Information about http://vote.nist.gov/comment_james_johnson.pdf

October 5, 2005 Comment on WiFi Threats: http://vote.nist.gov/threats…

Tags: accuracy test, accuvote, application interface, communications systems, communications technology, diebold, election day, electronic voting systems, error frame, infrared data association, insider, logic, optical ports, outsider, presence, rf communications, support communications, tgdc, voting system, vvsg,
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Language: english
Created: Thu Oct 6 13:41:54 2005
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October 5, 2005

Comment on WiFi Threats: http://vote.nist.gov/threats/papers/wifi_outsider.pdf
and http://vote.nist.gov/threats/papers/wifi_insider.pdf

I agree with Mr. Epstein concerning the threat WiFi equipped systems pose to electronic voting
systems. I am somewhat concerned that this discussion is focused on WiFi and not Optical and
RF in general. Any method of communicating with the voting system including optical or other
RF communications systems presents an equivalent threat.
A number of existing voting systems are equipped with IrDA (Infrared Data Association) optical
wireless ports. These systems support communications with the DRE voting systems at data rates
up to 115 Kb/s.
In Diebold System's AccuVote TS systems these ports are supported using Microsoft's Windows
CE with Winsock. This makes the application interface easy to program to, and all required
drivers are already installed in the OS.
It is interesting that the VVSG currently under development, while mentioning this technology
does nothing to restrict or prevent its use, not even on Election Day.
It is understandable that communications technology be used for pre election preparation, but is
totally irresponsible and inexcusable to allow it to be used during an election. The presence of
this technology makes it possible to upload to the voting system anything that is desired after the
final "Logic and Accuracy" test have been performed, thus totally compromising the system.
Even the ability to transmit as much as a single frame (even an error frame) of data could be
sufficient to alter the approved behavior of the system.
I submitted a short paper discussing this issue to the TGDC entitled Comment on Wireless
Requirements, at http://vote.nist.gov/ECPosStat.htm. I believe this to be a highly likely line of
attack on voting systems unless the technical community is vocal in exposing this threat before it
becomes accepted practice to install optical ports in voting systems. I hope that you will use your
influence to draw attention to these flaws as well as to the threat of WiFi.
Thank You,
James C. Johnson