 12-13 should be used for an

accurate representation of what the class requests: nominal damages for past injuries;

invalidating and enjoining the operation of the VAWA provisions (the traditional method for

enforcing personal constitutional rights, Wright, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Supp., § 3531.6, pp 1191-92

(2008); access to records holding Group A members guilty of mistreatment and a fair means,

similar with the Privacy Act 5 U.S.C. 552a(d), to correct those records; specific and limited

definitions of mistreatment; and procedures for preventing the disclosure of private and false

information about Group A. Such remedies will prevent or at least alleviated the injuries caused

by the VAWA provisions. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1458 (2007)(some

measure of relief suffices).

       Finally, the line of causation in this case is more traceable than in Duke Power Co., 438

U.S. at 74-75 or United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688-90 (1973).

                                          RULE 12(b)(6)

       Rule 12(b)(6) requires the plaintiff class to provide the grounds on which its claims rest

through factual allegations sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." ATSI

Communs., Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007)(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007)). To do so, a complaint should place allegations in a

context that raises suggestions of facts required for a cause of action, Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct.

at 1966, and may achieve this through either direct or inferential allegations as to all the material

elements of a legal theory, Bell Atl. Corp. at 1969. In civil rights actions concerning

discrimination, as in the case before this Court, it is enough to assert facts and reasonable




                                                 23
inferences so that when construing the complaint liberally and in the plaintiff class's favor, a

court could infer a violation. See Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 692 (2d Cir. 2001).

       When the Amended Complaint's factual allegations pertaining to Group A are considered

in relation to the extensive reach of the VAWA process into personal lives, the barred doors

behind which the defendants find citizens guilty, and the inappropriate influence exerted by a

powerful special interest group in creating and executing the process, valid inferences result that

the class representatives and thousands of citizen men have, are having and will have their rights

violated.

       A fair reading of the Amended Complaint will show the defendants' objections baseless:

bald spots grow hair, specters of speculation are exorcised, reality supplants opinions, content

holds sway over labels, formulaic recitations are adapted and legal conclusions are unmasked to

reveal factual bases. Some facts are on information and belief, but all going to the elements of

the violations of Group A members' rights to freedom of speech, privacy, freedom of choice in

marital relationships, procedural due process, equal protection and right of access to deportation

proceedings. The Amended Complaint gives the defendants fair notice of what the claims are

and the grounds upon which they rest. Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65.

       Defendants' cite to Port Dock & Stone Corp. v. Oldcastle Northeast, Inc., 507 F.3d 117,

121 (2d Cir. 2007), is misplaced because that Court found the plaintiff pled no facts alleging the

defendants' acts were for an anticompetitive purpose. The Amended Complaint is not lacking in

factual allegations of constitutional violations and harm. As for prohibitions on "bald conclusory

statements" of Goldfine v. Sichenzia, 118 F.Supp. 2d 392, 396-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) and "legal

conclusions, deductions, or opinions" of L'Europeene de Banque v. La Republica de Venezuela,




                                                 24
700 F. Supp. 114, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), the defendants cite to no such examples in the Amended

Complaint--they just make a blanket criticism.

       Some legal conclusions, however, are permissible when the defendants are gi