Tags: bender, court of common pleas, court of common pleas of allegheny county, david j, defendant, dr david, gynecology associates, husband pennsylvania, jury verdict, khalili, medical malpractice action, medical negligence, obstetric gynecology, orie melvin, plaintiffs, primary care inc, relevant course, relevant factual background, screening mammogram, trial court,
J. A14007/08
2008 PA Super 165
ROBIN M. WYTIAZ AND KEITH WYTIAZ, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
HER HUSBAND, : PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appellants :
:
v. :
:
DAVID J. DEITRICK, D.O., MERCY PRIMARY :
CARE, INC., KHALILI NOORBAKHSH AND :
DEITRICK METROPOLITAN OBSTETRIC :
GYNECOLOGY ASSOCIATES, INC., :
:
Appellees : No. 1219 WDA 2007
Appeal from the Judgment entered June 12, 2007
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Civil Division, at No. GD06-2688.
BEFORE: ORIE MELVIN, BENDER and ALLEN, JJ.
OPINION BY ORIE MELVIN, J.: Filed: July 25, 2008
¶1 Appellants, Robin and Keith Wytiaz, appeal from the judgment entered
following a jury verdict in favor of the defense in this medical malpractice
action. Appellants claim that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence and that they were denied a fair trial. After careful review, we
affirm.
¶2 The trial court succinctly set forth the relevant factual background in
this matter as follows.
Plaintiffs instituted the within action by the filing of a
complaint in February 2006 alleging medical negligence on
the part of the Defendants. Mrs. Wytiaz averred that her
relevant course of treatment began in approximately
January 2002, when she had a baseline screening
mammogram with normal results. Thereafter, she was seen
by the Defendant, Dr. David J. Deitrick, beginning with an
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annual examination on January 17, 2003, and on a number
of occasions up through and including visits in 2004 and
2005, during the last of which she was diagnosed with
breast cancer. Plaintiffs alleged that Dr. Deitrick had been
negligent in failing to properly examine and care for her as
early as January 2003 based upon her complaints, but most
certainly by August 11, 2003, when she was making
complaints consistent with a thickening under her right
breast. Further, [they alleged] that he continued for some
time to fail to conduct proper examinations, order
appropriate testing, and reach a timely diagnosis, and that
as a result Mrs. Wytiaz was required to undergo significant
surgery, chemotherapy treatment, radiation therapy, and
herceptin therapy.
At trial, each of the parties presented three expert
witnesses from the related disciplines in the diagnosis and
care of individuals with breast cancer.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/27/07 (Scanlon, J.),1 at 2-3.
¶3 The case proceeded to a jury trial in January 2007, at the conclusion of
which the jury found in favor of the defense. Specifically, the jury answered
the first interrogatory as follows:
QUESTION 1:
Do you find that the conduct of the defendant, fell below
applicable standard of medical care? In other words, was
David J. Deitrick, D.O. negligent?
Yes ________ No ____ ____
1
A second trial court opinion authored by a different judge was also filed on
September 27, 2007.
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Certified Record (C.R.) at 46. Appellants filed post-trial motions which the
trial court denied, and this timely appeal followed. Appellants present the
following two issues for our review:
I. Whether a new trial was required due to the jury's
verdict being against the weight of the evidence, as all
competent evidence showed that Robin Wytiaz reported a
palpable abnormality to Defendant Deitrick on August 11,
2005 [sic], which he failed to treat in violation of the
governing standard of care?
II. Whether a new trial was required because the court's
denial of Plaintiffs' proposed voir dire questions resulted in a
bias-tainted jury, which precluded Plaintiffs from receiving a
fair trial[?]
Appellants' brief at 4.2 We address these claims in the order presented.
¶4 We begin with our well-settled standard of review of claims relating to
the weight of the evidence.
Our review of challenges to the weight of the evidence is
extremely limited. We will respect the trial court's findings
with regard to credibility and weight of the evidence unless
it can be shown that the lower court's determination was
manifestly erroneous, arbitrary and capricious, or flagrantly
contrary to the evidence. Additionally, this Court's review of
a weight of the evidence claim is a review of the trial court's
exercise of discretion in weighing the evidence, not of the
underlying question of whether we believe that the verdict
is, in fact, against the weight of the evidence.
In re Mampe, 932 A.2d 954, 960 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted),
appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 944 A.2d 758 (2008).
2
Appellants complied with the trial court's direction to file a Rule 1925(b)
statement, and the trial court provided two separate Rule 1925(a) opinions
to support the rulings challenged on appeal.
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¶5 Appellants contend on appeal, as they did before the trial court, that
all of the credible evidence presented at trial establish that Dr. Deitrick
breached the standard of care in caring for Appellant/Wife. Following our
careful review, we find Appellants' claim oversimplifies the testimony and is
belied by the record. Furthermore, we agree with the following reasoning of
the trial court in denying Appellants' motion for a new trial:
[Appellants'] counsel suggests there was no conflict among
the experts with regard to the existence of a palpable
abnormality in Mrs. Wytiaz's right breast in August 2003 or
June 2004. There is testimony from all three defense
experts to the contrary. Dr. Schwarz, the breast surgeon,
testified in part regarding his belief that there was no
palpable abnormality at any of the relevant times bearing
on the issue of the failure to timely diagnose. Further, the
questions involving indications for further diagnostic study
such as a diagnostic rather than routine mammogram, or
for a sonogram and compliance with the standard of care in
that regard, were addressed by both Dr. Schwartz and Dr.
Bolognese, the [defense] OB/Gyn expert. In addition,
[defense] testimony from Dr. Aben, the radiologist,
supported the judgment of Dr. Deitrick retrospectively, by
establishing the lack of a radiologic indication for a
diagnostic mammogram or ultrasound during any of the
visits where Mrs. Wytiaz was seen by Defendant-physician
David Deitrick.
****
The issue is really whether after due consideration of all of
the evidence presented, including close to 600 pages of
testimony from six different expert witnesses spread out
over seven hours before this jury, that its decision could
reasonably have been reached. * * * * Careful and
thorough review of the record of testimony in this case
leads one only to a conclusion that there was an undeniable
conflict in the testimony presented by the six expert
witnesses. Such conflict could only have been resolved by
the jury.
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Trial Court Opinion, 9/27/07 (Scanlon, J.), at 4-5 (citations to record
omitted). We discern no abuse of the trial court's discretion in denying the
motion for a new trial on this basis.
¶6 Appellants' other argument is that the trial court abused its discretion
when it refused their request to ask the potential jurors several particular
voir dire questions and that they were thereby denied a fair trial. In
addressing this contention, we observe that, "[t]he purpose of the voir dire
examination is to secure a competent, fair, impartial and unprejudiced jury."
Mansour v. Linganni, 787 A.2d 443, 448 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation
omitted), appeal denied, 568 Pa. 702, 796 A.2d 984 (2002). The Rules of
Civil Procedure provide for voir dire to permit the parties to obtain pertinent
information about potential jurors including any "[r]easons the prospective
juror believes he or she cannot or should not serve as a juror" and "[s]uch
other pertinent information as may be appropriate to the particular case to
achieve a competent, fair and impartial jury." Pa.R.C.P. 220.1(a)(14) and
(16), 42 Pa.C.S.A. Furthermore, "[t]o achieve this goal the trial judge has
broad discretion in determining the scope, manner and procedure of the voir
dire examination, and his decisions will not be reversed in the absence of
palpable error." Mansour, supra, at 448.
¶7 Relying principally upon Capoferri v. Children's Hospital of
Philadelphia, 893 A.2d 133 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 659,
916 A.2d 630 (2006), Appellants claim they should have been permitted "to
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question potential jurors on their attitudes toward medical malpractice."
Appellant's brief at 26. The questions which Appellants sought to ask the
venire are as follows.
1. Some people have a belief that doctors should not be
held liable for medical mistakes or malpractice. There is
nothing wrong with this belief, but we need you to tell us if
you have such a belief.
2. Some of you may have heard or read about medical
malpractice lawsuits in the media. Have you heard anything
that has caused you to form any opinions about such
lawsuits?
3. If a doctor makes a medical error and a patient suffers
harm because of it, do you have any beliefs that would
prevent you from awarding compensation to such a patient?
See C.R. at 48; Trial Court Opinion, 9/27/07 (Strassburger, J.), at 3-4.
¶8 In Capoferri, the plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice suit alleging the
defendants were negligent in caring for their young son. The plaintiffs
sought to ask the following questions of the potential jurors about "media
coverage of `the alleged medical malpractice crisis in and the alleged flight of
physicians from Philadelphia,'" id. at 135:
27) Have you seen or heard advertisements which criticize
persons who use the judicial system as a method of
recovering money for personal injuries or damages caused
by another person? If so, what have you seen or heard?
28) Does anything concern you about personal injury
lawsuits generally or medical malpractice cases in particular
in which an injured person seeks money damages? If so,
what is your concern? Please explain.
29) Do any of you have any prejudice against a person who
files a lawsuit seeking money damages for personal injuries
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based upon anything you or anyone in your family or
household has seen or heard, or based upon any personal
feelings or thoughts you may have?
30) Do any of you have any preconceived prejudice against
individuals who file a lawsuit claiming injuries as a result of
the medical malpractice of hospitals and/or physicians,
because of recent publicity, advertising or newspaper
stories that you have read or heard regarding the "so-
called" medical malpractice crisis in the Philadelphia
community? If so, please explain.
Id. The trial court denied the request, and the matter proceeded to a jury
trial with a verdict in favor of the defense. On appeal, we concluded that the
trial court abused its discretion, reasoning that, because of the "massive
amount of media coverage" on medical malpractice and tort reform, the
parties should have been permitted to question the prospective jurors on
their views of those subjects to ascertain their impartiality. Id. at 142. This
Court did not, however, endorse the above questions, and instead suggested
that the trial court ask appropriate preliminary questions to discover
"whether any of the prospective jurors had been exposed to tort reform and
medical negligence propaganda." Id. at 143 (quoting Barrett v. Peterson,
868 P.2d 96, 102 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). Potential jurors who had been so
exposed could then be questioned further for bias. Id. Accordingly, we
reversed and remanded for a new trial.
¶9 In the case at bar, we note at the outset that the certified record does
not contain a transcript of the voir dire proceedings, nor is there an order
denying Appellants' proposed questions for the venire. Nonetheless, this
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claim was presented in Appellants' motion for post-trial relief and addressed
by the trial court in a Rule 1925(a) opinion.3 Specifically, the trial court
explained that it "denied all three questions because they were covered by
the Allegheny County standard voir dire questions." Trial Court Opinion,
9/27/07 (Strassburger, J.), at 4. Those standard questions are as follows.
21) Based on anything you may have heard or read, do you
have a belief or opinion about civil damage lawsuit?
a) If so, what is that opinion or belief?
b) Will that influence your judgment in this case so that
you may not be able to be fair and impartial?
22) This case involves a claim for money damages and is
the type commonly called a (products liability; medical
malpractice; auto accident; breach of contract; etc.)
lawsuit.
a) Do you have an opinion or a belief for or against this
type of case, the people who file this type of case, or the
persons who are sued in this type of case?
b) If so, what is that opinion or belief?
23) Will that influence your judgment in this case so that
you may not be able to be fair and impartial?
3
The record also reflects that Appellants included, as exhibits and an
appendix to their post-trial motion, a sizeable number of articles retrieved
from various internet websites which purportedly supported their claim
relating to the proposed voir dire. The trial court granted the motion of the
defense to strike those exhibits and appendix. Additionally, the trial court
noted that, "[a]t the time Plaintiffs in this case proposed the additional voir
dire questions, they did not make any reference to specific or pervasive
media coverage of the medical malpractice crisis near the time of this trial in
Pittsburgh, Allegheny County, or Pennsylvania." Trial Court Opinion,
9/27/07 (Strassburger, J.), at 6 n.3.
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24) Is there any reason why you feel you cannot serve as a
fair and impartial juror in this case?
Id. at 5-6; Allegheny Cty. L.R. 220.1.
¶ 10 In their brief on appeal, Appellants baldly assert that there was a
"significant media campaign against medical malpractice lawsuits in
Allegheny County" and that "the jury in the present case was prejudicially
tainted against" them. Appellant's brief at 27. They suggest that the
standard questions are sufficient to "begin the screening process" but were
not adequate to fully explore potential bias. Appellant's brief at 31
(emphasis in original).
¶ 11 We disagree. Unlike the plaintiffs in Capoferri, the potential jurors in
this case were asked specific questions which were designed to uncover
potential bias or impartiality, including whether they had been exposed to
and affected by media influences and whether they had any specific beliefs
about medical malpractice lawsuits or the parties involved in such litigation.
Simply because the trial court refused to use the particular wording of the
proposed questions offered by Appellants does not mean that they were
precluded from conducting the appropriate inquiry into the potential jurors'
"attitudes toward medical malpractice." Appellant's brief at 26. Appellants
also do not assert that they were prevented from questioning further any
potential juror who answered one or more of the standard voir dire
questions in a manner which might prompt additional inquiry. Simply put,
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we are unable to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.
Accordingly, this claim fails.
¶ 12 Judgment affirmed.
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