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Integrating Economic Instruments in AB 32 Implementation
Lawrence H. Goulder
Stanford University
11 July 2008
1
Why Employ Market-Based (Or "Economic")
Instruments?
Market-based instruments:
cap and trade, emissions fees, subsidies to R&D
Touted virtue:
help engage lowest-cost abatement activities
· Cap and trade, in particular, has potential attraction of
achieving given abatement target at lower cost than is possible
under conventional regulation alone.
· Cap and trade also has the virtue of establishing an
unambiguous cap on total emissions
2
Cap and Trade's Role under the AB 32
Draft Scoping Plan
2020 Reductions
Recommended Reduction Strategy Sector
(MMTCO2E)
Non-Market-Based Regulation
California Light-Duty Vehicle GHG Standards
Transportation 31.7
(Pavley Rules)
Energy Efficiency Standards (on buildings
Electricity, Commercial,
and appliances), Increased Combined Heat 26.4
Residential
and Power, Solar Water Heating
133.8
Renewables Portfolio Standard (increase to
Electricity 21.2
33%)
Low Carbon Fuel Standard Transportation 16.5
Other Measures various 38.0
Cap and Trade 35.2
Total 169.0
28% reduction from projected
BAU emissions of 596 MMTCO2E 3
Cap and Trade Supplements (rather than
displaces) Conventional Regulation
Transportation, Electricity, Residential/Commercial, and Industrial
Sectors:
Projected business-as-usual emissions 512
Projected emissions with recommended
non-market measures 400
Projected emissions with cap and trade
as well 365
How? Allowance prices rise enough to bring about the extra
needed reductions.
(Why not just tighten conventional regulations instead?)
4
Auction vs. Free Allocation
Under Cap and Trade
Auctioning allows flexibility:
revenues can be used for ...
· compensation to groups (firms or households) with disproportionate adverse
impacts
· promoting technological innovation (directly or through tax credits)
· financing reductions in existing distortionary taxes (income taxes, sales taxes,
etc.)
Auctioning has potential to be more cost-effective:
· it is more cost-effective than free allocation to the extent that third option is
exploited
Substantial revenues are involved:
· Under 100% auctioning, $15/tonCO2 allowance price yields $5.5 billion in
2020
-- could be 4-6% of 2020 State budget.
5
What About Other Market-Based Policies?
Tax-Credits for GHG-Reducing Activities?
· only item listed is credit for solar roofs
Emissions Fees?
· some discussion but no numbers in Draft Scoping Plan
· consistent with cap and trade?
Tax-Credits or Subsidies for R&D?
· not much discussion in Draft Scoping Plan (except in context of use
of allowance revenues)
6
Conclusions
I like the Draft Scoping Plan.
· Thoughtful, balanced, and clear presentation of the issues
· Effort to keep costs down: significant role for market-based
approach (cap and trade)
· contributes to about 21% of the needed reductions
· applies broadly (to industrial, commercial/residential, industrial and
transportation sectors)
Many important details (e.g., allocation method, initial cap level in
2012) still need to be worked out.
7