LEXSEE 49 ADMIN L REV 111 …

                                          LEXSEE 49 ADMIN L REV 111

                                    Copyright (c) 1997 American Bar Association
                                            Administrative Law Review

                                                     Winter 1997

                                               49 ADMIN. L. REV. 111

LENGTH: 5517 words

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: REGULATORY REFORM & THE 104TH CONGRESS: PAPERWORK REDUX:
THE (STRONGER) PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT OF 1995

JEFFREY S. LUBBERS *



           * A.B., Cornell University; J.D., University of Chicago Law School. Fellow in Administrative Law and
       Adjunct Professor, Washington College of Law, American University. Research Director of the Administrative
       Conference of the United States from 1981 to 1995. I would like to express my appreciation to Jefferson Hill of
       the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for his assistance in preparing this presentation.


TEXT:
     [*111] INTRODUCTION
      Although not a new law, the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA or "the Act") n1 has been updated and strengthened.
Its increasing importance warrants renewed examination of the Act and its role in shaping information and regulatory
issues.


           n1. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-13, 109 Stat. 163 (to be codified at 44 U.S.C. § §
       3501-3520).

      The PRA was originally enacted in 1980, n2 although its antecedents go back to the Federal Reports Act of 1942.
n3 It was re-authorized and [*112] amended in October 1986, n4 and thereafter on May 22, 1995. Describing the re-
cent 1995 changes as "amendments" is somewhat inaccurate, however. The 1995 changes were in the nature of an en-
tire recodification, as the Act was reenacted in toto, not merely amended.


           n2. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812.
           n3. Enacted December 24, 1942, Ch. 811, 56 Stat. 1078. That Act was incorporated into Title 44, Chapter
       35, U.S. Code, as part of the enactment of Title 44 into positive law pursuant to Pub. L. No. 90-620, 82 Stat.
       1302 (1968). When the PRA of 1980 was enacted, the chapter was completely revised and given a new heading,
       "Coordination of Federal Information Policy." The legislative history of both the Federal Reports Act and the
       PRA of 1980 is detailed in William F. Funk, The Paperwork Reduction Act: Paperwork Reduction Meets Ad-
       ministrative Law, 24 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1 (1987).
           n4. Paperwork Reduction Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 101(m) (tit. VIII, § 811),
       100 Stat. 1783-308, 1783-335; Pub. L. No. 99-591, § 101(m) (tit. VIII, § 811), 100 Stat. 3341-308, 3341-335.
       (Pub. L. No. 99-591 is a corrected version of Pub. L. No. 99-500).
     In addition to establishing the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), n5 the Act authorizes and re-
quires OIRA to perform a rather astonishingly wide-ranging array of oversight functions relating to information re-
sources in the federal government. For instance, the Act carves out an oversight role for OIRA on such crucial topics as
how agencies disseminate information to the public (including electronic dissemination); n6 how agencies collect, main-
tain, and use statistics; n7 how agency archives are maintained; n8 how agencies develop systems for insuring privacy,
confidentiality, security, appropriate disclosure, and the sharing of information collected by the government; n9 and last,
how the government acquires and uses information technology. n10


           n5. The original PRA of 1980 established OIRA in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). OIRA
       coordinates federal information policies and oversees agency collections of information. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3504(a)
       (West Supp. 1996).
            n6. Id. § 3504(d).
            n7. Id. § 3504(e).
            n8. Id. § 3504(f).
            n9. Id. § 3504(g).
            n10. Id. § 3504(h).

     These are all major functions and concerns for the government, and they give the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) and OIRA a tremendous amount of power and clout within the government--even beyond what they
already have with their budgetary and regulatory review roles. OIRA, of course, also has performed the lead role in
reviewing agency proposed and final regulations, pursuant to presidential Executive Orders. n11 The function to be dis-
cussed here, however, will be the reviewing and approving of collections of information by federal agencies and reduc-
ing the burden of this information collection on the public.


            n11. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994).

      [*113] I. THE PAPERWORK CLEARANCE PROCESS: AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE 1995
PRA
     Those most responsible for complying with the PRA are rightly asking, "What are we required to do under the
PRA?" The short term answer lies in the paperwork clearance process established by the Act, including the Act's man-
dated paperwork reduction goals. There are, of course, two ways of looking at this topic. When I was working with the
National Performance Review in 1993, n12 numerous complaints were voiced from all quarters regarding the abun-
dance of paperwork. The small business community was up in arms about needless agency forms and paperwork, and
the federal agency representatives were upset about what they perceived to be needless OMB forms and paperwork.
That war of words was, not surprisingly, won by the small business interests, and the result was an even stronger PRA.


           n12. The author served as Team Leader for the "Improving Regulatory Systems" team of the National Per-
       formance Review. See OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, ACCOMPANYING REPORT OF THE
       NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW: IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS (1993).

     The Act's overall paperwork reduction goals place the clearance process in some perspective. PRA section 3505
sets an annual government-wide goal for reducing the overall paperwork burden by at least ten percent for each of fiscal
years 1996 and 1997, and a five-percent goal for the four fiscal years after that. n13 Thus, the Act provides for an over-
all reduction from the 1995 basepoint of about thirty-six percent. That is an extremely ambitious goal, especially since
most of the burden comes from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). In 1992, for example, the Treasury Department
accounted for eighty-seven percent of the entire government's burden hours. n14
            n13. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3505(a)(1) (West Supp. 1996). The 1986 amendments, by contrast, set a goal of reduc-
       ing the burden by five percent for fiscal year 1986 and each of the next two years.
          n14. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO/PEMD-94-3,
       PAPERWORK REDUCTION: REPORTED BURDEN HOUR INCREASES REFLECT NEW ESTIMATES,
       NOT ACTUAL CHANGES 10 (1993) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].

     With the thirty-six percent basepoint goal defined, the PRA also sets forth a process for paperwork clearance. For
the purpose of clarity, this discussion will forgo analyzing the definition of a "collection of information" (CI) until after
the clearance process for CIs is examined. The PRA requires OIRA to review most information collection requests
sought by [*114] agencies. n15 The agency, including every agency in the government except the Federal Election
Commission and the GAO, n16 must establish an internal process to review proposed collections of information before
they are sent over to OIRA. The process must be coordinated by an agency office that is independent of program re-
sponsibilities. The Act specifies a number of considerations that agencies must weigh for each proposed CI: evaluating
the need for it, estimating the burdens in responding, and if appropriate, testing it through a pilot program. n17 Unless
the CI is part of a notice of proposed rulemaking (or unless it is exempted), agencies must provide sixty days' notice in
the Federal Register and otherwise consult with the public and affected agencies, for each new proposed CI or each
extension of OMB approval for an existing CI. The Federal Register notice must seek comments on the need for the
information, its practical utility, the accuracy of the agency's burden estimate, and ways to minimize that burden. Only
after providing this sixty-day notice, do agencies submit their paperwork clearance packages to OIRA for clearance and
approval. n18


            n15. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3504(a)(1).
           n16. See id. § 3502(1). See also Kuzma v. United States Postal Serv., 798 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding
       postal service regulations not subject to PRA review).
            n17. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3506(c)(1)(A).
            n18. Id. § 3506(c)(2)(A).

     As part of its submission to OIRA, the agency must submit a formal certification (along with a record supporting it,
including the comments received from the Federal Register notice) that each proposed CI is needed; is not necessarily
duplicative; reduces, to the extent practicable and appropriate, the burden on respondents, including small businesses
and small government entities; is written in "unambiguous terminology"; is implemented in ways consistent with the
existing record-keeping practices of respondents; and indicates how long respondents must keep the documents. n19 In
addition to these statutory requirements, OIRA has added some other requirements in its implementing regulations. n20
For example OIRA warns that it will not approve a CI that


       requires respondents to report more often than quarterly, requires a response in fewer than 30 days after
       receipt, requires respondents to submit more than an original and two copies, requires retention of re-
       cords (other than health, medical, government contract, grant-in-aid or tax records) for more than 3 years,
       contains a poorly designed survey, contains a pledge of confidentiality that cannot be backed up, or
       might lead to disclosure of trade secret information. n21


 [*115] When the agency submits the proposed CI to OMB, the agency must also publish a second notice of the request
for OMB approval in the Federal Register. n22 In this notice, the agency must summarize and describe the need for the
proposed CI, describe likely respondents, estimate the annual burden, and give notice that the comments may be submit-
ted to OMB and the agency. n23 The agency submits Form OMB 83-1, "Paperwork Reduction Act Submission," a sup-
porting statement, and the draft CI with supporting documentation to OIRA for review. OIRA has sixty days to review
the submission but, in practice, has to make its decision after thirty days and within sixty days of the submission, as the
Act specifies that the public has thirty days to comment to the OMB. n24
           n19. Id. § 3506(c)(3).
           n20. Controlling Paperwork Burdens on the Public, 5 C.F.R. § 1320 (1995).
           n21. Id. § 1320.5(d)(2).
           n22. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3507(a)(1)(D) (West Supp. 1996).
           n23. Id.
           n24. Id. § 3507(b).

     If OIRA approves the request, it issues a control number which must be displayed on the collection. n25 In addition
to this control number, the agency must include a notice to respondents on the form. This notice must include the rea-
sons the information is being collected; the way it will be used; the estimated burden; whether responses are voluntary,
required to obtain a benefit, or mandatory; and a statement that the respondent is not required to respond unless the CI
displays a valid OMB control number. n26 If the agency's CI fails to display the OMB control number and the dis-
claimer that no response is required without the control number, then no respondent can be penalized in any way for
failure to comply. This is known as the "public protection provision." n27 The 1995 amendments strengthened this
provision by making clear that this protection can be invoked "in the form of a completed defense, bar, or otherwise at
any time during the agency administrative process or judicial action applicable thereto." n28


           n25. Id. § § 3507(c)(3)(B), 3512.
           n26. Id. § 3507(c)(1)(B).
            n27. Id. § 3512 ("Public Protection"). At least two criminal prosecutions have been dismissed due to viola-
       tions of this provision. See United States v. Hatch, 919 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding failure to comply
       with Forest Service operations plan not offense when Forest Service requirements violated PRA); United States
       v. Smith, 866 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding violation of PRA precludes conviction of miners charged with
       working on unpatented mining claims without permit).
           n28. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3512.

     The OMB may not approve the CI for a period of longer than three years. n29 If OIRA fails to act within the sixty-
day period, there is an [*116] automatic approval for one year and a control number must issue. n30 Agencies are
bound by an OIRA decision to disapprove a CI, except that there is a unique provision relating to independent regula-
tory agencies that permits such an agency to override OIRA's disapproval of a CI by a majority vote of the members of
the board or commission. The term "independent regulatory agency" is defined in the Act and a list of existing ones is
included in the definition. n31 OIRA's actions in approving or disapproving a free-standing CI are subject to review
under the Administrative Procedure Act's n32 arbitrary-and-capricious standard. n33


           n29. Id. § 3507(g).
           n30. Id. § 3507(c)(3).
           n31. Id. § 3502(5).
           n32. 5 U.S.C. § § 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (1994).
            n33. Id. § 706. The OMB's actions under the predecessor Federal Reports Act were held reviewable. See
       Shell Oil v. Department of Energy, 477 F. Supp. 413, 428 (D. Del. 1979) (declaring OMB clearance of reports
       not "committed to agency discretion "), aff'd, 631 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1024 (1981);
       see also Action Alliance of Senior Citizens v. Sullivan, 930 F.2d 77 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (upholding OMB review
       and disapproval under PRA of provisions of HHS rule containing collection of information).
     It should be noted that the aforementioned is the process for reviewing free-standing forms and CIs that are not in-
cluded as part of proposed or current rules. The procedures for reviewing CIs in proposed rules and CIs in current rules
are a bit different. OIRA's regulations helpfully separate these three categories or submissions. n34


            n34. 5 C.F.R. § § 1320.10-1320.12 (1995).

     For CIs in proposed rules, the agency includes all the above-described information in the preamble to the notice of
proposed rulemaking, which also states that the CI has been submitted to the OMB and directs comments to the OIRA
desk officer for the agency. n35 Within sixty days the OMB may either approve the CI or file comments with the
agency to be placed in the record. n36 If OIRA fails to comment on a rule of which it has received notice, it may not
disapprove the CI contained in that rule. n37 If comments are filed, the agency will obviously have to react to those
comments as it prepares to send its draft final rule to OIRA for its regular rulemaking review. n38 Thus, OIRA's two
processes, rulemaking review and paperwork review, come together here, and it is obvious what kind of leverage the
OMB has in this process. It is theoretically possible, of course, that OIRA will ultimately approve a final rule even if
the agency does not accede to its paperwork comments, but in any event the agency [*117] has to explain in the pream-
ble to the final rule how it responded to OIRA's comments. n39 If OIRA finds that the agency's response to its com-
ments is unreasonable, it may disapprove the CI within sixty days of publication of the final rule. n40 All communica-
tions between OIRA and the agency concerning disapprovals or required modifications must be made public, along with
any outside comments the OMB receives. n41 Unlike its actions with respect to free-standing CIs, OIRA's decision to
"approve or not act upon" a CI contained in an agency rule is not subject to judicial review. n42


            n35. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3507(d)(1) (West Supp. 1996); 5 C.F.R. § 1320.11(a).
            n36. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3507(d)(1)(B); 5 C.F.R. § 1320.11(c).
            n37. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3507(d)(3).
            n38. See supra text accompanying note 11.
            n39. 5 C.F.R. § 1320.11(f).
            n40. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3507(d)(4)(C).
            n41. 5 C.F.R. § § 1320.11(f), 1320.11(i) (1995); see also 44 U.S.C.A. § 3507(e)(2) (West Supp. 1996).
            n42. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3507(d)(6). See Funk, supra note 3 at 79-80 for a discussion of this preclusion-of-
       judicial-review provision.

     If the CI is in an existing rule, it still comes up for review by OIRA, upon expiration of the control number. n43 The
agency may still enforce the rule during the review period, but if OIRA disapproves the CI, then the agency will be di-
rected to undertake a rulemaking and complete it within 120 days, limited to consideration of changes in the CI.


            n43. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3507(h); 5 C.F.R. § 1320.12.

     There are some procedures for emergency processing by the OMB, if requested by the agency head or a designated
senior official of the agency. n44 There are also provisions for OIRA to issue a formal delegation to agencies to handle
their own approvals of CIs, provided the OMB finds that the senior official in charge is sufficiently independent of the
program responsibilities to be trusted with this responsibility. n45 As of August 1995, there were only two such delega-
tions in existence: one to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and a much more limited one to the
managing director of the Federal Communications Commission. n46


            n44. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3507(j); 5 C.F.R. § 1320.13.
            n45. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3507(i); 5 C.F.R. § 1320.16.
            n46. 5 C.F.R. § 1320.16(d) (setting forth text of delegations in Appendix A to Part 1320).

    II. THE BROAD DEFINITION OF "COLLECTION OF INFORMATION"
     The Act does not apply to collections of information that take place in the course of intelligence activities, federal
criminal investigations or prosecutions, federal civil actions, antitrust investigations, or administrative investigations
against specific individuals or entities. n47 Otherwise, the [*118] Act's coverage is quite broad, providing that a "col-
lection of information" includes


       the obtaining, causing to be obtained, soliciting, or requiring the disclosure to third parties or the public,
       of facts or opinions by or for an agency, regardless of format, calling for either answers to identical ques-
       tions posed to or identical reporting or record keeping requirements on ten or more persons, other than
       agencies, instrumentalities, or employees of the United States. n48


It also covers "answers to questions posed to agencies, instrumentalities or employees of the United States which are to
be used for general statistical purposes." n49

           n47. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3518(c); 5 C.F.R. § 1320.4(a) (1995). See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Lujan, 963 F.2d
       1380, 1386-87 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding audit request not covered by PRA).
            n48. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3502(3)(A).
            n49. Id. § 3502(3)(A)(ii).

    To make sure that this definition is read broadly, OIRA's regulation contains an extensive list of items that are in-
cluded within the definition:


       report forms, application forms, schedules, questionnaires, surveys, reporting or record keeping require-
       ments, contracts, agreements, policy statements, plans, rules or regulations, planning requirements, circu-
       lars, directives, instructions, bulletins, RFPs, interview guides, oral communications, postings, notifica-
       tions, labeling or similar disclosure requirements, telegraphic or telephonic requests, automated, elec-
       tronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques, or questionnaires used to monitor com-
       pliance with agency requirements. n50


Similar broad definitions in OIRA's rule are offered for the ten-or-more-persons requirement (including any queries
within a twelve month period), n51 agency "conduct or sponsorship," n52 and "burden." n53

            n50. 5 C.F.R. § 1320(3)(c)(1).
            n51. Id. § 1320.3(c)(4).
            n52. Id. § 1320.3(d).
            n53. Id. § 1320.3(b)(1).

     While the Act does not define "information," the OMB's regulation defines it as follows: "any statement or estimate
of fact or opinion, regardless of form or format, whether in numerical, graphic, or narrative form and whether oral or
maintained on paper, electronic or other media." n54 This combination of a broad definition of "information" and a
broad definition of "collection of information" leads to extremely pervasive coverage. Literally speaking, the require-
ment of a cockpit recorder in an airplane is covered because it is it is an oral statement of fact or opinion being imposed
on ten or more persons. Warning placards or signs may also be covered, unless the wording is specifically dictated by
the government. [*119] Purely voluntary surveys, even if used to determine whether regulated parties have problems
with existing regulations, are covered, as are focus groups used to determine whether a regulation is clear or is burden-
some, if more than ten persons are involved in the group. In fact, to help with that latter problem, I suggested a very
simple amendment to the Act when I was serving in the National Performance Review, "add a zero," so that it would
apply to requests directed at one hundred or more people, rather than ten. That fell on deaf ears. But I think we can all
agree that the Act's scope extends far beyond what most people think of as "paperwork" burdens.


            n54. Id. § 1320.3(h).

    Because this definition of information is potentially so broad, the OMB also included a lengthy list in the regulation
of what it generally does not consider information. n55 Although the OMB reserves its right to change its mind on any
specific item, this list includes physical samples (e.g., urine samples), direct observation by employees (but only if it
does not involve standardized oral communication), most solicitations in the Federal Register, clinical examinations,
requests directed to a single person, aptitude or employment exams, and solicitations at public hearings. n56 Affidavits,
oaths, affirmations, etc., are generally not covered, but a "certification" will be covered if an agency substituted it for
some other regulatory or informational requirement. n57


            n55. Id. § 1320.3(h).
            n56. 5 C.F.R. § 1320.3(h)(2)-(4) (1995).
            n57. Id. § 1320.3(h)(1).

    Finally, the OMB and agencies are to develop an annual Information Collection Budget, summarizing the changes
from previous years and setting new goals within the statutory reduction goals mentioned earlier. n58 How this will
work remains to be seen. As mentioned before, much depends on the IRS. And some things are beyond the control of
agencies, like the census requirement in the year 2000. Moreover, there needs to be a good baseline. The overall gov-
ernment-wide burden increased in 1989 when the IRS changed the way its baseline was calculated. n59 Thus, there are
major methodological issues raised by the Information Collection Budget.


            n58. Id. § 1320.17.
            n59. GAO REPORT, supra note 14, at 7.

    CONCLUSION
     In closing, certain issues of major importance raised by the Act and the OMB's regulations need to be mentioned.
First, the 1995 amendments [*120] settled the major question of whether agency rules that require businesses or indi-
viduals to maintain information for the benefit of third parties or the public were covered by the Act. The Supreme
Court had ruled in Dole v. United Steelworkers, n60 involving OSHA's requirement that companies provide hazardous
material notices to workers, that the Act did not so require. But the 1995 Act was amended, after a lot of wrangling in
Congress, to make clear that it does now. n61 This means that many agency rules containing such requirements not pre-
viously reviewed by OIRA will now have to be reviewed.


            n60. 494 U.S. 26 (1990).
            n61. The key language is the addition of the phrase "or requiring disclosure to third parties or the public" to
       the definition of "collection of information." 44 U.S.C.A. § 3502(3)(A) (West Supp. 1996).
     Second, there has been some litigation over whether statutorily mandated paperwork requirements are subject to the
Act. The OMB has acceded to court rulings that if the requirement is imposed directly by statute, such as the statutory
requirement that a person file a tax return, the agency is not prevented from enforcing the penalty if the public protec-
tion provision is not followed. n62 However, this is only in the case of a purely statutory provision. If the statute simply
gives the agency authority to impose a CI, any ensuing CI is subject to the public protection provision. Moreover, the
OMB's position is that these statutory CIs are not completely exempt from the Act. OMB still expects to review such
CIs, in part to make sure the agencies do not go beyond the statutory mandate. n63


            n62. 5 C.F.R. § 1320.6(e) (1995). See Salberg v. United States, 969 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1992); United
       States v. Neff, 954 F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Dawes, 951 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1991); United
       States v. Hicks, 947 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Wunder, 919 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1990).
            n63. See Preamble to OIRA's Final Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 44,981 (1995) (quoting 1980 Senate Report: "The
       fact that the [CI] is specifically required by statute does not, however, relieve an agency of the obligation to
       submit the proposed collection for the Director's review.").

    Third, issues have been raised as to how to balance the Act's requirements with the independence of the inspectors
general in the various agencies and their gathering of information. It is fair to say that the OMB is still working on this.
n64


           n64. See id. at 44,982 (suggesting that it may be appropriate for inspectors general to submit CIs to OIRA
       independently of agency head).

    Last, commentators on the OMB regulation suggested that regulatory certification programs should not be covered,
because they tend to be less [*121] burdensome on the regulated parties than full record keeping. The OMB has
adopted a wait and see attitude on this one. n65


            n65. See id. at 44,979-80 ("OMB prefers to see whether any issues arise in implementing this provision in
       the context of concrete situations.").

     Clearly, each agency will need to develop a sophisticated approach and a trained staff to navigate this statute. It re-
quires a lot of lead time to get CIs cleared, and given the breadth of the coverage, there will be numerous disputes be-
tween agencies and OIRA. There will be wrangles over cuts in the agencies' annual CI budget, and small businesses
will be observing this process with a watchful eye. In the end, it is safe to predict that there will be less paperwork bur-
den on the public, but there will also be delays in regulatory implementation. n66


            n66. For a small example in a delay in agency action blamed on PRA review, see Environmental Defense
       Fund v. EPA, 716 F.2d 915, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (awarding attorneys' fees against EPA for delay in implemen-
       tation of reporting requirements; EPA blames OMB review under PRA).

    As a parting thought, I'd like to reflect on the PRA's sister statute, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). n67
Most people consider FOIA a great success story, but Antonin Scalia once called the it "the Taj Mahal of the Doctrine
of Unanticipated Consequences, the Sistine Chapel of Cost-Benefit Analysis Ignored." n68 It will be interesting to see
how the Paperwork Reduction Act is spoken of ten years from now.


             n67. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
             n68. Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REGULATION, Mar.-Apr. 1982, at
       14.