Technical article Wiley Handbook of Science and…

Technical article                     Wiley Handbook of Science and Technology for Homeland Security



Human Behavior and Deception Detection
Mark G. Frank, University at Buffalo, State University of New York
Maureen O'Sullivan, University of San Francisco
Melissa A. Menasco, University at Buffalo, State University of New York
Keywords
Behavior; Cognition: Deception;         Detection;       Emotion;        Judgment;         Lying;
Malfeasance; Memory.

Abstract
Human intelligence is the key to stopping terrorism, and therefore it is essential
to know when the information obtained is false. This chapter briefly outlines the
research on behavioral clues to deception, as well as research on people's
abilities to spot deception once it has happened. We find that there is no clue or
clue pattern that is specific to deception, although there are clues specific to
emotion and cognition. In general, behavioral clues are only limited in their
abilities to identify deception and that there are still behavioral measurement
issues that may plague research on deception. Moreover, a closer examination
of the laboratory research suggests many research studies are not relevant to
security contexts, thus the research literature may underestimate the usefulness
of behavioral information ­ particularly for the utility of identifying emotional and
cognitive states. We also find that most people, unaided by technology, cannot
detect lies from behavior information, but that some groups do show significantly
higher levels of accuracy ­ although more research is needed to understand
why. We conclude that more directed interaction with scientists and practitioners
­ in both lab work and in the real world, in creating real world databases, in
identifying base rates for malfeasant behavior in security settings, in optimizing
training and in identifying pre existing excellence within security organizations
can more rapidly capitalize on the usefulness of behavioral information in security
settings.

Terrorism at its core is a human endeavor. Human beings cultivate what they
hate, plan and then execute terrorist attacks. Thus, any information that can aid
the intelligence or security officer to weigh the veracity of the information he or
she obtains from suspected terrorists or those harboring them would help prevent
attacks. This would then not only add another layer to force protection but would
facilitate future intelligence gathering. Yet the face to face gathering of
information through suspected terrorists, informants, or witnesses is replete with
obstacles that affect its accuracy such as the well documented shortcomings of
human memory, honest differences of opinion, as well as what is the focus of this
chapter - outright deception [1].

The evidence suggests that in day to day life most lies are betrayed by factors or
circumstances surrounding the lie, and not by behavior [2]. However, there are



Article ID: SY07                                                                             Page 1
Technical article                      Wiley Handbook of Science and Technology for Homeland Security



times when demeanor is all a Homeland security agent has at his or her disposal
to detect someone who is lying about his or her current actions or future intent.
Because a lie involves a deliberate, conscious behavior, we can speculate that
this effort may leave some trace, sign, or signal that may betray that lie. What
interests the scientist, as well as society at large, is a) Are there clues perceptible
to the unaided eye that can reliably discriminate between liars and truth tellers; b)
Do these clues consistently predict deception across time, types of lies, different
situations, and cultures?; and if a) and b) are true, then c) How well can our
counter-terrorism professionals can make these judgments, and can they do this
in real time, with or without technological assistance?


Scientific overview ­ behavioral signs of deception.
To date no researcher has documented a "Pinocchio response;" that is, a
behavior or pattern of behaviors that in all people, across all situations, is specific
to deception (e.g., [3]). All the behaviors identified and examined by researchers
to date can occur for reasons unrelated to deception. Generally speaking, the
research on detecting lies from behavior suggests that two broad families of
behavioral clues are likely to occur when someone is lying - clues related to liars'
memory and thinking about what they are saying (cognitive clues), and clues
related to liar's feelings and feelings about deception (emotional clues) [3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8].

Cognitive clues.

A lie conceals, fabricates, or distorts information; this involves additional mental
effort. The liar must think harder than a truth teller to cover up, create events that
have not happened, or to describe events in a way to allow multiple
interpretations. Additional mental effort is not solely the domain of the outright
liar, however; a person who must tell an uncomfortable truth to another will also
engage in additional mental effort to come up with the proper phrasing while
simultaneously reducing the potential negative emotional reaction of the other.
This extra effort tends to manifest itself with longer speech latencies, increased
speech disturbances, less plausible content, less verbal and vocal involvement,
less talking time, more repeated words and phrases, and so forth [9]. Research
has also shown that some nonverbal behaviors change as a result of this mental
effort. For example, illustrators ­ hand or head movements that accompany
speech, and are considered by many to be a part of speech (e.g., [10]) ­ will
decrease when lying compared to telling the truth [11, 12].

Another way in which cognition is involved in telling a lie is through identification
of naturalistic memory characteristics. This means that experienced events have
memory qualities that are apparent upon description that are different from
events that have not been experienced (the "Undeutsch hypothesis" [13]).
Events that were not actually experienced feature more ambivalence, have fewer
details, a poorer logical structure, less plausiblity, more negative statements and


Article ID: SY07                                                                              Page 2
Technical article                      Wiley Handbook of Science and Technology for Homeland Security



are less embedded in context. Liars are also less likely to admit lack of memory,
and have less spontaneous corrections (reviewed by [8, 9]), and may use more
negative emotion words, and fewer self and other references [14]. Mental effort
clues seem to occur more in the delivery of the lie, whereas memory recall clues
tend to occur in the content of the lie.

We note that not all lies will tax mental effort; for example, it is much less
mentally taxing to answer a close ended question like "Did you pack your own
bags?" with a yes or no than to answer an open ended "What do you intend to do
on your trip?" Moreover, a clever liar can appear more persuasive if he or she
substitutes an actual experienced event as their alibi rather than creating an
entirely new event. This may be why a recent general review paper [9] found
consistent non-homogenous effect sizes for these mental effort and memory
based cues across the studies they reviewed, as the particular paradigms used
by researchers varied greatly in the extent to which the lies that were studied
mentally taxed the liars.

Emotional clues.

Lies can also generate emotions, ranging from the excitement and pleasure of
"pulling the wool over someone's eyes" to fear of getting caught to feelings of
guilt [4]. Darwin [15] first suggested that emotions tend to manifest themselves
in the facial expressions, as well as in the voice tones, and that these can be
reliable enough to accurately identify emotional states. Research has since
shown that for some expressions ­ e.g., anger, contempt, disgust, fear, happy,
sadness/distress, or surprise ­cultures throughout the planet recognize and
express these emotions in both the face and voice similarly [16]. To the extent
that a lie features higher stakes for getting caught, we would expect to see more
of these signs of emotion in liars compared to truth tellers. If the lie is a polite lie
that people tell often and effortlessly, there would be less emotion involved (e.g.,
[17]). Meta-analytic studies suggest that liars do appear more nervous than truth
tellers, with less facial pleasantness, higher vocal tension, higher vocal pitch,
greater pupil dilation and fidgeting [9]. If the lie itself is about emotions ­ e.g.,
telling someone that one feels calm, when in fact one is nervous ­ the research
shows that signs of the truly felt emotion appear in the face and voice despite
attempts to conceal, although these signs are often subtle and brief [18, 19].

Measurement issues.

One issue in measuring lie signs is to make clear what is meant by the terms
cognition and emotion. For example, in deception research the term arousal is
used interchangeably with emotion, but often refers to many different
phenomena: an orienting response (e.g., [20]), an expression of fear (e.g., [21]),
a more indeterminate affect somewhere between arousal and emotion (e.g., [22];
see also discussion by Waid & Orne [23]), as well as physiological states as
different as stress, anxiety, embarrassment and even anger [24].



Article ID: SY07                                                                              Page 3
Technical article                     Wiley Handbook of Science and Technology for Homeland Security




A second issue in measuring lie signs is to clarify the level of detail of
measurement as well as to specify why that level of detail may or may not
correlate with lying [25]. Many meta-analyses of behavioral deception clues
report insignificant effect sizes, but the variance among effect is not homogenous
(e.g., [3; 9, 26; 27; 28]). For example, some studies investigated behavior at the
most elemental physical units of measurement such as counting the movements
in the hands, feet, arms, legs, torso, eye movements, eye blinks, pupil dilation, lip
pressing, brow lowering or raising, lip corner puller (smiling), fundamental
frequency, amplitude, pauses, filled pauses, response latency, speech rate,
length of response, connector words, unique words, self-references, and so forth.
Other studies investigated behavior at the most elemental psychological meaning
units of measurement. Some of these included manipulators - which involve
touching, rubbing, etc., of various body parts ­ which could be composed of a
number of hand, finger, arm movements, but which were scored for theoretical
rather than merely descriptive reasons. Other psychologically meaningful units
of measurement include illustrators, which accompany speech to help keep the
rhythm of the speech, emphasize a word, show direction of thought, etc., or
emblems, which are gestures that have a speech equivalent, such as a head nod
meaning "yes", or a shrug meaning "I'm not sure", or facial emblems such as
winking. The psychological meaning units might also include vocal tension,
speech disturbances, negative statements, contextual embedding, unusual
details, logical structure, unexpected complications, superfluous details, self
doubt, and so forth. Finally, other studies investigated behavior at the most
interpretative/impressionistic unit level, which are further unarticulated
composites of the physical and the psychological meaning units described
earlier. Some of these behaviors impressionistic variables include fidgeting,
involvement, body animation, posture, facial pleasantness, expressiveness, vocal
immediacy and involvement; and spoken uncertainty; plausibility, cognitive
complexity (again, see review by [9]). The problem of course is that as one
moves from physical to impressionistic measures, it would seem become harder
to make those judgments reliably. This is not always the case though; e.g., the
term "smile" has rarely been defined in research reports, yet independent coders
are typically above .90 reliability when coding smiles (see [29] for a review).
Although research suggests that people can be more accurate when they employ
indirect inferences to deception (e.g., Does the person have to think hard? [30]),
`gut' impressions tend to be uncorrelated with accuracy [26]. This suggests that
we must be cautious about clues at the impressionistic level, and that it may be
more productive to study them at their psychological level where they might be
more meaningful to understanding deception.

Prognosis on generalizability of deception findings across time, lies, situations,
and cultures.

It is safe to conclude that although there are some clues that betray a lie at rates
greater than chance, none of them are exclusive to deception. This conclusion


Article ID: SY07                                                                             Page 4
Technical article                      Wiley Handbook of Science and Technology for Homeland Security



applies to machine based physiological approaches as well. However, the
origins of these signs ­ mental effort, memory, and emotion - are universal. This
suggests that if the context in which the information is gathered is controlled, and
designed to differentially affect liars and truth tellers, it would increase greatly the
chances of being able to distinguish people with deceptive intent from those with
truthful intent. Polygraph examination has done this by controlling their question
style to improve hit rates, but to date this has not been done systematically in
behavioral studies. Thus its effects are unknown, but we can speculate based
upon what we know about normal, truthful human behavior. If the lie is of no
significance to the person, with no costs for getting caught, and involves a simple
yes or no answer, odds are there will not be many clues to distinguish the liar
and the truth teller. If the situation has significance to the person, there are
consequences for getting caught, and the person is required to recount an event
in an open ended question, then we would expect more clues to surface that
would distinguish the liar from the truth teller. This may be a curvilinear
relationship; a situation of extraordinary high mental effort and emotion - e.g.,
one in which a person is being beaten, screamed at, and threatened with
execution - will generate all the "lie clues" described earlier, but equally in liar and
truth teller. Nonetheless, information about mental effort, experienced memory,
and emotion can be very useful clues to Homeland Security personnel to identify
behavioral "hot spots" [4] that can provide information about issues of importance
to the subject. A counter-terrorism Intelligence officer who knows when a subject
is feeling an emotion or thinking hard can know what topics to pursue or avoid in
an interview, whether the subject is fabricating, concealing information, or merely
feeling uncomfortable with the topic, although truthful.

Scientific overview ­ abilities to spot liars.

Research over the past 30 years suggests that the average person is slightly
statistically better than chance at identifying deception, but not practically better.
The most recent review of over 100 studies has shown that when chance
accuracy is 50%, the average person is approximately 54% accurate [31].
There are a number of reasons for this poor ability; among them poor feedback in
daily life (i.e, a person only knows about the lies they have caught); the general
tendency for people to believe others until proven otherwise (ie, a `truth bias';
[32]), and especially a faulty understanding of what liars actually look like (ie, the
difference between people's perceived clues to lying compared to the actual
clues; [26]).

General abilities of specialized groups.
Most of the studies reviewed were laboratory based and involved observers
judging strangers. But similar results are found even when the liars and truth
tellers are known to the observers (also reviewed by [31]. If the lies being told
are low stakes, so that little emotion is aroused and the lie can be told without
much extra cognitive effort, there may be few clues available on which to base a


Article ID: SY07                                                                              Page 5
Technical article                    Wiley Handbook of Science and Technology for Homeland Security



judgment. But even studies of high stakes lies, in which both liars and truth
tellers are highly motivated to be successful, suggest an accuracy level that is
not much different than chance.

Research that examined unselected professionals involved in security settings ­
police, federal agents, and so forth ­ have typically found that they too are not
any more accurate in their abilities to spot deception than laypeople (e.g., [27,
33, 34, 35, 36]). However, within these studies there have been a handful of
groups that have performed better than 60% accurate on both lies and truths,
and what these groups are doing might be informative for Homeland Security
applications. The first group identified was a group of Secret Service agents who
not only were superior, as a group, in detecting lies about one's emotions, but
those who were more accurate were more likely to report using nonverbal clues
than those who were less accurate. The authors [33] speculated that the Secret
Service agents were more accurate than the other groups because they were
trained in scanning crowds for nonverbal behaviors that did not fit, and they also
dealt with assassination threats, many of which were made by mentally ill
individuals. Unlike most police officers whose assumption of guilt in suspects is
high [37], reflecting the experience of their daily work, Secret Service agents
interviewed suspects where they knew the base rate of true death threats was
low. The second set of groups identified included forensic psychologists, federal
judges, selected federal law enforcement officers and a group of sheriffs [34]. A
commonality among these groups seemed to be their very high motivation to
improve their lie detecting skills. A third set of groups identified were police
officers examining real life lies, who showed 65% overall accuracy in detecting
lies and truths [38].

Individual differences.
As with any ability, research suggests that some people are better able to detect
deception that others in high stake lies (e.g., [39]); this skill does not seem to
translate to lower stake lies [32]. One element of better skill in higher stake
settings is the ability to judge micro-momentary displays of emotion [33, 39].
Other groups who showed better than 60% accuracy included people with left
hemisphere brain lesions that prevented them from comprehending speech [40],
and those subjects who scored higher on a test of knowledge of clues to deceit
were also more accurate than those who did not [41]. A different approach has
been to identify individuals who obtain high scores on lie detection tests and
studying them in detail [42]. After testing more than 12,000 people using a
sequential testing protocol involving three different lie detection accuracy
measures, O'Sullivan and Ekman identified 29 highly accurate individuals.
These individuals had a kind of genius with respect to the observation of verbal
and nonverbal clues, but since genius often connotes academic intelligence, the
expert lie detectors were labeled "truth wizards" to suggest their special talent.
Although this term is unfortunate in mistakenly suggesting that their abilities are
due to magic rather than talent and practice, the term does reflect the rarity of
their abilities. One of the first findings of the Wizard Project was a profession


Article ID: SY07                                                                            Page 6
Technical article                     Wiley Handbook of Science and Technology for Homeland Security



specific sensitivity to certain kinds of lies. About 1/3 of the wizards were highly
accurate on all three of the tests used. Another third did very well on two of the
tests, but not on the third, in which people lied or told the truth about whether
they had stolen money. Nearly all of these wizards were therapists who had
little, if any, experience with lies about crime. On the other hand, the remaining
third of the wizards were law enforcement personnel ­ police and lawyers ­ who
did very well on the crime lie detection test, but not on a test in which people lied
or told the truth about their feelings. Compared with a matched control group,
expert lie detectors are more likely than controls to attend to a wide array of
nonverbal behaviors and to be more consciously aware of inconsistencies
between verbal and non-behaviors. Although expert lie detectors make almost
instantaneous judgments about the kind of person they are observing, they are
also more cautious than controls about reaching a final decision about
truthfulness.

Critical needs analysis.

Research on human behavior and deception detection can make a useful
contribution to Homeland Security needs as long as scientists and practitioners
understand what it is they are observing ­signs of thinking, signs of feeling. This
rule applies to automated approaches that measure physiology as well. Even
with this limitation, training in behavioral hot spot recognition may make security
personnel better at spotting those with malfeasant intent. Other critical needs
include:

More relevant laboratory paradigms and subjects.
We must recognize that general meta-analyses of the research literature,
although useful, are limited in their applicability to security contexts, since such
analyses tend to combine studies that feature lies told with few stakes and
cognitive demands with those with higher stakes and stronger cognitive
demands. Thus, we should be more selective about which studies to examine
for clues that may be useful or relevant to security contexts. This also means it is
important for scientists to develop research paradigms that more closely mirror
the real life contexts in which security personnel work. Although laboratory
settings are not as powerful as real world settings, high stake laboratory
deception situations can provide insights with the best chance of applicability.
Consistent with this approach, two current airport security techniques capitalize
on behaviors identified by research studies on stress, with anecdotal success (ie,
TSA's Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques and the MA State
Police Behavioral Assessment System). One way to facilitate this type of
progress is to have Homeland Security personnel advise laboratory research, as
well as allow researchers to spend on-the-job time with Security personnel. We
believe pairing the researchers and practitioners would eventually result in calls
for laboratory studies featuring higher stakes to the liars, different subject
populations beyond US/Europeans (as research suggests that people can detect


Article ID: SY07                                                                             Page 7
Technical article                     Wiley Handbook of Science and Technology for Homeland Security



deception in other cultures at rates greater than chance; [43, 44]), and differing
interview lengths such as examining shorter interviews (i.e, a 30-90 second
security screening) and longer interviews (i.e., a 1-4 hour intelligence interview).

Examination and creation of real world databases.
There have been very few studies of real world deception (e.g., [38]), yet the
technological capability exists to create many more. The biggest problem with
real world data is determining the ground truth (was the person really lying, or did
they truly believe what they just stated?). Estimating ground truth ­ as compared
to knowing ground truth ­ will slow down the identification of any patterns or
systems. Clear criteria must be established a priori to determine this ground
truth. For example, confessions of malfeasance are a good criterion, but false
confessions do happen. Catching someone with contraband (i.e., a `hit') is also
a good criterion, but occasionally the person may be truthful when he or she
states that someone must have snuck it into their luggage. Moreover, academics
should advise on the capture and recording of these databases, to insure that the
materials are able to be examined by the widest number of researchers and
research approaches. For example, most of the police interview video we have
seen is of such poor quality that we cannot analyze facial expressions in any
detail. It is only when these databases are combined with the laboratory work
that we can more sharply identify behaviors or behavioral patterns that will
increase the chances of catching those with malfeasant intent. To optimally use
this information though, we must also examine in detail known cases of false
negatives and false positives as well as correct hits to determine why mistakes
were made in these judgments.

Ground truth baserates.
Security personnel do not know is the base rates for malfeasance in their
settings. Although it may be logistically impossible to hand search every piece of
hand luggage in a busy airport, or follow every investigative lead, it would be
essential to know this base rate in order to ascertain the effectiveness of any new
behavioral observational technique. This would also permit more useful cost-
benefit analyses of various levels of security and training. A less satisfying but
still useful way to ascertain effectiveness is to compare hit rates for contraband
for those using various behavioral observation techniques with those who are
stopped randomly (as long as the day of the week and time of the day/year are
scientifically controlled).

Optimizing Training.
The most recent meta-analysis of the research literature on training people to
improve deception detection from behavior has shown that across over 2,000
subjects, there was a modest effect for training, despite the use of substandard
training techniques [45]. This obviously suggests that better training techniques
will yield larger improvements in people's abilities to sort out truth from lie. One



Article ID: SY07                                                                             Page 8
Technical article                      Wiley Handbook of Science and Technology for Homeland Security



training change would be to train on behavioral clues that are derived from
similar situations and supported by research. For example, one study trained
research subjects to recognize a set of behavioral clues that are believed to be
indicative of deception, and are often taught to law enforcement personnel as
signs of deception, although many of these signs are not supported by the
scientific literature [46]. This study reported a 10% decrease in accuracy for the
groups receiving such training. Therefore, the first step in adequate training is to
identify what information is useful for training (see above). The second step is to
determine the most effective way to deliver that information. For example, what is
the training duration that maximizes comprehension ­ one full day, 3 full days, or
more? Should it be done in a group or self study? Does it need simple repetition,
or more creative approaches, and how many training items are needed? Does it
need to be reinforced at particular intervals? How many clues should be taught ­
i.e., at what point do you overwhelm trainees? How do you train in such as way
as to improve accuracy without over inflating confidence? These are just a few
of the questions with unknown answers.

Identifying Excellence.
Another critical need is to identify who within relevant organizations shows signs
of excellence, through their higher hit rates or whatever other clear criteria can be
applied. This strategy is similar to the strategy of the "wizards" study [42]. One
caution is that to date, most testing material will be laboratory experiment based,
and the generalizability of that information to real world contexts is not perfect.
An examination of the convergent validity of laboratory tests of deception
detection and other more naturalistic approach measures (peer ratings , field
observations in airports or other points of entry with accuracy determined by the
rate of contraband "hits" by individuals compared to random selection) would be
a great start.

Future research directions.

The aforementioned critical needs suggest several research questions, but by no
means is that section comprehensive. As we peer into the future, there is much
work to do. A partial list of future directions suggests we should:

     ·    Examine the role of technology in facilitating behavioral observation. A
          number of computer vision algorithms are now available that can aid
          observation, such as recognizing emotional expressions in the face (e.g.,
          [47]). What is unknown is how robust these algorithms are in real world
          contexts. What is also unknown is how best to combine technological
          observation of behavior with human judgment. Would there be a tendency
          for humans to over rely upon the technology over time?
     ·    Identify the optimal environmental set up for surveillance, whether with
          technology or the unaided eye. This includes proxemic placement of



Article ID: SY07                                                                              Page 9
Technical article                          Wiley Handbook of Science and Technology for Homeland Security



          tables, lines, stanchions, other individuals, and so forth. One goal would
          be to create an environment that would reduce the typical stress felt by the
          normal traveler, which would hopefully increase the salience of any sign of
          stress exhibited by the malfeasant to increase the chances it can be
          observed.
     ·    Identify optimal interaction style between security agents and the public.
          One can aggressively question and threaten travelers, but that might
          render behavioral observation useless due to the overall stress
          engendered. A rapport building approach (e.g., [48]) might be better, but
          this needs more research.
     ·    Identify the optimal interview style. Phrasing of questions is important in
          obtaining information, but this has not been researched in the open
          literature. Small changes in phrasing ­ e.g., open versus close ended -
          might add to the additional cognitive burden of the liar and thus could be
          useful. The order of questions will also be important, as well whether one
          should make a direct accusation. But only additional research will tell.
     ·    Identify the optimal way to combine behavioral clues. Research tends to
          examine individual behavioral clues to ascertain their effectiveness, yet
          more modern neural network and machine learning approaches may be
          successful in identifying patterns and combinations of behaviors that
          better predict deception in particular contexts.
     ·    Identify the presence of countermeasures. An inevitable side effect of the
          release of any information about what behaviors are being examined by
          security officers to identify riskier individuals in security settings is that this
          information will find its way onto the internet or other public forum. This
          means a potential terrorist can learn what to do and what not to do in
          order to escape further scrutiny. The problem is that we don't know yet
          whether one can conceal all their behaviors in these real life contexts.
          Moreover, some of these behaviors, like emotional behavior, is more
          involuntary [16] and should be harder to conceal that more voluntary
          behavior like word choice. Thus it remains an open question as to whether
          a potential terrorist can countermeasure all of the critical behaviors.

Space limitations preclude an exhaustive list of needs, future directions, and
research. In general, the research suggests that there are limited clues that are
useful to sorting out liars and truth tellers, but most people cannot spot them.
However, a closer examination of this literature suggests that some behavioral
clues can be useful to security personnel, and some people can spot these clues
well. We feel that it may be ultimately most productive to expand our thinking
about behavioral clues to deceit to include thinking about behavioral clues to a
person's reality ­ clues that someone is recounting a true memory, is thinking
hard, or is having an emotion they wish to hide. This would enable a security
officer to make the most accurate inference about the inner state of the person
they are observing, which, when combined with better interaction and
interviewing techniques, would enable them to better infer the real reasons for
this inner state, be it intending us harm, telling a lie, or telling the truth.


Article ID: SY07                                                                                 Page 10
Technical article                   Wiley Handbook of Science and Technology for Homeland Security




References
1. Haugaard, J. J. & Repucci, N. D. (1992). Children and the truth. In S. J. Ceci,
        M. DeSimone-Leichtman, and M.E. Putnick (Eds) Cognitive and social
        factors in early deception. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
2. Park, H.S., Levine, T. R., McCornack, S. A., Morrison, K., & Ferrar, M. (2002).
        How people really detect lies. Communication Monographs, 69, 144-157.
3. Zuckerman, M., DePaulo, B. M., & Rosenthal, R. (1981). Verbal and
        nonverbal communication of deception. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.) Advances in
        experimental social psychology. Vol 14, (pp. 1-59). San Diego, CA:
        Academic Press.
4. Ekman, P. (1985/2001). Telling lies. New York: Norton.
5. Ekman, P., & Frank, M. G. (1993). Lies that fail. In M. Lewis & C. Saarni
        (Eds.) Lying and deception in everyday life. (pp 184-200). New York:
        Guilford Press.
6. Hocking, J. E., & Leathers, D. G. (1980). Nonverbal indicators of deception: A
        new theoretical perspective. Communication monographs, 47, 119-131.
7. Knapp, M. L., & Comadena, M. E. (1979). Telling it like it isn't: A review of
        theory and research on deceptive communication. Human Communication
        Research, 5, 270-285.
8. Yuille, J. C. (Ed.) (1989). Credibility Assessment. Dordrecht, Netherlands:
        Kluwer
9. DePaulo, B. M., Lindsay, J. J., Malone, B. E., Muhlenbruck, L., Charlton, K., &
        Cooper, H. (2003). Cues to deception. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 74-
        112.
10. McNeill, D. (1992). Hand and Mind. What Gestures Reveal about Thought.
        Chicago: Chicago University. Press.
11. Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1972). Hand movements. Journal of
        Communication, 22, 353-374.
12. Vrij, A. (1995). Behavioral correlates of deception in a simulated police
        interview. The Journal of Psychology, 129, 15-28.
13. Undeutsch, U. (1967). Beurteilung der Glaubhaftigkeit von Aussagen. In U.
        Undeutsch (Ed.), Handbuch derPsychologie. Bd. II: Forensische
        Psychologie (pp. 26-181 ). Goettingen, Verlag fur Psychologie.
14. Newman, M. L, Pennebaker, J. W., Berry, D. S., & Richards, J. M. (2003).
        Lying Words: Predicting Deception From Linguistic Styles. Personality
        and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 665-675.
15. Darwin, C. (1872/1998). The expression of the emotions in man and animals.
        New York: Oxford. (3rd Edition, w/ commentaries by Paul Ekman).
16. Ekman, P. (2003). Emotions revealed. New York: Henry Holt.
17. DePaulo, B. M., Kashy, D. A., Kirkendol, S.E., Wyer, M. M., & Epstein, J.A.
        (1996). Lying in everyday life. Journal of Personality and Social
        Psychology, 70, 979-995.
18. Ekman, P., Friesen, W. V., & O'Sullivan, M. (1988). Smiles when lying.
        Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 414-420.


Article ID: SY07                                                                          Page 11
Technical article                    Wiley Handbook of Science and Technology for Homeland Security



19. Ekman, P., O'Sullivan, M., Friesen, W. V., & Scherer, K. (1991). Invited
       article: Face, voice, and body in detecting deceit. Journal of Nonverbal
       Behavior, 15, 125-135.
20. deTurck, M. A., & Miller, G. R. (1985). Deception and arousal: Isolating the
       behavioral correlates of deception. Human Communication Research, 12,
       181-201.
21. Frank, M. G. (1989). Human lie detection ability as a function of the liar's
       motivation. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Cornell University, Ithaca,
       NY.
22. Burgoon, J. E., & Buller, D. B. (1994). Interpersonal deception: III. Effects of
       deceit on perceived communication and nonverbal behavior dynamics.
       Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 18, 155-184
23. Waid, W. M., & Orne, M. T. (1982). The physiological detection of deception.
       American Scientist, 70, 402-409.
24. Steinbrook, R.(1992). The polygraph test: A flawed diagnostic method. New
       England Journal of Medicine, 327, 122-123.
25. Frank, M. G. (2005). Research methods in detecting deception research. In
       J. Harrigan, K. Scherer, & R. Rosenthal (Eds.). Handbook of Nonverbal
       Behavior Research. London: Oxford. (pp 341-368).
26. DePaulo, B.M., Stone, J., & Lassiter, D. (1985). Deceiving and detecting
       deceit. In B. R. Schlenker (Ed.) The self and social life. (pp.323-355).
27. Vrij, A. (2000). Detecting lies and deceit: The psychology of lying and the
       implications for professional practice. Chichester: John Wiley.
28. Zuckerman, M. & Driver, R. E. (1985). Telling lies: Verbal and nonverbal
       correlates of deception. In W. A. Siegman & S. Feldstein (Eds.)
       Multichannel integration of nonverbal behavior. (pp. 129-147). Hillsdale,
       NJ: Erlbaum.
29. Frank, M.G. (2003). Smiles, lies, and emotion. In M. Abel (Ed). The smile:
       Forms, functions, and consequences. New York: The Edwin Mellen Press.
       (pp 15-43).
30. Vrij A.; Edward K.; & Bull R. (2001). Police officers' ability to detect deceit:
       The benefit of indirect deception detection measures. Legal and
       Criminological Psychology, 6, 185-196
31. Bond, C.F, Jr., & DePaulo, B. M. (2006). Accuracy of deception judgments.
       Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10, 214-234.
32. DePaulo, B. M., & Rosenthal, R. (1979). Telling lies. Journal of Personality
       and Social Psychology, 37, 1713-1722.
33. Ekman, P., & O'Sullivan, M. (1991). Who can catch a liar? American
       Psychologist, 46, 913-920.
34. Ekman, P., O'Sullivan, M., & Frank, M.G. (1999). A few can catch a liar.
       Psychological Science, 10, 263-266
35. DePaulo, B.M., & Pfeifer, R.L. (1986). On-the-job experience and skill at
       detecting deception. Journal of Applied Social Psychology , 16 , 249-267.
36. Kraut, R. E., & Poe, D. (1980). Behavioral roots of person perception: The
       deception judgments of customs inspectors and laymen. Journal of
       Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 784-798.



Article ID: SY07                                                                           Page 12
Technical article                     Wiley Handbook of Science and Technology for Homeland Security



37. Meissner, C. A. & Kassin, S. M. (2002). :"He's guilty!": Investigator bias in
       judgments of truth and deception. Law and Human Behavior, 26, 469-
       480.
38. Mann, S., Vrij, A., & Bull, R. (2004). Detecting true lies: Police officers'
       abilities to detect suspects' lies. Journal of Applied Psychology, 89, 137-
       149.
39. Frank, M. G., & Ekman, P. (1997). The ability to detect deceit generalizes
       across different types of high stake lies. Journal of Personality and Social
       Psychology, 72, 1429-1439.
40. Etcoff, N.L., Ekman, P., Magee, J.J., & Frank, M.G. (2000). Superior lie
       detection associated with language loss. Nature; 405 (11 May), 139-139.
41. Forrest, J.A., Feldman, R. S., & Tyler, J. M. (2004). When accurate beliefs
       lead to better lie detection. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 34, 764-
       780.
42. O'Sullivan, M.,& Ekman, P. (2004). The wizards of deception detection. In
       Granhag, P.A.,& Stromwell, L. (Eds.),The Detection of Deception in
       Forensic Contexts (pp. 269­286). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
       University Press.
43. Bond, C. F. Jr; Atoum, A. O. (2000). International deception. Personality &
       Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 385-395
44. Bond, C. F; Omar, A; Mahmoud, A; & Bonser, R.N. (1990). Lie detection
       across cultures. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 14, 189-204.
45. Frank, M.G., & Feeley, T.H. (2003). To catch a liar: Challenges for research
       in lie detection training. Journal of Applied Communication Research,
       31, 58-75.
46. Kassin, S.M; & Fong, C.T. (1999). "I'm innocent!": Effects of training on
       judgments of truth and deception in the interrogation room. Law & Human
       Behavior, 23, 499-516.
47. Bartlett, M. S., Littlewort, G., Frank, M. G., Lainscsek, C., Fasel, I., &
       Movellan, J. (2006). Fully automatic facial action recognition in
       spontaneous behavior. Journal of Multimedia, 6, 22-35.
48. Collins, R., Lincoln, R., & Frank, M.G. (2002). The effect of rapport in
       forensic interviewing. Psychiatry, Psychology, & Law, 9, 69-78.

Further reading list
Enter your "Further Reading" list here. This section will contain additional
recommended readings (books, articles, websites, etc.) that are not included in
the reference section. For some articles, this section may include references for
specific techniques or protocols; for others, a listing of book chapters that provide
general information on the topic may be sufficient. References in the reading list
are not numbered, but otherwise should follow the style outlined for the
References section.
Cross-references
See: Social and psychological aspects;
Terrorism risk: characteristics and features;


Article ID: SY07                                                                            Page 13
Technical article                 Wiley Handbook of Science and Technology for Homeland Security



Deterrence;
Physical security; models and countermeasures

Glossary terms
Malfeasance
Hot Spots
Micro Expression
Content Based Criteria Analysis
Demeanor
Pinocchio response
Meta-Analysis




Article ID: SY07                                                                        Page 14