Hearing of the United States Senate Select Committee on …

     Hearing of the United States Senate Select Committee on
                            Intelligence

                               Terrorist Ideology
                                 June 12, 2007

                                Daniel Kimmage
                                Regional Analyst
                         Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
                                 Washington, DC

I would like to thank the Committee for inviting me to appear at his hearing. I wil
limit my spoken remarks to five minutes, but I ask the Chairman that my full
written statement be entered into the record.

My colleague, Kathleen Ridolfo, RFE/RL's Prague-based Iraq analyst, and I have
recently completed a detailed report on how Sunni insurgents in Iraq and their
supporters worldwide are pursuing a far-reaching media campaign to advance
their agenda and influence perceptions of events in Iraq. The report, which
devotes considerable space to al-Qa'ida in Iraq, is scheduled for public release
on June 26, 2007. I will address the questions prepared by the Committee with a
particular focus on al-Qa'ida in Iraq and the findings of our forthcoming report.
The views expressed here are my own and do not represent an official position of
my employer, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

How Well Do We Understand Terrorist Ideology?
In the years since September 11, 2001, a significant body of research has
emerged to augment previous scholarship and broaden our understanding of
terrorist ideology. While there is more work to be done, we now possess a good
understanding of the overall ideology that underpins the various iterations of al-
Qa'ida. Al-Qa'ida's theorists and ideologues, through their prolific efforts to
expound and disseminate their ideology, have provided us with abundant
material to analyze.

Like other totalitarian ideologies, al-Qa'ida's ideology is based on a simplistic
worldview that claims to offer a universally applicable and easily implemented
solution to all problems. The "solution" is classically totalitarian in its attempt to
regulate all spheres of human activity, encompassing personal life, domestic and
international politics, the economy, and society.

Although the adherents of al-Qa'ida's ideology do not themselves accept any
meaningful distinction between religion and politics, in practice their ideology
focuses on what we in the West would define as religious and political issues.
The core tenets of this ideology are as follows:
Hearing of the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence                      June 12, 2007
Daniel Kimmage (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty)



    ·    A global struggle between faith (iman) and unbelief (kufr): The world
         is divided into two hostile camps, and all people must choose sides. On
         one side are the true believers, on the other the enemies of the faith. The
         opposition of faith and unbelief, or truth (haqq) and falsehood (batil), is
         absolute. Reconciliation is impossible, and the struggle will continue until
         faith triumphs over unbelief.

    ·    A backward-looking utopia (Salafism): The first three generations of
         Muslims (al-salaf al-salih, lit., "the righteous ancestors") represent the
         model of a perfect society for al-Qa'ida, both in political organization and
         personal behavior. Using as primary sources a literal reading of the Qur'an
         and the recorded utterances of the Prophet Muhammad, adherents of al-
         Qa'ida's ideology fight for the restoration of this order.

    ·    Faith as the struggle for "make God's word supreme," and unbelief
         as a capital crime: To be a true Muslim, one must go beyond the
         traditional "pillars of the faith" as those are currently understood in the
         Muslim world (the profession of faith, prayer, fasting, almsgiving, and
         pilgrimage); one must actively strive to restore the society of the "righteous
         ancestors"1. In practice, only those who accept and advance all of the core
         tenets of the ideology are seen as true Muslims. All other so-called
         Muslims have strayed, either because they were misled, in which case
         they may yet return to the fold, or because they are the "stalking horses of
         unbelief," in which case their lives are forfeit.

    ·    The permissibility of killing Muslims who have knowingly strayed
         from the faith (takfir): Muslims who knowingly violate the rules of the
         faith as defined by the ideology have committed the sin of apostasy and
         are no longer Muslims. The act of pronouncing a Muslim an unbeliever is
         called "takfir." In practice, the application of this principle gives adherents
         of the ideology a religious justification for killing political opponents. Al-
         Qa'ida in Iraq uses this principle to justify the killing of both Sunnis and
         Shi'a.

    ·    The legitimacy of violence (jihad): Jihad, which adherents of the
         ideology understand as "holy war," is the first and foremost obligation of
         Muslims in a world threatened everywhere by unbelief2. The legitimate


1
  For more on Salafism, see Understanding Islamism, March 2, 2005, International Crisis Group,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3301&l=1. An informed discussion of jihadist Salafism
can be found in Fu'ad Husayn, Al-Zarqawi: al-jil al-thani li-l-qa'idah [Al-Zarqawi: the second generation of
al-Qa'ida], Dar al-Khayal, Beirut: 2005, pp. 53-59.
2
  The term "jihad" can have various meanings. For more, see "What Does Jihad Mean?" by Douglas E.
Streusand, Middle East Quarterly, September 1997.



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Hearing of the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence    June 12, 2007
Daniel Kimmage (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty)

       means of fighting jihad include "martyrdom-seeking operations," or suicide
       attacks, against non-Muslims and Muslims alike.

   ·   The need to target the United States, Israel and "apostate" rulers in
       the Muslim world: The "Jews and crusaders" -- Israel and the United
       States -- are spearheading a charge to obliterate Muslim identity and
       subjugate Muslim lands to pillage their wealth. Their allies in this nefarious
       conspiracy are the quisling "apostate" rulers of the Muslim world. For truth
       to be victorious over falsehood, all of these enemies must be defeated.

While available evidence suggests that the total number of committed adherents
of al-Qa'ida's ideology is small, quantitative criteria are not of the essence. Al-
Qa'ida does not recognize electoral democracy as a valid political model and
seeks instead to overthrow fragile, corrupt regimes by force. Moreover, a
willingness to engage in suicide attacks against soft targets and the skillful
exploitation of the media have given al-Qa'ida undue international prominence,
and the group's ideology is exerting an outsize influence on mainstream political
discourse in the Arab-Muslim world.

Poor social and economic conditions in and of themselves do not cause terrorist
organizations to spring fully formed from a morass of societal decay. The Middle
East is not the most repressive or impoverished place on earth, yet it has
witnessed a proliferation of terrorist movements in recent decades. Fertile soil for
extremism results from the confluence of festering social and economic
problems, misgovernment, and an ideology that presents itself as a panacea. All
three factors are present in today's aggrieved, undemocratic, and restive Middle
East. Additionally, jihadist ideological treatises indicate that the United States has
become a target in the region not because of its democratic tenets, but rather
because of the perception that it supports and uses corrupt Arab regimes.

Is It A Global Ideology?
In theory, al-Qa'ida's ideology is global -- the division of the world into camps of
faith and unbelief does not recognize other boundaries. The ultimate goal of
"making God's word supreme" transcends national borders. In practice,
however, the profusion of local "franchises" of al-Qa'ida -- from al-Qa'ida in the
Islamic Maghrib to the so-called Islamic State of Iraq -- points to the continued
importance of regional factors and the implicit recognition of this fact by the
ideology's various adherents.

We can and should take into account both the division of al-Qa'ida into regional
"franchises" and the resulting distinctions between their ideological outlooks.
While all of the "franchises" broadly accept the core tenets of the ideology as
described above, they are embroiled in a variety of localized struggles. As all of
these groups aim to seize power, their respective agendas are political, and their



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Hearing of the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence    June 12, 2007
Daniel Kimmage (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty)

adherents are often motivated as much by local political factors as by the allure
of a global struggle.

Overt U.S. involvement appears to exert a "globalizing" influence on jihadist
motivations. The conflict in Iraq, for example, attracts volunteers from other Arab
countries who openly state that they are drawn by the opportunity to take up
arms against U.S. forces. There are no reports of equal numbers of foreign
fighters traveling to participate in the struggles undertaken by the various al-
Qa'ida "franchises" outside of Iraq.

We will not be able to reach an accommodation with any group driven by al-
Qa'ida's ideology, but we can and should focus on local factors in each particular
case. There are two reasons for this. First, it undermines the global pretensions
of the group's ideology. And second, individual members of regional "franchises"
are inevitably motivated by varying combinations of regional and global factors --
the better we understand the interaction of regional and global motivations in
each case, the more appropriately tailored our response will be. If al-Qa'ida's
current mantra is to "think globally, act locally," we stand to benefit by factoring
this into our efforts to counter it.

Are There Fissures In Al-Qa'ida's Ideology?
There are fissures in al-Qa'ida's ideology, as well as serious differences between
the various al-Qa'ida "franchises" and other groups with similar agendas. This is
particularly evident in Iraq, where the al-Qa'ida-affiliated Islamic State of Iraq has
clashed with other Sunni insurgent groups, both in polemics over ideology and
tactics and in fighting on the ground.

The greatest fissure in al-Qa'ida's ideology is internal, and shared by all regional
affiliates. The doctrine of "tawhid," which all branches of the network accept,
affirms the absolute singularity of God. The strict application of this doctrine holds
that only God has ultimate authority. The concentration of all authority in the
divine, to which humankind's only access comes through the text of the Qur'an
and the recorded utterances of the Prophet Muhammad, has severely impeded
the ability of al-Qa'ida's theorists to formulate convincing answers to modern
political questions. Jihadist Salafists have written numerous books on the political
implications of tawhid, but they have proved unable to present a coherent
paradigm for leadership and legislation. In practical terms, the result has been a
movement that is very clear on what it opposes but maddeningly obtuse about
what it supports beyond violent opposition to the many things it condemns.

The profusion of regional affiliates reflects the crisis of temporal authority
engendered by the doctrine of tawhid. A recent dispute between the Islamic Army
in Iraq, a Sunni insurgent group with a religiously inflected but nationalist outlook,
and the Islamic State of Iraq, al-Qa'ida's latest iteration in that country, showed



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Hearing of the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence                        June 12, 2007
Daniel Kimmage (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty)

that al-Qa'ida's opponents in the Arab world are keenly aware of the jihadist
Salafists' leadership problem.

In an April 5, 2007, statement, the Islamic Army in Iraq challenged the diffuse
organizational model espoused by al-Qa'ida in its various iterations throughout
the Arab world. After criticizing the Islamic State of Iraq for a variety of excesses
and outrages in Iraq, including the murder of unarmed Muslims and attacks on
soft targets, the Islamic Army in Iraq appealed directly to Usama bin Ladin:

           He and his brothers in the al-Qa'ida leadership are responsible on
           Judgment Day for what is happening on account of their followers. It is not
           enough to wash one's hands of their actions; one must also correct them.
           In the two collections of utterances of the Prophet by Abdallah bin Umar,
           the Prophet said, "Is not each of you a shepherd, and is not each of you
           responsible for his flock? The imam must look after his people, for he is
           responsible for them." And Al-Faruq3 says, "If a beast of burden should
           stumble in the mountains of Iraq or the Sham4, then I feel that God would
           call me to account for it and ask, 'Why did you not pave the road?'"

The implication of this passage is that al-Qa'ida is out of control in Iraq, its parent
organization is unwilling or unable to bring it to heel, and Usama bin Ladin is
failing to live up to Islamic standards of leadership. It is a charge that the
subsequent polemic, which has lasted for more than two months and included
responses from the Islamic State of Iraq, failed to disprove, in large part because
Usama bin Laden remained conspicuously silent throughout the debate.

Is Ideology A Motivating, Legitimizing, Or Recruiting
Instrument?
Ideology performs all three functions, albeit in different ways for different
segments of al-Qa'ida and its affiliates. For regional leaderships and the al-
Qa'ida core that fled Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, ideology is a
motivating factor. Individuals who occupy higher levels in the organization(s) are
more likely to have a strong commitment to the global aspect of al-Qa'ida's
ideology and to think in terms of a larger, worldwide struggle.

Ideology serves to legitimize acts of violence for all levels of the network.
Internally, the individuals who commit violent acts can reassure themselves that
they are doing the right thing for the right reason. Externally, ideology underpins
public statements taking responsibility and expressing support for violence. Both
internally and externally, it is ideology that performs the function of proclaiming
that the horrific violence perpetrated by al-Qa'ida is not terrorism, but rather
legitimate warfare undertaken in the service of a divinely sanctioned cause.

3
    Umar ibn al-Khattab, the second of the four "rightly guided" caliphs (634-644).
4
    Roughly equivalent to present-day Lebanon, Jordan, Israel/Palestinian Territories, and Syria.


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Hearing of the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence                       June 12, 2007
Daniel Kimmage (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty)



Ideology is a particularly effective instrument in the recruiter's toolbox. While
other tools, from financial incentives to the skillful exploitation of individual
psychology, have their place, only ideology can answer questions. Most recruits
are young men with burning questions about the world around them. Al-Qa'ida's
ideology provides simple, direct answers to those questions, replacing doubt with
surety and unformed striving with hardened purpose.

Are The Components Of Al-Qa'ida Motivated Primarily By
Ideology, Power Politics, Or Criminality?

While criminality may motivate many rank-and-file members of the al-Qa'ida
terrorist network, leadership cadres are caught in a quandary, with some
concerned primarily with ideological purity, and others power politics. This
divergence has been evident in views of the Shi'a, with al-Qa'ida in Iraq choosing
ideological purity while representatives of al-Qa'ida's original leadership opted for
power politics.

With the emergence of Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi as the leader of al-Qa'ida in Iraq,
the organization adopted a viciously anti-Shi'ite line. Al-Qa'ida's unyielding
ideology provides ample theological justification for such a position.
Nevertheless, in a 2005 letter to Al-Zarqawi from Ayman al-Zawahiri, often
termed the ideological leader of the original al-Qa'ida, the latter urged the
Jordanian parvenu to soften his stance on the Shi'a for reasons of political
expediency5. Al-Zawahiri wrote that

         ...many of your Muslim admirers amongst the common folk are wondering
         about your attacks on the Shi'a. The sharpness of this questioning
         increases when the attacks are on one of their mosques, and it increases
         more when the attacks are on the mausoleum of Imam Ali Bin Abi Talib,
         may God honor him. My opinion is that this matter won't be acceptable to
         the Muslim populace however much you have tried to explain it, and
         aversion to this will continue.

Conclusions

The report my colleague, Kathleen Ridolfo, and I have just completed devotes
considerable space to the issue of al-Qa'ida's ideology in the context of the
ongoing struggle in Iraq. I close with two of the report's findings that have a direct
bearing on this issue.



5
 For a discussion of the tension between ideological purity and power politics in al-Qa'ida's reaction to the
war between Israel and Hizballah in the summer of 2006, see Al-Qaeda Addresses The Jihad-Versus-
Resistance Conflict, by Daniel Kimmage, RFE/RL, July 31, 2006,
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/07/96bd70d7-07bd-4862-8751-41f30aa14028.html.


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Hearing of the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence                    June 12, 2007
Daniel Kimmage (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty)

1. While the majority of Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq do not espouse
jihadist ideology, the media products they create are a boon to global
jihadist media and advance the global jihadist ideological agenda. There are
two reasons for this. First, the general context of the conflict in Iraq fits in
perfectly with jihadist ideology, which posits a titanic struggle between the forces
of unbelief, led by the United States, and the forces of faith. Second, the images
produced on a daily basis by the insurgency in the form of attack videos are grist
for the jihadist propaganda mill, which relishes any and all depictions of
"crusader" soldiers targeted in the Arab world.

This is especially true in light of negative Muslim views on al-Qa'ida attacks
against civilians, which evoke strong disapproval6. Arab respondents to a recent
poll overwhelmingly supported attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq, however7.
Thus, insurgent media products showcasing attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq
reinforce an aspect of the jihadist message that is viewed positively in the Arab
world. In this light, it seems entirely logical that jihadist forums, which are
ideologically closer to Al-Qaeda than to most insurgent groups, are among the
primary distribution channels for the text, audio, and video products created by
virtually all insurgent groups across the ideological spectrum.

2. There is a growing rift between nationalist elements in the Sunni
insurgency and al-Qa'ida in Iraq. Ideology lies at the root of this split, with
nationalist insurgent groups limiting their aims to Iraq, while al-Qa'ida views Iraq
as part of a larger, global struggle. A recent polemic between the Islamic Army in
Iraq and al-Qa'ida in Iraq highlighted these ideological differences.

Ibrahim al-Shammari, the official spokesman of the Islamic Army in Iraq, defined
his group's struggle in national terms in an April 11, 2007, interview with Al-
Jazeera. Interviewer Ahmad Mansur asked, "Do your goals include causing
America to fail abroad or does your goal relate only to Iraq?" Al-Shammari
responded, "No, our goal is the liberation of Iraq from the occupation it is
experiencing ­ the Iranian occupation and the American occupation...."

By contrast, a mid-April 2007 address by Abu Umar al-Baghdad, leader of the al-
Qa'ida-affiliated Islamic State of Iraq, advanced a starkly different vision.
Summarizing gains and losses on the fourth anniversary of the fall of the Hussein
regime, Al-Baghdadi stated, "Let everyone know that our aim is clear: the
establishment of God's law, and the path to that is jihad in its wider sense."
Earlier in the address, Al-Baghdadi made it clear that "the outlines of the gains
6
  See Muslim Public Opinion On US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda, World Public Opinion.org,
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr07/START_Apr07_rpt.pdf.
7
   Ibid.: "Majorities in Egypt and Morocco expressed approval for attacks on US troops in Muslim
countries. Egyptians were those most likely to support such actions. Nine out of ten Egyptians approved of
attacks on US military troops in Iraq (91%) and in Afghanistan (91%). Four out of five Egyptians (83%)
said they supported attacks on US forces based in Persian Gulf states. Substantial majorities of Moroccans
were also in favor of attacks on US troops in Iraq (68%), in Afghanistan (61%) and slightly smaller
majorities supported attacks on those based in Persian Gulf states (52%)."


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Hearing of the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence   June 12, 2007
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and losses in the past four years" indicate that "jihad has been adopted as the
primary solution to drive out the unbelievers and apostates from Muslim
countries."




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