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Religion, Politics and Class: …
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Religion, Politics and Class:
Conflict and Contestation in the
Development of Football in Iran
BA BA K FO ZO ONI
babakfozooni@hokmail.com
Dept.
BabakFozooni
0
3
500000Autumn
2004 & Francis
Original Psychology
1466-0970 Society Ltd
Soccer and(print)/1743-9590 PathologyMMUElizabeth Gaskell Campus, Hathersage RdManchesterM13 OJA
10.1080/1466097042000279607
FSAS5303.sgm Ltd
Taylorof Article 2004& Speech(online)
Francis
In recent years Iranian football has become an overdetermined site of social contestation.
Almost every institution within civil and political society attempts to impose its own agenda on
football. The game has become a highly charged arena where contending factions carry out a
curious war by proxy, since it is not in their interest to declare open hostilities. This study
charts the development of various class, religious, racial and gender conflicts within Iranian
football. In the process, it sheds light on the process of nation building, the relationship between
`church' and state and the social conflict that has shaped Iran. I conclude by suggesting that the
mullah-bourgeoisie's inability to control and discipline football crowds is indicative of a more
general loss of authority throughout Iranian society.
Early Origins: CIRCA. 1900-19241
At the turn of the last century a game called `cheltoup' was popular amongst the
youth of Tehran.2 This game involved a worn cloth being wrapped round a piece
of rubber and shaped into a ball and was played with sticks in the treacherous
ditches surrounding the city. In 1908 the sporting landscape of Iran saw the
emergence of another ball game when British consul officials and oil explorers in
the southern city of Masjed-e Suleym ¯ n and the Persian Gulf port of Bandar-e
a aa
m
[c
]r
Abb ¯ s played football during their leisure time. The introduction of the beautiful
a a]a
m
[cr
game seems more haphazard in Iran than places like Goa (Portuguese India)
where highly motivated missionaries used football as a way of indoctrinating the
natives with `rational recreation' and `Muscular Christianity'. In neighbouring
Turkey, English merchants played the game informally on the meadows of
Istanbul and Izmir. Following debates over whether football was contrary to
Islamic codes, the first Turkish team was established in 1901 with an English
name - the Black Stockings'.3
The diffusion of football to Iran was a much more contested process. The local
populace responded to the game with a mixture of proletarian curiosity and petty
bourgeois disapproval. Football's modernist imperatives were a cultural challenge
to indigenous games, particularly traditional wrestling (or Zur-khaneh, literally
¯ aa
m
[c
]r
`strong house'). The origins of zur-kh ¯ neh go back to mithraic-zoroastrian times
a aa
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[c
]r
Soccer and Society, vol. 5, No. 3 Autumn 2004, pp 356370
ISSN 14660970 print/17439590 online
DOI: 10.1080/1466097042000279607 © 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd
RELIGION, POLITICS AND CLASS 357
(when it functioned as a military resistance network) and the Mogul era (when it
acted as a patriotic-Shi'a front against the incursions of both the Moguls and
Sunni Muslims). Traditional wrestling, which was historically dominated by the
bazaari middle class through guilds, and modern European gymnastics, which was
supported by the `educated' middle class, were both expressions of a nascent civil
society in competition with the political elite. Zur-kh¯ neh mirrors the
a ]aa
m
[c
r
development of the large network of Turnvereine (gymnastic clubs) in Germany at
the end of the 19th century. As with the German urban middle class both the
modernist and bazaari wings of the Iranian middle class felt excluded from the
process of nation building. Turnvereine in Germany and zur-kh ¯ neh in Iran
a aa
m
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[r
`provided a forum for the dissemination of [middle class] desire for national unity
and political reforms'.4 Group identity was forged in a rapidly changing environ-
ment and common cultural roots reaffirmed in a highly fragmented society
through sporting festivals. Compared to these events the new game of football
seemed competitive and soulless and yet its popularity amongst the proletariat
could not be denied. Nonetheless, zur-kh ¯ neh began to be marginalized because
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]r
of football's emerging popularity and the growth of European gymnastics, which
was being promoted by the Cossack Army School (Ghazz a gh-kh a neh) around
¯
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m
[c
]r ¯ aa
m
[c
]r
1916 as part of a new pedagogy.5
Decades before the concept of `fandom' took root in the country, inquisitive
youths would gather at football games played by British consul staff. Initially the
European embassy staff who played each other competitively were subjected to
hoots of laughter from the uncouth city troglodytes. Had they not been made of
`the right stuff', they might have packed their boots and baggy shorts and
retreated to the safety of their embassies. Gradually, the locals began to show
much more interest and youths began to double up as ball boys. The shortage of
British players meant that from time to time a few natives would be called upon
to make up the numbers and hence local Iranians were now playing the game.
What Americans call `pickup' games became more and more widespread and
shrewd local entrepreneurs began manufacturing footballs to feed the new
appetite.
Prior to WWI, foreign schools played a pivotal role in promoting football,
especially the German School and the American College in Tehran. European
Embassy staff also remained active in promoting the game amongst the local popu-
lace. Indeed, they encouraged the formation of native teams from the staff of the
Royal Bank of Persia and the telegraph service. These teams were to play each
other in `friendlies' but the games soon garnered increasingly political overtones.
In 1925 one such occasion gained symbolic currency in the Iranian collective
psyche when a handpicked team from Tehran took on the British residents' best
XI. The future founder of the Pahlavi dynasty, Reza Khan decided to grace the
proceedings with his (soon to become) majestic presence in the hope of strength-
ening the patriotic fervor of his subjects. However, an early goal by the British side
threatened to subvert the exercise. Apparently, his faithful aids had to plead with
358 SOCCER AND SOCIETY
his Excellency to stay for the second half. Fortune smiled on the young leader and
Tehran scored twice in the second half to win the match 2-1.6
Victory over a ragbag of bloated consul officials was hailed as a magnificent
national triumph. The following year Colonel Reza Khan crowned himself `in the
style of his hero Napoleon - the Shah-in-Shah of Iran'7 and embarked on a nation
building exercise. As with all rulers, Reza Khan instinctively saw the payback of a
modern sporting system. As Brohm notes in relation to a different arena,
The [right to sport] was all the more readily conceded given the numerous
benefits that it provided the ruling class in the form of a more disciplined
and healthy working class (and potential soldiery) spending less time on the
more inflammable pursuits of reading, discussion and self-organisation.8
In the 1920s, Reza Khan was faced with an unstable ethnic and religious mix,
which many believed was on the verge of implosion. Hence, the promotion of
football as national duty changed its parameters from a game to a sport belonging
to the realm of `unfree activity'.
Shaky Foundations: 1925-1940
The modernization impulse, which reached a crescendo during the Constitu-
tional Revolution (1905-9), was reanimated during Reza Khan's autocratic reign
(1925-41). Football became a mechanism for transferring tribal allegiance to the
central government. As with Mao Zedong's capitalist People's Republic of China,
it was the middle class university and high school students who initially took up
organized football, although its expansion into the ranks of proletarians seems to
have been more rapid in the case of Iran. The ruling classes of both countries saw
football `as a symbol of modernity; a talisman of topicality; a statement of intent'.9
The growing significance of football in Iran in this period can be seen in the
response to the national team's performances during a number of friendly
matches, played in Baku in 1925 following an invitation by USSR capitalism. On
their arrival the team was presented with gifts by the Azeri locals, many of whom
considered themselves at least part Iranian. Iran managed a feeble nil-nil draw
with a university team and was subsequently defeated by two Baku based sides.
Whilst many of the players considered these results a step forward for the national
side, their optimism was not shared by a disapproving nation who took them to
task on their return. A satirical magazine called Nahid (meaning, Venus) even had
the audacity to depict them sardonically in a cartoon. Enraged by their reception,
the players paid a visit to the offices of Nahid and registered their discontent by
smashing up the headquarters of the magazine. Thus players and not fans
perpetrated the first act of `hooliganism' in the history of Iranian football!
Arrested by the police and humiliated in prison, they were finally released on bail
after the intervention of the leader of parliament.10
RELIGION, POLITICS AND CLASS 359
Cross-fertilization of ideas was further hastened by a number of individuals
who after a stint playing abroad transferred their skills to the Iranian scene.
Mohammad Ali Sard ¯ r briefly kept goal for the Geneva based team, Servette. It is
aa]a
m
[cr
even alleged that after the Swiss national goalkeeper received an injury during a
game against France, Sard ¯ r was sent on as substitute.11 Another early pioneer
a aa
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was Hussein Sediq ¯ ni. Having gained valuable experience whilst playing for
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[ra
Fenerbahçe's youth team and Rapid Vienna's second XI, he established the
Ferdousi Sport Club in Mashad (a north-eastern Iranian city). One aspect of this
cross-fertilization and the disappointing results against foreign teams was the
realization that established attitudes about football in Iran needed to be
challenged. Football and footballers had to be re-structured in order to increase
productivity. Hussein Meft ¯ h, having personally tasted defeat as part of the
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m
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[r
national side thrashed at Baku, drew the following conclusions: `... the [Baku]
journey taught us that dribbling and individualism are a thing of the past'.12
The early phase of Iranian football is characterized by the same ferocity
displayed in other parts of the world. `Friendlies' between Armenian-Iranians and
Muslim-Iranians usually resulted in terrible injuries and on at least one occasion
fatally. Goalkeepers, in particular, unprotected by referees seem to have been
considered a legitimate target in those days. For example, an Armenian goalkeeper
died during one such friendly after landing on his head. Playing against foreigners
also generated a great deal of tension. Bishop, an English goalkeeper, died under
similar circumstances.
Although at this stage most players were still bourgeois (or petty-bourgeois),
proletarian crowds were beginning to gather at makeshift grounds and to make
their presence felt. The authorities, nervous about disorder at the best of times,
reacted with predictable regulatory zeal. Referees began to make a gradual appear-
ance, especially in Tehran. The fact that most were army officers suggests
politicians considered discipline on the playing field to be of paramount impor-
tance.13 Football associations and cup competitions, again instigated by politicians
and technocrats, became widespread. The first sporting weekly, A'een Varzeshi,
began publishing around 1926. Unlike sporting journals in say South Africa that
`came under the pressures of apartheid censorship in the 1950s and lost much
political content',14 Iranian journals have usually been devoid of political contro-
versy, due mostly to a process of self-censorship.
Football soon found a high-ranking patron in the shape of the leader of parlia-
ment, Mohammad Tadayon. He was a member of the Revival Party, which was
comprised of young Western educated reformers who called, amongst other
things, for `separation of religion from politics, creation of a well-disciplined army
and a well-administered bureaucracy ... expansion of educational facilities for all,
including women ...'.15 During his time, physical education became a compulsory
part of the school curriculum. In 1934 Reza Shah ordered the establishment of the
National Association for Physical Education and Scouting. The first stadium was
built at Amjadi'yeh, a district of Tehran, with an initial capacity of one thousand
360 SOCCER AND SOCIETY
spectators. Soon a second ground was added as well as a number of tennis courts
and a modern swimming pool.
The role played by secular bourgeois institutions in promoting football cannot
be overstated. Whereas in countries like Britain, both the religious and secular
wings of the ruling class quickly saw the economic and ideological dividends of
football, in Iran it was left to the secularists to establish a sport that was initially
opposed by religious traditionalists. This is a trend similar to neighbouring
Turkey.16 Traditionalists saw football as a western import, licentious and a
distraction from religious education and duties. Later on we will see how, having
secured its hegemony over the proletariat, the Islamic Republic followed their
secular counterparts in regulating football for the benefit of Iranian capitalism.
Post-War Boom: 1941-67
The escalation of the Second World War did not leave Iran unscathed, despite the
country's declaration of `neutrality'. When the allies invaded Iran the national side
was in neighbouring Afghanistan. They had just finished playing a goalless draw
against their host when they were informed of the upheavals back home. The game
is remembered for the oddity of having only two referees. This should not be
interpreted as a subversive gesture against football regulations but simply as
administrative incompetence. Most of the team selected for the Afghanistan game
came from a military background and would in time become high-ranking military
personnel in the Pahlavi regime.17 The centralization and militarization of sport
was not on the same par as a country such as China but the contours of the devel-
opment were similar. Elite army teams promoted the country abroad whilst at
home the game was used to augment state education. Sporting committees at both
national and provincial levels were set up to systematize the promotion of football.
The first competitive `success' for the Iranian national team under this sports
system came during the 1951 Asian Games held at New Delhi. Wins over Burma
and Japan followed by a 1-0 defeat against India in the finals earned Iran a second
place. This minor achievement was reversed seven years later at the Tokyo Asian
Games (1958) with two heavy losses against South Korea and Israel. However,
progress could again be seen during the qualification games for the 1964 Tokyo
Olympics. Having beaten Pakistan and Iraq in earlier rounds, only India stood
between Iran and a first appearance in the Olympics. Iran's qualification was
secured after a 3-1 win at Calcutta. This victory not only highlighted the improving
standard of the Iranian national team but also emphasized links between football
and the military. The extent of these links was apparent when on their return from
India, both a spontaneous proletarian crowd and a carefully orchestrated military
parade welcomed the squad. Sadr describes the spectacle in the following terms;
Each player was placed in an open top army jeep. Their names appeared on
a white placard in the front window. The national flag decorated both sides
RELIGION, POLITICS AND CLASS 361
of the bonnet and a bouquet of flowers was placed around the neck of each
player. The parade of jeeps carrying players in chequered shirts and straw
hats waving at the adoring crowds remains the largest welcoming procession
in the history of Iranian football, even eclipsing the victory parade organized
after Iran's qualification for the 1998 World Cup.18
The heavy-handed propaganda approach of the Pahlavi regime may seem
anachronistic by today's standards.19 However, it could be argued it was an ideal
accompaniment to the break-neck cycle of capital accumulation sprouting up all
over the `developing' world. In Argentina, similar centripetal manoeuvres in
football were designed to build `imagined communities', integrating various
proletarian ethnicities. Pablo Alabarces connects this process to male identity-
formation, `[Argentinean football] was ... a space for the expression of male
identity and belonging, particularly via Peronism'. In Iran `masculinity is so
standardized that most Iranians do not see it as a category'.20 Today, the sombre
hypermasculinity of `brave' martyrs and `pious' clerics has become a burden for
most men as well as women. Football provides fans with alternative identity
types, looser dress code and more joyous modes of discourse. With the weak-
ening of pre-modern concepts such as `honour', and early modernist concepts
such as `dignity', both male and female identities are becoming more sensitive to
the requirements of `authenticity' to one's own belief system and life style.
Spectator fluidity reflects this trend in football. Identity-formation was also used
to create the myth of national style in the hope of restructuring discursive and
corporeal practices: `On the one hand, style has an ideological component,
particularly in journalistic discussions; on the other hand, it is used as a way of
educating the public aesthetically'.21
In the Pahlavi era, this project of aesthetic education was linked to the import
of `western' fashion and music at the expense of an earlier Islamic wave of
colonization. This elitist concept of aesthetic education is, of course, not limited
to so-called `developing' countries. Commenting on the interaction between
footballing culture and fashion in a North American setting, Zwick and Andrews
unpack the authoritarian nature of aesthetic conventionalism,
Wearing an outdated T-shirt, sporting an unsuitable haircut, or having a bad
hair day, would be immediately criticized for being an indication of lack of
care of the self...Nobody escaped the omnipresent and normalizing gaze of
the players' taste culture, as the coach, parents, and even researchers [mean-
ing Zwick and Andrews themselves] were subject to open critique for their
aesthetic flaws.22
Football was and still remains a major ideological terrain where this battle is
waged. In Iran the `other' in the shape of the Turk, Arab, Indian or Afghani was
portrayed as aggressive and barbaric. Depending on circumstances, the authorities
362 SOCCER AND SOCIETY
employed `residual cultural artifacts' such as honour, `dominant cultural artifacts'
such as dignity, and `emergent cultural artifacts' such as authenticity on the football
field to combat this `other'.23 Defeat against this `inferior other' became
exceedingly intolerable, since the whole nation could now be persuaded to feel
`dishonoured'. As a consequence, some of the players who lost against Iraq in a
friendly in 1962 were not selected for the fourth Asian Games held in Jakarta on
the express orders of an upset Mohammad Reza Shah. Thus, the `transformation
of ludic, playful activity pursued for its own sake, to physical activity that is used
for extrinsic purposes'24 which took centuries to complete in most European
societies was crammed into a relatively short timespan in relation to Iranian
football. Sport had marginalized play.
Football in Iran was also a sphere of activity that was influenced by the
economic climate of the time. Despite the oil bonanza, the administration had to
resort to deficit financing by 1960. A bad harvest in 1959-60, coupled with
`unproductive' military expenditure obliged the Shah `to seek emergency aid from
both the International Monetary Fund and the US government'.25 The IMF loan
was accompanied by wage freezes and budget cuts, whilst US President
Kennedy's `hand-out' was contingent on land reform and `liberalization', seen
then as now, as the best guarantee against `communism'. The land reforms, which
began with the intention of creating a class of independent farmers, ended up by
replacing `sharecroppers with tenant farmers, wage laborers, or agricultural
machinery'.26 Feudal landlords were encouraged to commercialize their opera-
tions. The social upheavals that resulted from such `uneven development' resulted
in a wave of riots in 1963, `supported' for differing reasons by both the `liberal'
National Front and the authoritarian clergy around Khomeini. Hand in hand with
such socioeconomic transformations, the commodification, rationalization and
quantification of football would gather pace throughout the 1960s and 1970s.
`Golden-Age' Interrupted: 1968-78
The period 1968-78 was one of rapid economic growth. In 1968-69, `the oil
income had climbed to $958 million ... $5 billion in 1973-1974, and, after the
quadrupling of world petroleum prices, nearly $20 billion in 1975-76'.27 Despite
massive arms expenditure, the Gross National Product also grew from an annual
rate of 8 per cent in 1962-70 to 30 per cent in 1973-74. Although a robust `national
identity' took root in central provinces, in `peripheral' provinces allegiance was
merely shifted from one's tribe to a larger ethnicity, such as Kurdish, Arab,
Turkoman, Baluch and Azeri. These ethnic tensions were to have implications for
the national squad in years to come.
During this time period racism began to manifest itself in Iranian football. The
Tehran Asian Games of 1968 provided Iranian racists with the perfect opportunity
to promote their agenda, especially as it coincided with the spread of television
coverage. Having defeated Hong Kong, Taiwan and Burma in the early rounds,
RELIGION, POLITICS AND CLASS 363
Iran was pitted against Israel in the finals in front of an estimated 30,000 crowd at
Amjadi'yeh stadium. Perhaps for the first time in Iranian history, cries of `Death
to Israel' were to echo around a football ground during what proved to be a narrow
2-1 victory for the home side. Anti-Jewish chants were reinforced by balloons
thrown in the air which carried the Nazi swastika.28 It is claimed that the small
number of Jewish-Iranians who dared to turn up to watch the match divided into
the relatively better off secularists, who supported both sides, and the religious-
poor, who favoured Israel. Some young Jews were beaten up after the match, a
Jewish hospital was damaged and the crowd let loose a one-eyed ass on the streets
of Tehran in reference to Moshe Dayan, the one-eyed Israeli defence minister and
the architect of the 1967 Israeli victory over the Arabs.29 As with today's rulers,
there was an attempt by reactionary groups to manipulate legitimate concerns
about Israeli state policies and its corresponding nation-building ideology of
Zionism into prejudice directed against Jews (both Iranian and non-Iranian). This
brand of chauvinism was, in time, to give way to an alternative Islamic bigotry
which criss-crossed with other forms of discrimination against Kurds, Armenians,
Turkomans and Azeris.
It should be noted that anti-Jewish prejudice in Iranian football has a long
history which can be traced to at least 1930 when Jewish players had to run the
gauntlet of hatred en route to their training ground.30 The 1930s and 1940s had
witnessed the clumsy import of European fascist ideology by a number of
influential nationalists who by jumping on the `Aryan' bandwagon introduced a
specifically racial element to what was hitherto a religious form of `anti-Jewish'
prejudice.31 Some elements within the imagined community of Muslims, the
umma, have always perceived Jews as `unclean'. Physical contact and the transfer
of bodily fluids such as sweat during contact sports was anathema to such
reactionaries. The only thing worse than having to wrestle a Jew was losing to
one! This mindset is still a real factor in the government's decision to boycott
Israeli sporting activities. Despite discrimination on and off the field, Jewish
sport clubs were fairly successful. The Kurosh (Cyrus) football club, for instance,
was an early runner-up in the national league. In response to fascist attacks, some
Jewish players decided to fight back. A Jewish club named Bar a dar a n (Brothers)
a]a
m
[cr¯ ¯
a]a
m
[cr
organized a defence committee, which physically repelled fascist aggression
using traditional wrestling equipment not dissimilar to that used by Chinese
martial art gangs.
Ironically, one cornerstone of this era's secularization strategy was the import
of foreign coaches and referees. One foreign coach in particular, the `legendary'
Zedravkov Rykov captured the popular imagination more than most. Rykov was a
Yugoslav international who represented his country in the 1954 and 1958 World
Cups. He managed the Iranian national team for only two matches before joining
the club side, T ¯ j. During his seven year reign at T ¯ j he instigated a successful
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]r aa
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]r a
youth policy and introduced new tactics and strategies which laid the foundations
for supremacy in Asia. For the first time a non-military head was appointed to run
364 SOCCER AND SOCIETY
the Iranian Football Association. A tame 1-0 victory over Brazil during the 1972
Olympic Games in Munich did not make up for the disappointment of heavy
losses against Hungary and Denmark. Youth football programmes were instigated
as a response to the failure to qualify for the 1974 World Cup. A new national
league expanded regular football to areas beyond Tehran and the southern
province of Khuzestan. A certain corporate or economic mentality began to shape
clubs. In the north-western city of Tabriz, Terucktor-s a zi (literally, `Tractor
aa
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]c
[r ¯
manufacturing') reigned supreme, whilst the central city of Isfah ¯ n produced the
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a]a
[cr
competent Zob a han (literally, `Iron-works'). With the establishment of Malav a n
¯
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[c
]r ¯
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[c
]r
Anzali (literally, `Anzali sailors'), the navy could, at last, compete in the popularity
stake with the army. The ex-Manchester United boss Frank O'Farrell was
brought in to train the next generation of domestic coaching staff, with consider-
able success. Under O'Farrell, Iran won the 1974 Asian games beating Israel 1-0
in the final in front of 120,000 delirious fans. The nucleus of O'Farrell's team
performed relatively well in the 1978 World Cup under his Iranian protégé
Heshmat Mohajerani.
Although this foreign influence on Iranian football was positive and successful,
in a sporting sense, with the entrenchment of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
xenophobic tendencies curtailed further foreign contribution. This was certainly
the case in the 1980s and early part of the 1990s when foreign coaches were
dismissed or undermined and there were protests organized by the fascist wing of
the regime `against the invitation extended to the United States to compete in the
[freestyle wrestling] Takhti Cup'.32 Even as recently as 2003, the overtures of
England's ex-captain, Bryan Robson, to the Iranian Football Federation regarding
coaching the national side were ignored completely. Whilst it should be noted that
they were not the only ones who were unwilling to hire Robson, the fact that they
did not even have the courtesy to return Robson's call is yet another indication of
the contempt in which foreigners are held by certain sections of the theocratic
bureaucracy.33
Islamic Vicissitudes: 1979-2004
Iran's most significant result in the 1970s was achieved against Scotland in a
famous 1-1 draw at the 1978 World Cup, which basically curtailed Scotland's
progress to the second round. So dismayed were the Scots by the outcome that they
refused to swap shirts at the final whistle. It might reasonably have been expected
that this result would have acted as a catalyst for the development of Iranian
football. However, after the Islamic `revolution' an official anti-football campaign
was augmented by a general unease about the exorbitant costs of grooming teams.
Football was dismissed as a royalist tool of manipulation. Sadr34 describes how in
1979, angry crowds chanting confused and contradictory slogans laid siege to a
national training camp: `The national team's camp is a betrayal of the people'. A
new form of divine chauvinism, based on the fascist concept of folk, was replacing
RELIGION, POLITICS AND CLASS 365
patriotism based on monarchical principles.35 Muslim clerics tapped into genuine
proletarian concerns regarding the lowering of the social wage in order to under-
mine football's popularity. With the outbreak of the IranIraq war, Muslim
authorities intensified their anti-football exhortations:
...given the current war conditions, holding football tournaments is deemed
unsuitable. For the time being we will only organize lower league football
competition for the amusement and entertainment of the masses.36
Recognizing the concern of their new Muslim masters with money, pro-foot-
ball forces tried to ingratiate themselves by pointing out the game's financial
potential. Charity games in favour of war-refugees were organized. Popular ex-
professionals were signed up to promote the league. However, these gestures fell
on deaf ears and once public gatherings were declared a national security threat in
1980, the preconditions for a crackdown on football were in place. Football
matches and mini-tournaments would get cancelled based on the flimsiest of
pretexts. One cancellation in 1981 caused an unheard of rapprochement between
Perseopolis and T ¯ j supporters who joined forces to denounce the authorities. A
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]ra
more serious riot following a match between Perseopolis and P ¯ s led to the
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[ra
suspension of the First Division in 1984.
The 1980s witnessed stagnation in the sporting field. The Islamic Republic
came to rue its decision to withdraw from the 1980 Moscow and the 1984 Los
Angeles Olympic Games. The myth of amateurism was deflated in 1986 when no
less than 14 players refused to participate in Parviz Dehd ¯ ri's national squad for
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financial reasons. Creeping professionalism could no longer be denied. Player-
power was emerging as a significant force in Iranian football and `under the table'
payment was no longer deemed the preferred method of retaining top players.
A further source of tension was the migration of Iranian footballers abroad. In
the 1980s and early 1990s a batch of players left for the Gulf States and lowly
European clubs. Two prominent players were banned from representing the
national side for six months as a disciplinary measure. The media was instructed
to censor them.37 Later, the Islamic Republic learned to love football and milk its
popularity to enhance the government's international status. The policy of less
well off European clubs, such as Arminia Bielfeld, to import cheap labour from
Iran also boosted international contact. However, the sale of three players to lowly
Greek clubs for what was considered a derisory figure incurred the wrath of the
Football Federation, which would henceforth step in to safeguard the market
value of this new precious commodity. So long as the war with Iraq lasted,
however, migrant-players were deemed almost as ghastly as `conscientious
objectors' and treated with the same contempt.
Working class players and members of `ethnic minorities' used the new
opportunities to improve their social status. Football, and later cinema, became
two legitimate channels for escaping the poverty trap. As Bromberger suggests;
366 SOCCER AND SOCIETY
The make-up of the national team ... provides another interesting lesson in
sociology. The team's driving forces are recruited mainly from the
Azerbaijani Turks (often the best defenders), Khuzestan Arabs forced into
exile by the 1980-1988 IranIraq war (who tend to be good in attacking
positions), and youth from the popular quarters and southern suburbs of
¯ aa
Tehran...The team also has one or two players from the Ar¯ r ¯ t club [an Aa
[m
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r aa
m
[c
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m
[c
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Armenian league team], who at one time were kept out by a selector reputed
to be an Islamist.38
¯ aa
In fact, teams like Ar ¯ r ¯ t allowed Armenian Christians to enhance their ethnic
A]a
[mc
r a]a
m
[cr a]a
m
[cr
identity in an often-hostile environment and their distinctive footballing style
ensured a massive following for them amongst Armenian-Iranians.39
Influenced by various Japanese corporations such as Mitsubishi and Hitachi,
Iranian firms had begun sponsoring football from the 1960s onwards. The
National Iranian Oil Company sponsored San'at-e Naft (literally, `Oil Industry')
¯ a a
in the southern city of Ab ¯ d ¯ n. B a nk-e Melli (literally, `National Bank'), Payk a n
A]a
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r ¯ a]a
m
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m
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m
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m
[cr
(established in 1969 by Iran National which manufactured Talbot cars for the
¯ ¯
domestic market) and R a h A han (literally, `Railways') were three other enterprise
a]a
m
[cr A]a
[mc
r
sides that did not fair as well as their Japanese counterparts. With migration
heading towards the capital, the same fate befell `provincial' sides. In the 1990s
wages for elite professionals, however, continued to spiral in keeping with their
enhanced social status. In this decade attendance for national games and top club
sides would routinely exceed 100,000. By the close of the millennium Iran's record
at the national level stood at `152 wins, 56 losses and 68 ties'.40
The tensions within the ruling class between modernizers and conservatives
were reflected in football. Conservative managers, fully cognizant of their
educational and entrepreneurial limitations, felt under threat from a new batch of
modern-oriented technocrats intent on transforming the infrastructure and
cultural practices of Iranian capitalism. One such technocrat was the market
oriented Far ¯ h ¯ ni who was eventually forced to resign as President of the Football
a a
a]a
m
[cr a]a
m
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Federation in 2002. Two days before his resignation Far ¯ h ¯ ni, gave a revealing
a a aa
m
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m
[c
]r
interview during which he criticized mysterious `conservatives' who had opposed
his modernization drive. He bemoaned the fact that `the 1998 World Cup resulted
in no significant employment, merely a temporary euphoria and a very minor
upturn in the economy'.41 He also claimed that 300,000 new employment oppor-
tunities could be created within football on condition that it is industrialized along
Japanese lines. According to Far ¯ h ¯ ni, 10 per cent of his budget came from state
a a aa
m
[c
]r aa
m
[c
]r
taxes, with 90 per cent self-generated. The bulk of the Federation's income is
made up of sponsorships and foreign trips. As an average figure a friendly against
Denmark, for instance, would earn the Iranian Federation around $150,000. It
comes as little surprise, therefore, that in 2001 Iran topped FIFA's table for the
most active national side (a total of 92 games at all age levels). Furthermore, wide-
spread national TV coverage has ensured a sustained flow of sponsorship money
RELIGION, POLITICS AND CLASS 367
into the coffers of the Football Federation. Greed does, however, have its limits.
During the 1998 World Cup, the Iranian goalkeeper (and captain) was fined by
FIFA for promoting two commercial logos on his gloves. The 1990s also
witnessed an alarming increase in the number of positive drug tests for top
players. Nevertheless, with the historic victory over the USA in the 1998 World
Cup, every corruption and failure was happily forgotten. The occasion provided
dissidents an ideal excuse for carnivals and street parties. On their return, the
team's aircraft was met by thousands of frenzied fans a forerunner of future
instances of `youth' power.
Recent years have witnessed a sharpening of social conflict. Football has not
only reflected this conflict but has in many ways catalysed it. Certain taboos have
been broken first within football and then extended to the rest of society. The
intermingling of fans from both sexes during post-match celebrations, particularly
after victories over Australia and the USA, has been a significant step toward
achieving sexual equality. As Gerami puts it, `Never has a masculine sport like
soccer been celebrated with such a feminine defiance'.42 The role of Iranian
women is not confined to fans, of course. In August 1998 for the first time since
the Islamic `Revolution' 40 women `took part in an amateur football training
session at Tehran's Hejab Stadium'.43 The very presence of women in stadiums,
and their insistence on having their own league has left conservative elements
fuming.
Despite many victories by women there have also been occasional setbacks
inflicted on them by religious forces. During the Tehran leg of the Republic of
Ireland v Iran World Cup qualifier in 2002, Iranian female fans were barred from
attending the match on the grounds that the vulgar language now routinely used
by male proletarians would corrupt their `sensitive nature'. Their Irish counter-
parts, however, were allowed to attend the match at Azadi stadium as their lack
of Farsi protected them from `cultural contamination'. Similarly, in September
2003 women fans (some of them sportswomen) were ejected from a super league
handball game on grounds that they were watching `half naked young men'.
Such conservatism has also been reflected in other sports. For example, when
certain forces within the ruling elite floated the concept of female traditional
wrestlers working out in zur-kh ¯ nehs, reactionaries were aghast. This sacrile-
ma
aa
[c
]r
gious suggestion was opposed with considerable journalistic ferocity in papers
supportive of the fascist wing of the regime.
Of late, events off the field have been more interesting than the football itself.
In October 2001 there were serious riots during the qualifying rounds of the 2002
World Cup. Football became an excuse for large Bakhtinian carnivals against the
Islamic Republic. Many cities became temporarily ungovernable and thousands
were arrested for offences ranging from stone-throwing to dancing.44 Since then,
every football gathering is policed even more meticulously for fear of political
demonstrations. On the field, with the exception of a few successful exports (such
as Ali Dai and Mahdavee-Kia to Germany), playing standards have fallen. The
368 SOCCER AND SOCIETY
national team's standing in FIFA's table has also fallen to 42.45 Meanwhile the only
success of recent years has come in Asia. In 2002 Iran won the (outdoor) Asian
Cup and a year later the indoor five-a-side crown was added to the trophy cabinet
in front of a delirious 12,000 crowd.
Conclusions
This study has outlined some of the key political, economic and cultural moments
which have shaped Iranian football. As a site of contestation, encompassing various
dichotomies, football is a concentrated microcosm of wider societal conflicts. The
battle between civil and political society initially found football on the side of
middle class civil modernizers at the expense of authoritarian political elites.
Gradually the ruling classes warmed to the charms of football. First the Pahlavi
dynasty and then the mullahs began to wield football as a political and monetary
instrument. The `battle of the sexes' has witnessed a successful encroachment by
women in a field hitherto inaccessible to them. The battle between football's
modernist imperatives (with its emphasis on competition, Taylorism, division of
labour and exchange value) and pre-modernist play-activities such as traditional
wrestling has been decidedly won by the former.
However, a number of tensions continue to bedevil the game. Rivalry
between club teams from the capital and smaller urban centres has reached new
heights, reflecting antipathy towards Tehran as the supreme site of state power.
Professionalism has become entrenched at the expense of naïve amateurism.
Player mobility has broken down rigid ties of club loyalty that pervaded in the
past. Clubs with a semi-public status are desperately seeking private finance in
order to compete with the Middle Eastern market in players and coaches.
Sponsors are having a bigger say in the running of the game. Already privatized
clubs such as Perseopolis are slowly moving towards greater financial transpar-
ency and professional accountancy practices. Newspapers, TV and radio follow
these negotiations in painstaking detail. Secularism has all but driven out religion
from the terraces, reducing religious forces to government-sponsored displays of
`terrace-power'. Finally, class conflict continues to express itself in the form of
chanting, gossiping, strikes, sit-ins, pitch-invasions, boycotts and riots in an
ever-increasing cycle of animosity directed towards the Islamic theocracy.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my supervisor, Ian Parker (Discourse Unit, Manchester
Metropolitan University) for his constructive comments and encouragement.
Thanks are also due to Paul Darby (University of Ulster) for his editorial
assistance. The paper was written during a generous PhD scholarship from the
Department of Psychology and Speech Pathology at Manchester Metropolitan
University.
RELIGION, POLITICS AND CLASS 369
NOTES
1. The periodization of the history of football in Iran (190024; 192540; 194167; 196879; 1979present)
was arrived at through three simultaneous criteria: First, the evolution of the game itself. For instance,
the game was introduced into Iran at the beginning of the 20th century, thus the date acts as a `natural'
demarcation point. Second, the internal dynamics of Iranian capital and state formation generate various
seminal markers, especially so since the development of capitalism in Iran is closely linked to the
metamorphosis of the state. The date 1924, for example, symbolizes a break with the political turmoil
of the pre-Reza Khan period. After 1924 a period of relative stability allowed for capital accumulation
and state formation to encourage sport. The 1979 marker represents yet another break since the attitude
of the Islamic regime regarding football was initially at odds with the Pahlavi dynasty. Third, various
external factors that affected Iranian politics had a disproportionate influence on the evolution of football
too. The Second World War, for instance, led to an early example of `regime change' and a corresponding
modernization of the state apparatus, which in turn turned football into a catalyst for international
relations.
2. Hamid Reza Sadr, Rouzi, rouzeg a ri footb a l [Once Upon a Time Football]. (Tehran: Avizhe Publishing,
¯
a]a
m
[cr ¯
a]a
m
[cr
2001). (Farsi)
3. Can Kozanoglu, `Beyond Edirne: Football and the National Identity Crisis in Turkey', pp. 117-25, in
Football Cultures and Identities, Edited by G. Armstrong and R. Giulianotti (London: Macmillan Press
Ltd, 1999). Cüneyd Okay claims the English name was chosen to baffle the spies and informers of the
pro-Muslim Abdulhamid II who whilst welcoming the West's material benefits frowned upon its
cultural exports such as football. See `The Introduction, Early Development and Historiography of
Soccer in Turkey: 1890-1914', Soccer and Society, 3, 3 (Autumn 2002), 110.
4. Udo Merkell, `The Hidden Social and Political History of the German Football Association (DFB),
1900-50', Soccer and Society, 1, 2, (2000), 168.
5. See Sadr, Once Upon a Time Football, p. 117.
6. See Sadr, Once Upon a Time Football, p. 25.
7. Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1982), p. 120.
8. Jean-Marie Brohm, Sport: A Prison of Measured Time (London: Ink Links, 1978), p. viii.
9. Dong Jinxia and J.A. Mangan, `Football in New China: Political Statement, Entrepreneurial Enticement
and Patriotic Passion', Soccer and Society, 2, 3, (2001), 79.
10. See Sadr, Once Upon a Time Football, p. 24.
11. Ibid., p. 21.
12. Ibid., p. 24.
13. Ibid., p. 25.
14. John Nauright, `Bhola Lethu: Football in Urban South Africa', p. 197, in Football Cultures and
Identities, (eds.) G. Armstrong and R. Giulianotti (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1999).
15. See Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 127.
16. See `The Introduction, Early Development and Historiography of Soccer in Turkey: 1890-1914',
Soccer and Society, 3, 3, (Autumn 2002), p. 6.
17. Sina, The Most Comprehensive History of Iranian Soccer, 1999, text at http://www.irans-
portspress.com/main/frontpg/history.htm, [accessed on 24.2.2003].
18. See Sadr, Once Upon a Time Football, pp. 32-3.
19. Such `heavy-handed' propaganda around sporting victories is not a preserve of `developing'
countries. The victory parade in Paris after the 1998 World Cup was designed to re-integrate the
French nation around a more multi-ethnic identity and the recent victory march through London
following the 2003 Rugby World Cup success was meant to re-animate New Labour's brand of
`soft' patriotism.
20. Shahin Gerami, `Mullahs, Martyrs and Men: Conceptualizing Masculinity in the Islamic Republic of
Iran', Men and Masculinities, 5, 3, (January 2003), pp. 257-74.
21. Pablo Alabarces, `Post-Modern Times: Identities and Violence in Argentine Football', in Football
Culture and Identities, Edited by Gary Armstrong and Richard Giulianotti, (London: Macmillan Press
Ltd, 1999), p. 79.
22. Detlev Zwick, and David L. Andrews, `The Suburban Soccer Field: Sport and America's Culture of
Privilege', in Football Culture and Identities, Edited by Gary Armstrong and Richard Giulianotti,
(London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1999), p. 220.
370 SOCCER AND SOCIETY
23. Raymond Williams, `Base and superstructure in Marxist cultural theory', New Left Review, 82,
(Nov-Dec 1973).
24. James H. Frey and Stanley Eitzen, `Sport and Society', Annual Review of Sociology, 17, (1991), 507.
25. See Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 422.
26. Ibid., p. 424.
27. Ibid., p. 427.
28. Ibid., p. 135.
29. Ibid.
30. Houshang Esfandiar Shah abi, `Yah u dian-e Irani dar Arseyeh Varzeshi' [Iranian Jews in sporting
¯ aa
m
[c
]r ¯ ¯
ua
[]c
m r ¯
aa
m
[c
]r aa
m
[c
]r
fields]. Ir a n N a meh, 18, 125-49, (Farsi).
¯ [c¯
a]a
m r a]a
m
[cr
31. Ideological affinities between the Islamic Republic and European Fascism and Latin American
Populism are discussed in Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic, (Berkeley,
Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 44-5; Behz ad K azemi, Melli-gar a y a n
m
[c¯
a]a
r ¯
a]a
m
[cr ¯ ¯
a]a
m
[cr a]a
m
[cr
Va Afsa neye Democra cy [Nationalists and the Myth of Democracy], (Nazm-e K argar Publishing:
¯ aa
m
[c
]r ¯ aa
m
[c
]r ¯aa
m
[c
]r
London, 1999), www.isf.org.uk/books, pp. 93-152, (Farsi).
32. Christian Bromberger, `Sport as a touchstone for social change: A third half for Iranian football', Le
Monde diplomatique, April 1998, http://mondediplo.com/1998/04/04iran, [accessed on 24.2.2003].
33. Navad [Ninety], Persian newspaper, First Year, no. 85, 14 August 2003, p. 6.
34. See Sadr, Once Upon a Time Football, p. 43.
35. The similarities between the Islamic Republic and European Fascism of the 1930s are not merely
ideological. Once in power, the mullah-bourgeoisie was faced with the same structural problems as
those which bedevilled German and Italian capitalisms in the 1930s. They chose the same mechanisms
for overcoming the crisis. These included the destruction of autonomous proletarian organizations, the
banning of strikes and a reversion to methods of absolute surplus value extraction. Writing on German
Fascism, Alfred Sohn-Rethel has described this process accurately: `The switch to the terroristic
control of absolute surplus value production by the [Nazi] state meant that the bourgeois elite had to
smash not only the proletarian political organization but also the mass basis appropriate to their own
previous control through relative surplus value production, mainly the unions and social democracy;
these they had to replace with a different mass basis: that of National Socialism' (Alfred Sohn-Rethel,
The Economy and Class Structure of German Fascism, London: Free Association Books, 1987, pp. 69-70).
36. Hussein Shah-Husseini, Minister for Physical Education, quoted in Sadr, Once Upon a Time Football,
p. 44.
37. Majid Abb asqoli, `Iranian Football Players in Europe: A Bridge Over Amateurism (Parts I and II)',
¯ aa
m
[c
]r
Tamashagaran [Fans]: Soccer Monthly, 44, (1999), 5-13.
38. See Christian Bromberger, `Sport as a touchstone for social change: A third half for Iranian football',
Le Monde diplomatique, April 1998, http://mondediplo.com/1998/04/04iran, [accessed on
24.2.2003].
39. See Sadr, Once Upon a Time Football, p. 78.
40. Sina, The Most Comprehensive History of Iranian Soccer, 1999, text at http://www.irans-
portspress.com/main/frontpg/history.htm, [accessed on 24.2.2003].
41. Iran, Persian newspaper, VIII year, no. 2246, 18.9.2002, p. 11.
42. See Gerami, `Mullahs, Martyrs and Men: Conceptualizing Masculinity in the Islamic Republic of
Iran', 271.
43. Ibid.
44. Babak Fozooni, `Iranian Football Riots and the Resurgence of Proletarian Carnivalesque', part II of
unpublished PhD manuscript, (Manchester Metropolitan University, 2004).
45. Dony a y-e Varzesh [The World of Sport], Persian monthly magazine, XXXIII Year, no. 1559, 2 August
m¯
a]a
[cr
2003.