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Apple Crumble @ Blackhat
Posted by Gunter Ollmann on March 28, 2008 at 7:08 AM EDT.
It's been an interesting day at Blackhat Amsterdam. As conference venues go, you can't
really beat having Blackhat in Amsterdam - the city is alive at night (even if you manage
to filter out the red hue around certain districts) - meanwhile, at the conference level,
the actual number of attendees is pretty small, but the atmosphere is cozy and open to
discussion; something not so common at other cookie-cutter security conferences.
-- Browse by Month -- The highlight of the day was the presentation given by Stefan Frei and Bernard
Tellenback titled "0-day Patch Exposing Vendors (In)Security Performance" covering
their analysis of several years of vulnerability disclosures and patching processes from
various vendors, and a detailed dissection of Apple's and Microsoft's performance. (from
the X-Force perspective, we've looked this data in the past, however their analysis
focused on correlating multiple external data sources and honing in on the CVE-
About Frequency X numbered vulnerabilities with full `cradle-to-grave' disclosure histories)
Contact Us In essence, with their "0-day Patch" metrics, they managed to show just how far Apple is
X-Force Web Site trailing Microsoft in security patch responsiveness in fact, after inspecting their graphs,
Apple appears to be trending entirely in the wrong direction; more vulnerabilities, longer
Vulnerability Disclosure patching times, more 0-days, etc. not the sort of thing we expect from a well known
Guidelines software vendor.
Subscribe to Frequency X While I think that there are quite a few reasons why this is probably so, I'd be inclined to
say that Apple's biggest problem appears to be that they treat every new vulnerability as
a potential PR disaster rather than an opportunity to visibly reinforce their work in
securing their customers. In recent times this has most critically been reflected in the
way Apple works with security researchers (e.g. I'm yet to find a single security
researcher that has had any positive things to say about their dealings with Apple's
security team).
While all of todays presentations were good and of a high quality, perhaps the most
interesting presentation for me personally today was that of Christopher Tarnovsky -
"Security Failures in Secure Devices".
Diving deeply in to an area of security research and vulnerability discovery that I've
never been involved with, he covered his work in the field of Integrated Circuit (IC)
design. It was great to see and hear of his experiences in hacking IC's decapsulating
the chip substrate, invasive probing, methods of introducing electrical and optical
glitches, and generally bypassing current chip-level protection schemes.
Seeing a master like Chris discussing his work was fantastic (I guess playing with acid,
lasers, and high-powered microscopes has it's attractions too), and I'm sure he made it
look much easier than it really is. That said, his work clearly shows that no matter how
well you engineer protection (even at the chip-level), if you have unrestricted physical
access to the technology you'll always be able to break it and in this case extract the
carefully guarded cryptographic keys that lay at the heart of modern access control
technologies.
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