This is a close-to-final draft of a paper that appeared in Utilitas,…

This is a close-to-final draft of a paper that appeared in Utilitas, April 1998. For
citations, please refer to the published article.


                      The Worm at the Root of the Passions:
                    Poetry and Sympathy in Mill's Utilitarianism

                                       L. A. PAUL
                                   Princeton University


Then sing, ye Birds, sing, sing a joyous song!
      And let the young Lambs bound
      As to the tabor's sound!
We in thought will join your throng,
      Ye that pipe and Ye that play,
      Ye that through your hearts to-day
      Feel the gladness of the May!
What though the radiance which was once
      so bright
Be now for ever taken from my sight,
      Though nothing can bring back the hour
Of splendour in the grass, of glory in the flower;
      We will grieve not, rather find
      Strength in what remains behind;
      In the primal sympathy
      Which having been must ever be;
      In the soothing thoughts that spring
      Out of human suffering;
      In the faith that looks through death,
In years that bring the philosophic mind.
                                  -Wordsworth1




During a period of severe depression in his twenties, John Stuart Mill was greatly

affected by the poetry of Wordsworth. Mill was in the midst of a personal crisis, a crisis

in which he had come to doubt all that he had been taught and feared that he had

discovered an insurmountable difficulty with the Benthamite philosophy upon which he

had been reared.


1
        This state [of depression] of my thoughts and feelings made the fact of

        my reading Wordsworth for the first time... an important event in my

        life. ...I found that he too had had similar experience to mine; that he

        also had felt that the first freshness of youthful enjoyment of life was not

        lasting; but that he had sought for compensation, in the way that he was

        now teaching me to find it.2



Mill's crisis arose from his realization that he could no longer associate pleasure and the

attainment of great happiness with the creation of a utilitarian society. He believed that

the cause of this problem was that his education had rigorously trained his intellect but

had underdeveloped his capacity for feeling.

        For Mill, the realm of the intellect and the realm of the feelings are separate. The

realm of the feelings is based upon arbitrary associations with objects, created as the

result of conditioning in education and experience. Feelings of pleasure and pain are

caused as the result of these associations. Thus, `...there must always be something

artificial and casual in associations thus produced. The pains and pleasures thus forcibly

associated with things, are not connected with them by any natural tie....'3 The problem

was that the principle quality of a well-developed intellect is to discover which

connections in nature are real and which are mere products of human prejudice and

whim, and to dissolve or analyze away the latter. Such a quality was invaluable when it

came to analyzing the world and tendencies in nature, but a side effect was that the

intellect would also tend to dissolve the artificial bonds that connected the motivating

associations of pleasure with the pursuit of utilitarian goals.

        When Mill realized that he no longer associated pleasure with the creation of a

utilitarian society, he fell into a great depression, fearing that he had discovered an

insurmountable difficulty with the Benthamite precept that agents should pursue

maximum happiness, since this pursuit would be foiled by the intellects of well-educated

2
and clear-sighted agents.4 But when Mill discovered that he could still experience

pleasure and pain by reading poetry, his depression was lifted, and he began to place

new importance upon the development of what he called the `internal culture of the

individual'. The effect on Mill extended beyond his personal habits; as a result of his

experience, he constructed a new theory which incorporated his insights into a theory of

the importance of poetic or aesthetic education to the basic structure of the utilitarian

state.5 Mill's new theory was that the development of the `internal culture of the

individual' was extremely important to the successful creation of a utilitarian society, and

that the education of members of society should involve aesthetic cultivation as well as

intellectual training.6

         Mill's views on poetry and their connection to his utilitarianism need to be

explicated, for there is a tension between Mill's associationist psychology and his

utilitarian project: if the members of society are to be educated, then this education will

work directly against the `motivating association' that links the feeling of pleasure with

the creation of a utilitarian society. The well-developed intellects of members of society

will discover and dissolve the association between pleasure and utilitarianism, which

means that those members will no longer be motivated to pursue utilitarian goals. Mill

needs a way to resolve this dilemma, for if educated members of society cannot be

motivated to promote (to desire) a utilitarian society, then his social agenda cannot be

realized.7



                                     I. SYMPATHY

Before we delve into Mill's theory of poetry, it would be well to be as clear as possible

about the notion of sympathy that Mill relies upon in his writings. Like his father, Mill

accepted the psychology of associations of ideas. For Mill, the notion of sympathy is

connected with the important role that pleasures and pains play in utilitarianism.



3
Sympathy involves the ability to understand the pleasures and pains of another by

somehow taking on those pleasures or pains as one's own.



        ...[I]t is well known that the pains and pleasures of another person

        affect us; that is, associate with themselves the ideas of our own pains

        and pleasures, with more or less intensity, according to the attention

        which we bestow upon his pains and pleasures. A parent is commonly

        either led or impelled to bestow an unusual degree of attention upon the

        pains and pleasures of his child; and hence a habit is contracted of

        sympathizing with him, as it is commonly, and not insignificantly named;

        in other words, a facility of associating the ideas of his own pains and

        pleasures, with those of the child.8



        When we exhibit sympathy towards another person, we understand their pains

and pleasures by taking on these emotions ourselves. When someone to whom we are

sympathetic (in Mill's sense of the word) experiences pain as the result of, say censure,

we feel pain also, by imagining ourselves receiving the same censure, which results in

our imagining ourselves to be in the same sort of pain as that person.



        The vivacity and sympathy of the expressions of the pains and pleasures

        of children, in their looks, and tones, and attitudes, as well as words,

        give them a particular power of exciting sympathy, that is, of associating

        with them trains [sequences of associated ideas] of the analogous

        feelings of ourselves.9,10




4
Sympathy with another results in a feeling of pleasure `in association with the other as

feeling pleasure' when the other person feels pleasure, and in feeling pain when she feels

pain.11,12

         Sympathy with others in virtue of our understanding of their pain and pleasure

plays a significant part in Mill's ethical and political theory, for sympathy is part of the

foundation for the moral feelings that are supposed to motivate agents to maximize the

greatest happiness, or pleasure, for all. 13 With this in mind, we are now prepared to

understand Mill's aesthetic theory in the appropriate context.



                           II. MILL'S THEORY OF POETRY

For Mill, the poet characterizes experiences, objects and states of mind in terms of his

own feelings, in such a way that those feelings are communicated to whoever reads the

poem. What Mill calls poetry is a special aspect of art (which may be found in other art

forms such as literature, painting and sculpture) that expresses human feelings.14 `All art,

therefore, in proportion as it produces its effects by an appeal to the emotions partakes

of poetry, unless it partakes of oratory, or of narrative.'15,16 Although Mill focuses on

written work of the sort that we would normally define as poetry, Mill's term `poetry'

can refer to any art form that appeals to feeling: what we normally call poetry often

involves such an appeal, but other art forms that appeal to feelings are also covered.17

The best poet (i.e., creator of poetry in the wide sense) is one who best understands

and communicates his own feelings.

         Mill defines poetry as the `representation of feeling' or the `delineation of states

of feeling'.18 A written discourse is poetry when `the feeling... becomes itself the

originator of another train of association, which expels or blends with the former'.19

Poets are able to express their emotions in poetry because they are those who `are so

constituted, that emotions are the links of association by which their ideas, both



5
sensuous and spiritual, are tied together'.20 Further, those with truly poetical natures,

such as Shelley,



        really feel more, and consequently have more feeling to express; but

        because, the capacity of feeling being so great, feeling, when excited

        and not voluntarily resisted, seizes the helm of their thoughts, and the

        succession of ideas and images becomes the mere utterance of an

        emotion; not, as in other natures, the emotion a mere ornamental

        colouring of thought.21



Thus, the expression of feeling is the very essence of poetry. Poets are those who feel

more strongly than others and also understand the world through their feelings; they

have strong emotional associations that connect their ideas and can represent feelings in

a unique way. For Mill, poetry conveys the essence of feeling more strongly than any

other vehicle of expression.

        In addition to the expression of the poet's feelings, poetry (if effective) inspires

feelings in those who read it.22 Poetry, as the pure expression of feeling, is expressed

without regard to its influence upon others.23 However, the value of poetry for the

reader, as Mill discovered when he read Wordsworth, is that it does influence others,

in that it inspires and awakens feelings in the reader.24,25 The poet describes an

experience in a special emotion-oriented way (since for the poet, the experience is

entwined with the emotion that is connected to the experience), and this description

allows the reader to understand the ideas of these emotions as the poet experienced

them. John Robson argues that, for Mill, the poet



        has a unique method of mental association--between ideas, and

        between idea and sensation, the link is emotional.... The natural poet,

6
        untrained in mind but strong in feeling, is [different from the non-poet]: in

        him sensations call up emotions immediately, so that the ideas

        connected to the sensations are welded to the ideas connected to the

        emotions... [the poet] throws off a series of images connected

        emotionally with the sensation.26



Robson argues further that Mill makes the case that the portrayal of human nature given

by the poet is essential, for such a portrayal is inaccessible using `mere observation'.27

        If the reader is a normal person, feelings of pain expressed by the poet will

cause the reader to feel pain by sensing the pain of the poet, and feelings of pleasure will

cause the reader to feel pleasure by sensing the pleasure of the poet.28 Thus, the reader

may feel pleasure when reading poetry which expresses pleasurable feelings such as

love or the experience of beauty, and may feel pain when the poet expresses his feelings

of anguish and loss. Although there are doubtless other ways of understanding the

emotions of others, the medium in which the communication of feelings is cultivated in

our society is the medium of poetry; the main object of poetry is to show the feelings of

the poet as deeply and honestly as possible in order to allow the reader to partake of

the poet's emotional states.



        There is no generic distinction between the imagery which is the expression of

        feeling and the imagery which is felt to harmonize with feeling. They are

        identical. The imagery in which feeling utters itself forth from within, is also that

        in which it delights when presented to it from without.29



More explicitly:




7
        For it is through these thoughts and images [of the poet's, which must

        be `given up to a state of feeling'] that the feeling speaks, and through

        their impressiveness that it impresses itself, and finds response in other

        hearts....30



Not only is poetry the most effective way to express feelings; as a result of its

effectiveness it is the best way to inspire feelings in others.

        This ability of poetry to stimulate others to actually experience a feeling

associated with the poet's feelings is important. Throughout his works, Mill argues that

one of the best ways for an individual to actively or truly understand an idea is to have

personal experience with it. He makes this point clear in On Liberty, where he

emphasizes the need for debate and discussion of alternative points of view, instead of a

dogmatic presentation of the received view, and when he discusses the need for

experiences in order to understand the full meaning of truths.31



        The great instrument of improvement in men is to supply them with the

        other half of the truth, one side of which they have ever seen; to turn

        them the white side of the shield, of which they, seeing only the black,

        prove that the shield is black. It is not considered sufficient by many

        zealots, for even right opinions, that you have done little or nothing for a

        man, when you have merely given him an opinion. An opinion suggests

        hardly anything to an uninformed mind; it may become a watchword,

        but can never be a moving and influencing and living principle within

        him. Words, or anything which can be stated in words, benefit none but

        those minds to whom the words suggest an ample store of correct and

        clear ideas, and sound and accurate knowledge, previously acquired,

        concerning the things which are meant by the words.32

8
        Poetry is special, for it enables us to sense, in a particularly intimate fashion, the

feelings and experiences of another, and thus to share the idea of pleasure of or pain in

another mind. In this way, poetry allows us to see the world through the mind of the

poet, and gives us an intimate connection to his mind. `Poetry is feeling confessing itself

to itself, in moments of solitude, and bodying itself forth in symbols which are the nearest

possible representations of the feeling in the exact shape in which it exists in the poet's

mind.'33 When we read the poet's expressions of joy and despair, we are presented

with the ideas of emotion in the mind of the poet, `in association with the other person

as feeling them'.34,35



        The imagination... [is] that which enables us, by a voluntary effort, to

        conceive the absent as if it were present, the imaginary as if it were real;

        and to clothe it in the feelings, which, if it were indeed real, it would

        bring along with it. This is the power by which one human being enters

        into the mind and circumstances of another. This power constitutes the

        poet, in so far as he does anything but melodiously utter his own

        feelings....36,37



Thus, for Mill, poetry is the a particularly effective medium for the expression and

communication of feeling, because of the way it gives us an intimate experience of

others' feelings.

        We need to develop the capacity to empathize with the emotions of others in

order to understand the ideas and viewpoints of other people, since the experience of

understanding the ideas of another plays a central role in our understanding of the

pleasures and pains of that person. It is the ability to have empathy with others about



9
experiences and feelings that others have had that that allows us to broaden our minds

and develop a fuller understanding of human nature.38



        Without [the power to enter into the mind and circumstances of

        another], nobody knows even his own nature, further than

        circumstances have actually tried it, and called it out; nor the nature of

        his fellow-creatures, beyond such generalizations as he may have been

        able to make from his observations of their outward conduct.39




                                  III. ASSOCIATIONS

To fully understand the importance of poetry for Mill, we must examine Mill's

psychological theory of associations and the problem of the intellect. For Mill, good and

bad moral feelings are the products of associations which have been created through

experience or education. Thus, we desire a thing, action or type of contemplation if we

associate pleasurable ideas with it, and avoid it if we associate it with painful ideas. The

associations are formed artificially by the repeated correlation of pleasurable and painful

experiences with the object, action or contemplation; eventually, as the result of these

correlations, the individual's mind creates associations which cause the corresponding

feelings of desire or aversion upon presentation or suggestion of the objects (or actions,

etc.) The right sort of education would encourage the association of pleasurable ideas

with actions or things that would benefit humanity, so that the student would desire the

right things, and encourage the association of painful ideas with whatever was

detrimental, so that the student would not desire the wrong things.40

        Now, agents with keen intellects and clear perspectives are necessary to foster

good government, intellectual advance, and a just society. To foster such a society,

these agents must have moral associations that cause them to desire `all things beneficial

10
to the great whole, and of pain with all things hurtful to it'.41 This is especially the case

for utilitarian agents, as the basis of the utilitarian morality is that sympathy with human

beings, or the desire for the good of humankind, should be the primary objective in

order to maximize the pleasure of all. A good education must also encourage the

development of the intellect, so that the student would be prudent, clear-sighted, and

equipped to bring about the beneficial ends that her education had designed her to

desire.42

        However, to the young Mill, it was this necessary combination of the

development of the intellect and the cultivation of moral associations that seemed to be

on a direct collision course. Mill feared that the development of the intellect subverted

the moral associations that were so necessary to foster the utilitarian goals, since the

intellect would `fearfully undermine all desires, and all pleasures, which are the effects of

association, that is, according to the theory I held, all except the purely physical and

organic'.43 Thus, an educated person could not help but realize that her desire for a

particular goal was merely the product of an association that was not `natural', i.e.,

`physical' or `organic'. This was especially true for the sorts of associations created

simply by using praise and blame, e.g., of the sort instilled by parents in young children.

Once the realization that the association was arbitrary occurred, the association was

destroyed, and the desire (and thus the motivation to achieve the goal) was also

destroyed.

        Mill realized this problem when he himself experienced the sundering of his

association of pleasure with the achievement of a utilitarian society.



        ...I had always heard it maintained by my father, and was myself

        convinced, that the object of education should be to form the strongest

        possible associations of the salutary class; associations of pleasure with

        all things beneficial to the great whole, and of pain with all things hurtful

11
        to it. All this appeared inexpugnable, but it now seemed to me on

        retrospect, that my teachers had occupied themselves but superficially

        with the means of forming and keeping up these salutary associations.

        They seemed to have trusted altogether to the old instruments praise

        and blame, reward and punishment... But there must always be

        something artificial and casual in associations thus generated: the pains

        and pleasures thus forcibly associated with things, are not connected

        with them by any natural tie.... For I now saw...that the habit of analysis

        has a tendency to wear away the feelings.44



His depression seems to have been the product of two effects, his inability to feel

pleasurable associations and his concomitant worry that this meant that the theory of

associations put utilitarianism in deep trouble. However, when he discovered that

reading poetry could arouse feelings of pleasure in him, he began to recover from his

depression, and in the process developed a solution to the problem of the

incompatibility of the feelings with the intellect.

        For Mill, reading Wordsworth caused him to share in the poet's pleasurable

feelings, and thus to understand and derive pleasure from the feelings and experiences of

others. `What made Wordsworth's poems a medicine for my state of mind, was that

they expressed, not mere outward beauty, but states of feeling, and of thought coloured

by feeling, under the excitement of beauty.'45 Mill had discovered a remedy for his lack

of feeling: he was able to experience pleasure by reading Wordsworth's expressions of

pleasure, such as Wordsworth's poetic descriptions of the joy of experiencing natural

scenery.

        Moreover, Mill thought that he could use his experience to fashion a solution to

the problem of the destructive analysis of the intellect.46 Although it is not clear exactly

how this solution is supposed to function, there is enough information in Mill's writings

12
to permit us to construct a plausible story. We have seen that, for Mill, a person can

gain access to the ideas of feeling in the poet's mind by reading the expression of those

ideas in the poet's verse. Mill's idea of how we experience the feelings of another is

complex: when we read of someone's agony in a poem we have a sort of `second

order' feeling or sense of that agony.



        It is ... obvious that the pleasure or pain with which we contemplate the

        pleasure or pain felt by somebody else, is itself a pleasure or pain of our

        own... but if it be meant that in such cases the pleasure or pain is

        consciously referred to self, I take this to be a mistake. By the acts or

        other signs exhibited by another person, the idea of pleasure (which is a

        pleasurable idea) or the idea of pain (which is a painful idea) are

        recalled, sometimes with considerable intensity, but in association with

        the other person as feeling them, not with one's self as feeling them.47



If these feelings are pleasurable feelings, the reader is able to have pleasurable feelings

when she contemplates the pleasurable feelings of the poet by reading his poetic

presentation of them. However, if the poet expressed despair, unhappiness or anxiety in

his poetry, then the reader would also experience a sense of despair, unhappiness or

anxiety, and thus experience unpleasant feelings when contemplating the expression of

the unpleasant feelings of another.48

        Thus, the insight that poetry has the power to create feelings in the reader that

are connected to the feelings of the poet can be used to recreate the motivation to

pursue the pleasure (and thus the happiness) of others. For, if we can have pleasurable

feelings by understanding the pleasure of others (through understanding the expression

of pleasurable feelings in poetry), then we have the means to develop pleasurable

associations with this experience, and so to develop pleasurable associations with the

13
pleasurable feelings of others. Likewise, by having painful feelings as the result of

understanding the pain of others, we may develop painful associations with the pain of

others. Since if a feeling of pleasure or pain is connected enough times with an action,

event or thing, we develop a pleasurable association with that thing, we can interpret

Mill's thesis as the idea that reading poetry can create associations of pleasure and pain

connected with the pleasures and pains of another person. 49

         By having pleasurable associations with the pleasure of others, an agent would

thus desire that others experience pleasure, and act so as to maximize the pleasure of

others, in order to maximize his own pleasure.50 Mill's Inaugural Address to the

University of St. Andrews provides support for this thesis:



        [poetic cultivation] brings home to us all those aspects of life which take

        hold of our nature on its unselfish side and lead us to identify our joy

        and grief with the good or ill of the system of which we form a part.51



We may thus speculate that Mill thought that through reading poetry he could foster in

himself and in others the association of regard to the feelings of other human beings, an

association that causes one to desire utilitarian ends, since these ends would bring the

maximum happiness to the maximum number of people.



        [Wordsworth's poems] seemed to be the very culture of the feelings,

        which I was in quest of. In them I seemed to draw from a source of

        inward joy, of sympathetic and imaginative pleasure, which could be

        shared in by all human beings; which had no connection with struggle or

        imperfection, but would be made richer by every improvement in the

        physical or social condition of mankind. From them I seemed to learn

        what would be the perennial sources of happiness, when all the greater

14
        evils of life had been removed. And I felt myself at once better and

        happier as I came under their influence... I needed to be made to feel

        that there was real, permanent happiness in tranquil contemplation.

        Wordsworth taught me this, not only without turning away from, but

        with a greatly increased interest in the common feelings and common

        destiny of human beings. And the delight which these poems gave me,

        proved that there was nothing to dread from the most confirmed habit

        of analysis.52,53



Our pleasurable associations with the happiness of others can motivate us to work

actively towards the promotion of happiness for others in general.54

        Mill would thus emphasize the cultivation of the internal individual through

aesthetic education as a necessary condition for personal and social improvement.



        What we desire unselfishly must first, by a mental process, become an

        actual part of what we seek as our own happiness; that the good

        [pleasure] of others becomes our pleasure because we have learnt to

        find pleasure in it: this is, we think, the true philosophical account of the

        matter.55



The development of the internal individual could be used in general as a countervailing

influence to the disruptive power of the intellect and thus as a solution to the problem of

education.



        [E]xclusive cultivation [of the intellect], while it strengthens the

        associations which connect means with ends, effects with causes, tends

        to weaken many of those upon which our enjoyments and our social

15
        feelings depend... therefore, the corrective and antagonist principle to

        the pursuits which deal with objects only in the abstract, is to be sought

        in those which deal with them altogether in the concrete, clothed in

        properties and circumstances: real life in its most varied forms, poetry

        and art in all their branches.56,57



        Since poetry could be used to stimulate and develop the positive moral

association of regard to the pleasures and pains of others, education should develop

both the intellect and the `internal individual'. Because of its unique and effective ability

to connect us intimately with the pleasures and pains of others, poetic education or

encouragement of the culture of the internal individual should be a part of the utilitarian

program.58 Mill thus endorsed a `utilitarianism which takes into account the whole of

human nature... which holds Feeling at least as valuable as Thought, and Poetry not only

on a par with, but the necessary condition of, any true and comprehensive

Philosophy'.59

          Poetry would thus help people to develop the proper moral associations

necessary for the motivation to enact a utilitarian state:



        The idea of the pain of another is naturally painful; the idea of the

        pleasure of another is naturally pleasurable. From this fact in our natural

        constitution, all our affections, both of love and aversion towards human

        beings... are held, by the best teachers of the theory of utility, to

        originate. In this, the unselfish part of our nature, lies a foundation, even

        independently of inculcation from without, for the generation of moral

        feelings.60




16
Mill's view was that much of customary morality, or the common-sense views about

morality held by those of his day, were based unobviously upon utilitarianism: utilitarian

morality is the `first principle' and customary morality, since it is derived from much the

same values as utilitarianism--maximizing happiness for all is unobviously behind many

of the ends that customary morality selects as good--can be seen as a `secondary

principle', i.e., it follows from utilitarianism. Although in many places, such as

Utilitarianism, On Liberty and The Subjection of Women,61 Mill was critical of the parts

of customary morality that were derived from selfishness, partiality and prejudice, much

of it was acceptable in that it used the same principles as utilitarianism to define morally

good acts. The unacceptable parts of customary morality resulted from the application

of a method for determining what was morally good that was imprecise and not as

impartial as it ideally should be.

        In the ideal world, we would be impartial utilitarians and discard this imperfect

(customary) system. But for now, until we have developed the capacity for impartial

sympathy that we need to have in order to become good utilitarian agents, we should

follow the imperfect method that is already in place. And here we have the possibility of

a connection with poetry and the need for poetic education: by reading poetry, we

develop and enhance our capacity for impartial sympathy, thus improving our ability to

become good utilitarian agents and motivating us to become so. This does not conflict

with our use of customary morality; rather, as we read poetry and develop our

(impartial) sympathetic sensibilities, we will be able to refine and improve the method of

customary morality (since it is based on the same ideas as utilitarianism) so as to make it

into a more perfect instrument. The better our capacity for sympathy, the better we can

evaluate different ends as morally good or bad. Eventually the method of customary

morality will improve enough to become more perfectly utilitarian in that it will

incorporate the impartial analysis needed to correctly determine the ends that result in

the greatest happiness.62

17
        When we interpret Mill to be saying that poetry has the power to develop and

foster moral associations of pleasure in the pleasure of others based on the way it can

allow us to understand the feelings of the poet, we can understand why Mill emphasized

the importance of poetry and aesthetic education in his theories, and why he thought that

his discovery of the poetry of Wordsworth and his subsequent recovery from

depression `proved that there was nothing to dread from the most confirmed habit of

analysis'. We can also see how Mill's revision of Bentham's views on associationism

and poetry could be related to Mill's development of utilitarianism, since he holds the

moral feeling of regard to the pleasures and pains of others as the fundamental and

essential sanction for the advancement of a good and just society. 63 If we may use

poetry to counteract the tendency of the intellect to destroy our motivation to pursue the

good of others and as an instrument for refining the methods of determining morally

good ends used by customary morality, our progress toward the perfect utilitarian

society is not in jeopardy.



               IV. REGARD FOR OTHERS AND FELLOW-FEELING

But how could Mill think that he had overcome the problem with analysis merely by

discovering that he could create the proper sorts of associations by reading poetry?

After all, it is the business of the intellect to destroy arbitrary associations, and it would

seem that the moral association of regard to the pleasure and pain of others that is

derived from poetry is no different. Even if the right associations could be created by the

development of the internal culture of the individual, constant maintenance of one's

motivating associations would be required in order to retain the desire to pursue

utilitarian goals. If this were the case, Mill's solution would be at best a palliative for the

problem of motivation.

        However, Mill thought that these associations were different for two (related)

reasons. First, the associations created by reading poetry are special because they result

18
from a kind of experience that the agent has of the pleasure and pain of another. We

have already seen the importance of experience for Mill: it is the key to achieving full

and complete understanding of the views of another. By entering into `the mind and

circumstances of another', an intimate connection is created between ourselves and

other human beings. Simple associations of praise and blame do not involve an

experience of the feeling of others. The associations of pleasure (pain) that are based

upon experience are forged more powerfully and thus are stronger than associations

created merely by using rewards or punishments.

        The second, related reason why such associations were different was that once

they were created in sufficient strength, they would act in concert with and be supported

by the sympathetic faculty (or fellow-feeling) which is natural to all human beings.64

Remember that sympathy involves associating the pains and pleasures of another with

analogous pains and pleasures in ourselves.`[Sympathy is not] an emotion, but... the

capacity of taking on the emotions, or mental states generally, of others.'65 It is poetry,

and not (in general), associations created using praise and blame, that allows us to

experience feelings of pleasure (pain) that are directly connected to the feelings of

pleasure (pain) of another person (the poet). The experience of feeling the emotions of

others is thus an exercise of the sympathetic sentiments. In this way, the regard we feel

for the pleasures and pains of others is bound up with our capacity to empathize with

others and our sympathy with fellow creatures. Poetry, as that which allows the

individual to experience the emotional states of others, is uniquely fitted to foster the

sentiment of sympathy, since the experience of feeling the emotions of another connects

with our sentiment of sympathy with fellow creatures. Recall the passage cited earlier:



        They [Wordsworth's poems] seemed to be the very culture of the

        feelings, which I was in quest of. In them I seemed to draw from a



19
        source of inward joy, of sympathetic and imaginative pleasure, which

        could be shared in by all human beings....66



If the sympathetic sentiments can be developed well enough, then the association of

pleasure with maximum happiness (pleasure) for all would not be dissolved.



        But moral associations which are wholly of artificial creation, when

        intellectual culture goes on, yield by degrees to the dissolving force of

        analysis: and if the feeling of duty, when associated with utility, would

        appear equally arbitrary; if there were no leading department of our

        nature, no powerful class of sentiments, with which that association [of

        regard to the pleasures and pains of others] would harmonize... if there

        were not, in short, a natural basis of sentiment for utilitarian morality-- it

        might well happen that this association also, even after it had been

        implanted by education, might be analysed away. But there is this basis of

        powerful natural sentiment; and this it is which, when once the general

        happiness is recognized as the ethical standard, will constitute the strength

        of the utilitarian morality. This firm foundation is that of the social feelings

        of mankind; the desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures, which is

        already a powerful principle in human nature....67



        Now, Mill thought that both selfishness and sympathy with others were part of

human nature.68 The natural selfishness of humans is counteracted by the education and

cultivation of the feeling of sympathy with others.69 The sentiment of sympathy, or the

desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures, is necessary and is present in every

person (unless there exist `unusual circumstances' or there is an `effort of voluntary

abstraction'). This sort of sympathy is impartial in that the agent sees herself as part of a

20
society of human beings where `the interests of all are to be consulted'.70 As societies

develop, sympathy plays an important and necessary role in this development, and thus

societies encourage it until it becomes the `second nature' of their members.71



          If it be said, that there must be the germs of all these virtues in human

          nature, otherwise mankind would be incapable of acquiring them, I am

          ready, with a certain amount of explanation, to admit the fact. But the

          weeds [of selfishness] that dispute the grounds with these beneficent

          germs [of sympathy], are themselves not germs but frankly luxuriant

          growths, and would, in all but some one case in a thousand, entirely

          stifle and destroy the former, were it not so strongly the interest of

          mankind to cherish the good germs in one another, that they always do

          so, in as far as their degree of intelligence (in this as in other regards still

          very imperfect) allows. It is through such fostering, commenced early,

          and not counteracted by unfavourable influences, that, in some happily

          circumstanced specimens of the human race, the most elevated

          sentiments of which humanity is capable become a second nature,

          stronger than the first, and not so much subduing the original nature as

          merging it into itself.72



          Mill's remarks in his Inaugural Address suggest that it is aesthetic education that

fosters the `beneficent germ' of sympathy. 73 Art provides the link between moral feelings and

sympathy with fellow creatures, since the contemplation of the 'higher pleasures' inspires us to
                             74 75
have an 'elevated character'. , For Mill, the noblest quality of poetry is `that of acting upon the

desires and characters of mankind through their emotions, to raise them towards the perfection of
              76 77
their nature'. ,




21
        There are few capable of feeling the sublimer order of natural beauty

        ...who are not, at least temporarily, raised by it above the littlenesses of

        humanity, and made to feel the puerility of the petty objects which set

        man's interests at variance, contrasted with the nobler pleasures which

        all might share....78



        Poetry connects to sympathy because poetry causes us to take on the emotions

of others.79 The feelings we have and the associations we form as the result of reading

poetry `harmonize' with our natural inclination to assoicate our pleasure with the

pleasure of others, or to `identify our feelings more and more with their good, or at

least with an ever greater degree of practical consideration for it'.80 This harmony

between the associations of regard to others and sympathy is developed by society, for

it is in the best interests of society to encourage the idea that the interests of others are

the same as the interests of the individual.81



        Now, whatever amount of this feeling [that the interests of others are his

        own interests] a person has, he is urged by the strongest motives both

        of interest and of sympathy to demonstrate it....Consequently, the

        smallest germs of the feeling are laid hold of and nourished by the

        contagion of sympathy and the influences of education; and a complete

        web of corroborative association is woven around it, by the powerful

        agency of the external sanctions. This mode of conceiving ourselves and

        human life, as civilization goes on, is felt to be more and more natural.

        Every step in political improvement renders it more so....82



        The connection between the associations of regard to others and society's need

to encourage fellow-feeling provides the key to the problem of the intellect. `[T]he

22
delight which these poems gave me, proved that there was nothing to dread from the

most confirmed habit of analysis.'83 Since sympathy is firmly entrenched as a necessary

condition for a healthy society, the associations of regard for others (which Mill thought

could be developed or stimulated through poetry) can be strengthened and held fast by

the society as well.



        Not only does all strengthening of social ties, and all healthy growth of

        society, give to each individual a stronger personal interest in practically

        consulting the welfare of others; it also leads him to identify his feelings

        more and more with their good... He comes, as though instinctively, to be

        conscious of himself as a being who of course pays regard to others. The

        good of others becomes to him a thing naturally and necessarily to be

        attended to, like any of the physical conditions of our existence.84



        Not only does the association of regard to others harmonize with the natural

sentiment of sympathy, but the development of the society of which the individual is a

part encourages the association to become as though it were a necessary condition of

existence. If a positive association with the good of others seems like a necessary part

of one's existence, as necessary as eating when hungry or sleeping when tired, then it

will not be seen as an arbitrary association. Instead, as a fundamental part of human

existence, it will be seen as a natural need which we associate pleasure with when

fulfilled, much as we associate pleasure with a good night's sleep or a rest after hard

physical exercise. The harmony between the natural sentiment of sympathy and the

association of regard to the pleasure (or the good) and pain of others causes the

associations to be regarded by the intellect as though they were physical associations.

This provides the answer to our problem with the intellect, for the physical associations

are among the small class of associations which are immune from its dissolving force.85

23
If an association seems necessary and natural, it will not be attacked as arbitrary when

examined by the analytic mind.



        The deeply-rooted conception which every individual even now has of

        himself as a social being, tends to make him feel it one of his natural

        wants that there should be harmony between his feelings and aims and

        those of his fellow creatures. If differences of opinion and of mental

        culture make it impossible for him to share many of their actual

        feelings... he still needs to be conscious that his real aim and theirs do

        not conflict... This feeling in most individuals is much inferior in strength

        to their selfish feelings, and is often wanting altogether. But to those who

        have it, it possesses all the characters of a natural feeling. It does not

        present itself to their minds as a superstition of education, or a law

        despotically by the power of society, but as an attribute which it would

        not be well for them to be without. This conviction is the ultimate

        sanction of the greatest-happiness morality. 86



In this way, the associations created by poetry are strengthened by the support of the

human capacity for sympathy to the point where they are insoluble even by the potent

force of a well-educated intellect.

If Mill did adopt the theory which I have attributed to him, he was able to fashion a thesis that

could make his psychological theory of associations consistent with his utilitarian program. The

apparent tension between Mill's utilitarian goals and his views on associationist psychology that

jeopardizes the motivation that agents have to pursue utilitarian ends can be resolved by

recognizing the role of aesthetic education in fostering motivation. Mill's personal crisis and his

larger philosophical worries about the feasibility and consistency of the utilitarian theory are

resolvable by developing an approach where aesthetic education, the interests of society, and

24
the natural capacity for sympathy effectively act to inhibit the dissolving force of the intellect with

respect to the associations of regard to the pleasure and pain of others. These associations

could then motivate agents to pursue utilitarian ends. With the extermination of the debilitating

threat posed by the `perpetual worm at the root of the passions', Mill could consistently

promote his utilitarian ideals.87



1
    William Wordsworth, `Intimations of Immortality', in William Wordsworth: A Lakeland Anthology ed.

Piers Browne, John Murray, p. 51.

2
    J. S. Mill, Autobiography (hereafter as Autobiography), in Autobiography and Literary Essays, ed. John

M. Robson and Jack Stillenger, Toronto, 1981, Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (hereafter as CW) , i.

149-153.

3
    Autobiography, i. 141.

4
 `I felt that the flaw in my life, must be a flaw in life itself; that the question was, whether, if the reformers of

society and government could succeed in their objects, and every person in the community were free and in

a state of physical comfort, the pleasures of life, being no longer kept up by struggle and privation, would

cease to be pleasures. And I felt that unless I could see my way to some better hope for human happiness in

general, my dejection must continue...' (Autobiography, i. 149). Elizabeth S. Anderson, has argued that from

Mill's perspective, his experience (`experiment in living') served to disconfirm Bentham's psychology.

[Elizabeth S. Anderson, 'John Stuart Mill and Experiments in Living', The Philosophers Annual,14 (1991), pp.

1-23.]

5
 I will use `poetic' and `aesthetic' interchangeably in this paper; what Mill called `poetry' was not restricted

to poems or poetry per se. (See below.)

6
 Mill's views on poetry have not received enough attention from philosophers. Extant works include F.

Parvin Sharpless, The Literary Criticism of John Stuart Mill, The Hague, 1967, and a discussion in the

University of Toronto Quarterly starting with John M. Robson, 'J. S. Mill's Theory of Poetry', University of

Toronto Quarterly, 29 (1960), pp. 420-438, and continuing with Edward Alexander, `Mill's Theory of Culture:



25
The Wedding of Literature and Democracy', University of Toronto Quarterly , 35 (1965), pp. 75-88 and

Michele Green, 'Sympathy and the Social Value of Poetry: J. S. Mill's Literary Essays', University of Toronto

Quarterly, 60 (1991), pp. 452-468. Also see Daniel Burnstone, `The Very Culture of the Feelings: Poetry and

Poets in Mill's Moral Philosophy', Utilitas, 4 (1992), pp. 81-104.

7
 Candace Vogler, 'Means, Ends and Mill', unpublished manuscript, 1994, also presents this problem.

8
 James Mill, Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, 2 vols., edited with additional notes by John

Stuart Mill, Longmans Green, 1869, ii. 219-220. [Italics added]

9
 James Mill, ii. 220

10
    And again: `The affection which exists among Brothers and Sisters, has in it most of the ingredients which

go to the formation of friendship. There is first of all Companionship; the habit of enjoying pleasures, in

common, and also of suffering pains; hence a great readiness in sympathizing with one another; that is, in

associating trains of their own pains and pleasures, with the pains and pleasures of one another' (James

Mill, ii. 225).

11
    James Mill, ii. 218n.

12
    Sympathy should not be confused with sociability. Sociability involves the fondness of the company of

others (which may involve companionship), whereas sympathy involves the ability to have an intimate,

empathetic connection with others by `taking on' or experiencing in some form the feelings of others. A

sociable nature may increase one's capacity for sympathy.

13
    Mill does not explicitly give a definition of sympathy here, but his use of the word in his writings seems to

rely upon the definition that was accepted by both his father and Alexander Bain. In Mill's writing upon

Bain [J. S. Mill, Bain's Psychology (hereafter Bain's Psychology), in Essays on Philosophy and the Classics,

ed. John M. Robson, CW, Toronto, 1981] and editing of his father's book (James Mill, Analysis of the

Phenomena of the Human Mind), he is very outspoken when he disagrees, either in footnotes or (in the

treatise on Bain), in the text itself. Since nowhere does Mill contradict this notion of sympathy and indeed

seems to accept it without question, I think it is reasonable to accept the definition given by James Mill as

John Stuart's also. The definition of sympathy as involving taking on the pains and pleasures of another is


26
clearly laid out in James Mill, and J.S. Mill writes about this characterization of sympathy approvingly in the

treatise on Bain. (Bain's Psychology, xi. 362-3) Further, in a footnote in James Mill, J.S. Mill indirectly

endorses the definition of sympathy:



       `By virtue of the same law of association it is pointed out in the present chapter that human

       actions, both our own and those of other people... tend naturally to become inclosed in a web

       of associated ideas of pleasures or of pains at a very early period of life, in such sort that the

       ideas of acts beneficial to ourselves and to others become pleasurable in themselves, and the

       ideas of acts hurtful to ourselves and to others become painful in themselves... Mr. Bain, in the

       preceding note, makes in this theory [of disinterested feelings of moral approbation and

       disapprobation] a correction, to which the author himself [James Mill] would probably not

       have objected, namely, that the mere idea of a pain or pleasure, by whomsoever felt, is

       intrinsically painful or pleasurable, and when raised in the mind with intensity is capable of

       becoming a stimulus to action, independent, not merely of expected consequences to

       ourselves, but of any reference whatever to Self; so that care for others is, in an admissible

       sense, as much an ultimate fact of nature, as care for ourselves; though one which greatly

       needs strengthening by the concurrent force of the manifold associations insisted on in the

       author's text. Though this of Mr. Bain is rather an account of disinterested Sympathy...'

       (James Mill, ii. 308-309).



14
  J. S. Mill, 'What is Poetry' (hereafter `What is Poetry'), part I of Thoughts on Poetry and Its Varieties, in

Autobiography and Literary Essays, ed. John M. Robson and Jack Stillenger, Toronto, 1981, CW, i. 352.

15
  `What is Poetry', i. 354n.

16
  This was part of the actual text of the article when originally published, and changed to a footnote when

the essay was revised for republication.




27
17
  Except, as Mill indicates, those that involve oratory or narrative. Unless otherwise specified, when I use

the term `poetry' or poet, etc., I will be using it in the wide, i.e., Millian, sense.

18
  `What is Poetry', i. 344, i. 347.

19
  J. S. Mill, 'The Two Kinds of Poetry' (hereafter as `The Two Kinds of Poetry'), part II of Thoughts on

Poetry and Its Varieties, in Autobiography and Literary Essays, ed. John M. Robson and Jack Stillenger,

Toronto, 1981, CW, i. 362.

20
  `The Two Kinds of Poetry', i. 365.

21
  `The Two Kinds of Poetry', i. 361.

22
  `What is Poetry', i. 353-4n.

23
  `What is Poetry', i. 349.

24
  `What is Poetry', i. 353-4n.

25
  Given that the poet and the reader have enough similarity in character and mind, i.e., they must think about

things in somewhat the same way. Vogler has a nice discussion of this point.

26
  Robson, pp. 424-6.

27
  IBID., p. 433.

28
  J. S. Mill, Sedgwick's Discourse (hereafter Sedgwick's Discourse), in Essays on Ethics, Religion and

Society, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto, CW, 1963, x. 60.

29
  `What is Poetry', i. 354n.

30
  `The Two Kinds of Poetry', i. 361.

31
  J. S. Mill, On Liberty (hereafter as On Liberty), Essays on Politics and Society, ed. John M. Robson,

Toronto, 1977, CW, xviii. 249-250, xviii. 262).

32
  J. S. Mill, `Letter to Gustave d'Eichthal', in The Earlier Letters, ed. Francis E. Mineka, 2 vols., CW, Toronto,

1963, xii. 42.

33
  `What is Poetry', i. 348.

34
  James Mill, ii. 218n.




28
35
  Green argues that Mill thinks that conceptive genius, the kind of genius that is necessary to understand

any work of art, depends on the ability to mentally create the `structure' of the mind of another. (p. 459.)

36
  J. S. Mill, Bentham (hereafter Bentham) in Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, ed. John M. Robson,

Toronto, 1963, CW, x. 92.

37
  J. B. Schneewind (ed.), Mill's Essays on Literature and Society , New York, 1965, argues for this thesis in

his introduction, and further that `Through the power of poetry, [Mill] thought, we can work to overcome

our natural one-sidedness and to reach that understanding of a wide variety of men and institutions which

is essential to a sound social science. From that basis we may be able to move ahead to plan for the

reconstruction of a stable society.' (p. 19)

38
  Additional support for this hypothesis comes from Mill's notes for a speech he gave for the London

Debating Society: `There is no depth, no intensity, no force, in our descriptions of feelings, unless we have

ourselves experienced the feelings we describe....' [J. S. Mill, Wordsworth and Byron (hereafter Wordsworth

and Byron), Journals and Debating Speeches, ed. John M. Robson, 2 vols., CW, Toronto, 1988, xxvi. 438]

39
  Bentham, x. 92.

40
  Autobiography, i. 141.

41
  IBID.

42
  For Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, the utilitarian state would be made up of such individuals; James Mill

had educated Mill accordingly, so as to be the perfect utilitarian agent. `[My father] endeavored to give,

according to his own conception, the highest order of intellectual education.' (Autobiography, i. 7)

43
  Autobiography, i. 143.

44
  IBID., i. 115.

45
  IBID., i. 151.

46
  Anderson, p. 14, argues that Mill's crisis led him to adopt the hypothesis that `a lasting attachment to

objects of pleasure (besides physical ones) depends on viewing them as intrinsically valuable'. Although

Anderson may be correct, this paper presents an alternative explanation of the role of the aesthetic in Mill's

program and of the way poetry fostered Mill's recovery. If my argument is correct, then Mill need not be


29
seen as adopting a view of the intrinsic worth of ends that conflicts with the utilitarian rejection of

nonhedonic (pleasure-independent) values.

47
  James Mill, ii. 218n.

48
  Yet we may still take pleasure in reading a poem which expresses painful feelings. To resolve this

(apparent) paradox, we need to make a distinction between the feelings that are `called up' by the poem, and

the feelings we feel as the result of experiencing art in general. I suggest that we may have feelings of

pleasure when we read a good poem if we enjoy experiencing something of aesthetic value. This does not

conflict with the experience of being inspired to feel the second-order pain (pleasure) of the poet through

the poet's expression of these emotions in her verses.

49
  Robson argues that poetry played an essential role in Mill's revision of Benthamism. Robson thinks that

for Mill, the poet `presents a scene and characters so representative of valid human feelings as to be a moral

lesson to all who hear him. He teaches men to share the feelings of others' (p. 434). Robson also argues that

the function of the poet is to show people how to develop empathy, based upon his contention that for Mill,

the poet is moralist who portrays other-regarding affections (those who portray selfish and immoral feelings

are not true poets.) Robson's main thesis is that Mill's conception of the poet is the moralist-poet, and that

`the ethical claim of the poet [is] apparent: he presents scenes and characters which play upon the feelings

of the readers in such a way as to pattern out for them a standard of beautiful conduct.' (p. 434) His

interpretation is supported by passages in Wordsworth and Byron, xxvi. 441.

50
  In addition to directly supporting utilitarian ends, Mill's new thesis taught him that happiness is a by-

product of a search for some other goal, i.e., the happiness of others, the improvement of mankind, or

perhaps the perfection of some quality or art (Autobiography, i. 145-147).

51
  J. S. Mill, Inaugural Address (hereafter as Inaugural Address), in Essays on Equality, Law and Education,

ed. John M. Robson, CW, Toronto, 1984, xxi. 254.

52
  Autobiography, i. 151-2.

53
  Also: `I have learned from Wordsworth that it is possible ... to connect cheerful and joyous states of mind

with almost every object, to make every thing speak to us of our own enjoyments or those of other sentient


30
beings, and to multiply ourselves as it were in the enjoyments of other creatures....' (Wordsworth and

Byron, xxvi. 441)

54
  For Mill, to have motivation towards a goal, an individual must have some sort of reason or personal

experience that inspires real and heartfelt conviction (On Liberty, xviii. 258, xviii. 261). The experience

necessary to feel motivated to maximize happiness for all people is provided by the experience of

understanding the emotions of another. This idea is consistent with Mill's ideas about the role of

experience in understanding truth and meaning (On Liberty, xviii. 247-250, xviii. 258, xviii. 261).

55
  J. S. Mill, Whewell on Moral Philosophy, in Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, ed. John M. Robson,

Toronto, CW, 1963, x. 184n.

56
  Sedgwick's Discourse, x. 39

57
  Further, `[t]he habit of analysis has really this tendency [to wear away the feelings] when no other mental

habit is cultivated...' (Autobiography, i. 115).

58
  Alexander argues that `Mill's definition of poetry's moral function as its power of arousing imaginative

sympathy is the link between his theory of literature and his idea of a democratic culture. By widening the

sympathies of men and extending them to more objects, poetry re-enforces the peculiar power of democratic

society; by elevating the sympathies of men, poetry brings to democratic society precisely those aristocratic

qualities which it lacks.' (p. 87)

59
  J. S. Mill, `Letter to Edward Lytton Bulwer', in The Earlier Letters, ed. Francis E. Mineka, 2 vols., CW,

Toronto, 1963, xii. 312.

60
  Sedgwick's Discourse, x. 60.

61
     J. S. Mill, The Subjection of Women, in Essays on Equality, Law and Education, ed. John M. Robson,

CW, Toronto, 1984.

62
  A related topic involves the cultivation of the will. In J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism (hereafter as Utilitarianism), in

Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto, 1963, CW, x. 238-9, Mill discusses a

distinction between the will to be virtuous and the desire to be virtuous. As Mill sees it, we desire

something if it brings us pleasure. However, the truly virtuous agent (as common opinion would have it)


31
does not act virtuously because of the pleasure she receives by doing so: in fact, many times the pain a

virtuous agent receives will far outweigh the pleasure. Mill grants this, explaining that often agents will

things as a matter habit since the will can be cultivated to cause people to act so as to fulfill a general

intention (i.e., the intention to be virtuous) even when to do so means that they experience pain instead of

pleasure. `The distinction between will and desire thus understood, is an authentic and highly important

psychological fact; but the fact consists solely in this--that will, like all other parts of our constitution, is

amenable to habit, and that we may will from habit what we no longer desire for itself, or desire only because

we will it.' (Utilitarianism, x. 238)



For this reason (and because the trained will provides a useful constancy of habit), the will should be

cultivated so as to encourage virtuous behavior. People are to be trained to desire morally good ends by

associating them with pleasure, which will then cultivate the will ad thus the force of habit to encourage the

selection of morally good over bad ends. Here again we see a possible role for poetic education, since the

cultivation of the sympathetic sentiments via poetry could help to cultivate the agent's will to achieve ends

that benefit humankind by strengthening or implanting pleasurable associations with the pleasure of other

people. (Poetic education is certainly not inconsistent with the need for the cultivation of the will.) `It is by

associating the doing right with pleasure, or the doing wrong with pain, or by eliciting and impressing and

bringing home to the person's experience the pleasure naturally involved in the one or the pain in the other,

that it is possible to call forth that will to be virtuous, which, when confirmed, acts without any thought of

either pleasure or pain.' (Utilitarianism x. 239)

63
  Utilitarianism, x. 230-1.

64
  Robson also makes this connection between poetry and sympathy. However, he does not argue

extensively for the point. Although I agree with his assertion, I have attempted to develop it in more detail

and to provide a clear assessment of the need for such a thesis in Mill's utilitarianism.

65
  Bain's Psychology, xi. 162-3.

66
  Autobiography, i. 151.


32
67
  Utilitarianism, x. 230-231.

68
  J. S. Mill, Nature (hereafter Nature), in Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, ed. John M. Robson,

Toronto, CW, 1963, x. 394.

69
  Nature, x. 394-6, Utilitarianism, x. 231.

70
  Utilitarianism, x. 231.

71
  IBID., x. 231-2.

72
  Nature, x. 396.

73
  Anderson makes this point as well: `Mill thought it essential that a person's moral training appeal to

sentiments cultivated by aesthetic and not just scientific training... Aesthetic education provides this

connection [between moral associations and the social sentiment of unity with fellow creatures], linking the

moral sentiments with the sympathetic elements through the aesthetic ones... Thus, aesthetic education

inspires the feeling of unity with mankind which Mill thought necessary to support a utilitarian morality.' (p.

15n)

74
  Inaugural Address, xxi. 255

75
  Fred R. Berger, Happiness, Justice and Freedom: The Moral and Political Philosophy of John Stuart Mill,

California, 1984, also argues that Mill thought that `the idea of others experiencing pleasure through acts of

our own can be itself pleasurable and be the cause of other acts.' Further, Berger discusses the link to

sympathy via the associations we have with respect to the pleasures and pains of others. However, Berger

does not develop the connection between poetry and these associations. `[Mill's] idea seems to