Tags: arin, august 1, bbn technologies, bgp, blunk, cmu, iepg, interim measures, internet routing registry, ip sec, irv, lacnic, level security, level3, ljb, merit network, radb, routing security, secure path, security state,
Inter-domain routing security and the
role of Internet Routing Registries
IEPG meeting, IETF 60
August 1, 2004
Larry Blunk, ljb@merit.edu, Merit Network, Inc.
Overview
State of IDR security
State of the Internet Routing Registry
Historical security use of IRR's - filtering
Issues with filtering
IPv6 opportunities
Alternate use of IRR's anomalous route notification
Improving IRR security and coordination
Review
IDR security and IRR's IETF 60 IEPG August 1, 2004 Larry J. Blunk
State of IDR Security
Current efforts have largely focused on link-level security
TCP-MD5, IP-SEC, BGP TTL security hack (BTSH)
Some progress has been made (recent Cisco TCP reset scare)
Efforts at securing data validity have seen less progress
Secure BGP (S-BGP) BBN Technologies
Secure Origin BGP (soBGP) Cisco
Inter-domain Routing Validation (IRV) AT&T Research
Secure Path Vector (SPV) Berkeley and CMU
ISP's have not shown significant enthusiasm
RPSEC Working Group still working on requirements
Deployment will likely require some time
Are there interim measures that can deployed?
IDR security and IRR's IETF 60 IEPG August 1, 2004 Larry J. Blunk
State of the IRR
The IRR is currently somewhat loosely defined
Merit hosts www.irr.net and mirrors 41 other registries
No formal requirements or authority for presence in IRR
Currently hold about 304,400 routes, 203,200 unique
~116,000 route objects are actually being routed
Registries consist largely of smaller ISP's and networks
Some large ISP's present - Verio, Level3, and Savvis
Two open independent registries - RADB and ALTDB
3 RIR's run routing registries APNIC, RIPE, and ARIN
ARIN's is open and not yet integrated with address registry
LACNIC has limited "RR-like" functionality (non-RPSL)
Currently v4-only - RPSLng adds IPv6 and Multicast support
IDR security and IRR's IETF 60 IEPG August 1, 2004 Larry J. Blunk
Historical security use of IRR's - filtering
Filter BGP announcements based on origin AS
Several public and custom tools for filter generation
IRRToolset considered defacto standard
IRR.pm perl module
Savvis, Verio, Level3 use internally developed tools
Filtering has been limited to customer peers
Many ISP's use other non-IRR mechanisms
Statically configured prefix lists
Coarse-grained security max prefix limits
IDR security and IRR's IETF 60 IEPG August 1, 2004 Larry J. Blunk
Issues with filtering
Data incompleteness has limited it's use to customer peers
Size of filter lists is an issue with wider deployment on peers
Lack of dynamism can be a concern
Tool issues
IRRToolSet is somewhat complex
Does not compile with recent versions of C++
IRR.pm not widely known and does not support RIPE syntax
Better documentation, examples, and best practice guides
could be useful
IDR security and IRR's IETF 60 IEPG August 1, 2004 Larry J. Blunk
IPv6 Opportunities
RPSLng Internet Draft adds IPv6 and multicast support
Has gone through IESG Last Call review
Final draft should be out after IETF meeting
IPv6 Internet is currently fairly small (about 500 prefixes)
A global filter list is more practical than with ~135,000 IPv4
prefixes
Does not have issues with legacy allocations
All allocations have been made by RIR's
RIR data should have strong validity due to newness
Could be a driver for IPv6 deployment
Validate claims of improved security with IPv6
IDR security and IRR's IETF 60 IEPG August 1, 2004 Larry J. Blunk
IRR's and anomylous route notification
Use data from IRR as input for notification system
Monitor data from BGP collection services
e.g. Routeviews, RIPE RIS, etc.
Alert via Email, SNMP Trap, SMS, etc.
Some similar services implemented, not integrated with IRR's
RIPE's MyASN service
Renesys GRADUS product (commercial)
Other systems examine IRR data, but are not real-time
e.g. RIPE RRCC, Nemecis, radb-reports
Operators may prefer locally run tools to a service
Would be useful to aggregate BGP collection data
summarize specific events, e.g. Origin AS or AS path change
IDR security and IRR's IETF 60 IEPG August 1, 2004 Larry J. Blunk
Improving IRR security and coordination
Security of the registry repositories
Important if greater reliance is placed upon them
May want to include signature within objects
Security of queries and mirror operations
RFC 2769 defines a "repository-cert" for securing mirroring
Better coordination and authority model would be useful
RFC 2725 and 2769 define a heirarchical model
Need to review and decide how to proceed
irrc@merit.edu email list has been setup for coordination
IDR security and IRR's IETF 60 IEPG August 1, 2004 Larry J. Blunk
Review
IDR security with to data validity is currently weak
While work is ongoing, progress has been slow
IRR's present an opportunity to improve security on an interim
basis
Current filtering tools and documentation could be improved
Data consistency and accuracy is also a concern
IPv6 presents an opportunity due to current limited-scale
deployment
IRR utility could be improved with integrated anomalous route
detection and notification tools and services
IRR security and coordination need to be improved to create
more confidence in the data
IDR security and IRR's IETF 60 IEPG August 1, 2004 Larry J. Blunk
References
RFC 2622 - http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2622.txt
RFC 2725 - http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2725.txt
RFC 2769 - http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2769.txt
RPSLng - http://www.radb.net/rpslng.html
RRCC - http://www.ripe.net/rrcc/
Nemecis - http://www.cs.ucr.edu/~siganos/papers/Nemecis.pdf
Renesys - http://www.renesys.com
S-BGP draft-clynn-s-bgp-protocol-01 (expired)
SoBGP draft-ng-sobgp-extensions-02
SPV - www.acm.org/sigs/sigcomm/sigcomm2004/papers/p352-
hu.pdf
IDR security and IRR's IETF 60 IEPG August 1, 2004 Larry J. Blunk